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1IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
-vs-
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, 
AKA: EDGAR CANTU, 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Supreme Court No. 45547-2017 
Appeal from the Third Judicial District, Canyon County, Idaho. 
HONORABLE DAVIS F. V ANDERVELDE, Presiding 
Eric Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender, 
322 East Front Street, Suite 570, Boise, Idaho 83702 
Attorney for Appellant 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Statehouse, Boise, Idaho 83720 
Attorney for Respondent 
2State ofldaho 
vs. 
Raul E Herrera 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Location: 
Judicial Officer: 
Filed on: 
Appear by: 
Case Number History: 
Canyon County District Court 
VanderVelde, Davis 
12/04/2014 
01/09/2015 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
§ 
Appellate Case Number: 43975-2016 
45547-2017 
Previous Case Number: CR-2014-26736-C 
CASE INFORMATION 
Offense Statute Deg Date 
Jurisdiction: Nampa City Police Department 
1. Murder! 118-4001-1 FEL 11/08/2014 
TCN: 1400105983 
2. Robbery 118-6501 FEL 11/08/2014 
TCN: 1400105983 
3. Burglary 118-1401 FEL 11/08/2014 
TCN: 1400105983 
4. Kidnapping-Second Degree 118-4501-11 FEL 11/08/2014 
TCN: 1400105983 
5. Battery-Aggravated 118-907 FEL 11/08/2014 
TCN: 1400105983 
Statistical Closures 
09/19/2017 Closed 
Warrants 
Arrest Warrant - Herrera, Raul E (Judicial Officer: Huskey, Molly J.) 
12/18/2014 Warrant Returned Served 
12/17/2014 Outstanding Arrest Warrant 
Fine: $0 
Bond: $0 
Bonds 
Transcript Bond #CR-2014-26736 $334.00 
7/30/2015 Converted 
6/30/2015 Posted 
Counts: I 
DATE 
State 
Defendant 
Current Case Assignment 
Case Number 
Court 
Date Assigned 
Judicial Officer 
State of Idaho 
Herrera, Raul E 
CASE ASSIGNMENT 
CR-2014-26736 
Canyon County District Court 
01/05/2016 
VanderVelde, Davis 
PARTY INFORMATION 
, Victim Crime Victims Compensation Program 
Ghostwolf, Ronald James 
PAGE 1 OF 30 
Case Type: Criminal 
Lead Attorneys 
Canyon County Prosecutor 
208-454-739l(W) 
Stringfield, Kenneth Frederick 
Retained 
208-459-6879(W) 
Printed on 12/18/2017 at 9:43 AM 
3DATE 
12/04/2014 
12/04/2014 
12/04/2014 
12/04/2014 
12/04/2014 
12/04/2014 
12/04/2014 
12/04/2014 
12/04/2014 
12/04/2014 
12/04/2014 
12/04/2014 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT 
I'! Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: Mag 7; 
HEARING TYPE: Arraignment (In Custody); 
MINUTES CLERK: L. Pearson; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
START TIME: 12/04/20141:33PM 
STOP TIME: 12/04/2014 1:44PM 
ENTRY BY: PEARSON; 
LAST UPDATE BY: PEARSON; 
New Case Filed - Felony 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
New Case Filed-Felony 
Affidavit of Probable Cause 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Affidavit Of Probable Cause 
Criminal Complaint 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Criminal Complaint 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 12/04/2014 01:32 PM) 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Request to Obtain Approval to Video Record, Broadcast or Photograph a Court Proceedings-
Share photos with all other media, meet with Balifffor set up in advance of hearing 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result/or Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 12/04/2014 01:32 PM: Hearing 
Held 
Arraignment 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result/or Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 12/04/2014 01:32 PM: 
Arraignment I First Appearance 
Constitutional Rights W aming 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 12/04/20 I 4 OJ: 32 PM: 
Constitutional Rights Warning 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result/or Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 12/04/2014 01:32 PM· Order 
Appointing Public Defender 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 12/04/2014 01: 32 PM· 
Commitment On Bond -No Bond 
Hearing Scheduled 
PAGE20F 30 
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412/04/2014 
12/08/2014 
12/10/2014 
12/17/2014 
12/17/2014 
12/17/2014 
12/17/2014 
12/17/2014 
12/18/2014 
12/18/2014 
12/18/2014 
12/18/2014 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE NO. CR-2014-26736 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Preliminary Hearing 12/18/2014 08: 30 AM) Mo Bond Redu 
Arraignment (In Custody) (1:32 PM) (Judicial Officer: Frates. Gregory F.) 
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 12/04/2014 01:32 PM· Hearing 
Held 
Notice 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice of Substitution of Counsel for the Defendant/Bujak 
Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Defendant's Request For Discovery 
Indictment 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
SUPERCEDJNG Indictment 
Hearing Vacated 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 12/1812014 08:30 AM: Hearing Vacated 
MoBondRedu 
W arrant/Det Order Issued - Arrest 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Warrant Issued -Arrest Bond amount: .00 NO BOND Defendant: Herrera, Raul E 
Case Sealed 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Case Sealed 
Status Changed 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Case Status Changed: Inactive 
II Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: Mag7; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: John Bujak; 
HEARING TYPE: Arraignment (In Custody); 
MJNUTES CLERK: K. Fullerton; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
STARTT/ME: 12/18/20141:38PM 
STOP TIME: 12/18/2014 1:39PM 
ENTRY BY: FUUERTON; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FULLERTON; 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Arraignment (In Custody) 12/18/2014 01:30 PM) 
Warrant Returned - Served 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Wa"ant Returned Defendant: Herrera, Raul E 
Case Un-sealed 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Case Un-sealed 
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512/18/2014 
12/18/2014 
12/18/2014 
12/18/2014 
12/18/2014 
12/18/2014 
12/18/2014 
12/18/2014 
12/18/2014 
12/18/2014 
12/18/2014 
12/18/2014 
12/22/2014 
12/22/2014 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Status Changed 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Case Status Changed: Pending 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Request To Obtain Approval To Video Record, Broadcast Or Photograph A Court 
Proceeding/DENIED 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result/or Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 12/18/2014 01:30 PM: Hearing 
Held 
Arraignment 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 12/18/2014 OJ :30 PM: 
Arraignment I First Appearance 
Constitutional Rights Warning 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 12/18/2014 01: 30 PM: 
Constitutional Rights Warning 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result/or Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 12/18/2014 01:30 PM: 
Commitment On Bond- NO BOND 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Arrn. - District Court 01/09/2015 09:00 AM) Motion Bond Reduction 
Motion 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Ex Parte Motion For Disclosure O/Wire Intercepts 
Order 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Ex Parte Order For Disclosure Of Wire Intercepts 
Motion 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Motion For Grand Jury Transcript 
CANCELED Preliminary Hearing (8:30 AM) (Judicial Officer: Frates, Gregory F.) 
Vacated 
Mo Bond Redu Hearing result for Preliminary Hearing scheduled on 12/18/2014 08:30 AM: 
Hearing Vacated 
Arraignment (In Custody) (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Frates, Gregory F.) 
Hearing result/or Arraignment (In Custody) scheduled on 12/18/2014 01:30 PM: Hearing 
Held 
Order 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order for Grand Jury Transcript 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
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612/30/2014 
12/31/2014 
12/31/2014 
12/31/2014 
01/07/2015 
01/09/2015 
01/09/2015 
01/09/2015 
01/09/2015 
01/09/2015 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Estimated Cost of Transcript 
Motion to Dismiss 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or Compel Discovery 
Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Request For Discovery 
Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA 's Response And Objection To Request For Discovery 
Demand for Notice of Defense of Alibi 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Demand For Notice Of Defense Of Alibi 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA 's First Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
11 Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT 5; 
COURT REPORTER: Debra Kreidl.er; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: John Bujak; 
HEARING TYPE: Arm. - District Court; 
MINUTES CLERK: C. Robinson; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
STARTT/ME: 0I/09/2015 0:52AM 
STOP TIME: 0I/09/2015 0:59AM 
ENTRY BY: ROBINSONC; 
LAST UPDATE BY: ROBINSONC; 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for A"n. - District Court scheduled on 0 I 109/2015 09:04 AM: Hearing Held 
Motion Bond Reduction 
HUSKEY 
PT: MARCH 2@1:30 
JT: APRIL 14-24@9:00 w/HUSKEY 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 01/09/2015 09:04 AM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Debra Kreidl.er 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
Arraignment 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 01/09/2015 09:04 AM: Arraignment I 
First Appearance Motion Bond Reduction 
HUSKEY 
PT: MARCH 2@1: 30 
JT: APRIL 14-24@9:00 w/HUSKEY 
Appear & Plead Not Guilty 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PAGES OF 30 Printed on 12/18/2017 at 9:43 AM 
701/09/2015 
01/09/2015 
01/09/2015 
01/09/2015 
01/09/2015 
01/09/2015 
01/09/2015 
01/09/2015 
01/09/2015 
01/12/2015 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 01/09/2015 09:04 AM: Appear & Plead 
Not Guilty Motion Bond Reduction 
HUSKEY 
PT: MARCH 2@1 :30 
JI': APRIL 14-24@9:00w/HUSKEY 
Notice 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 01/09/2015 09:04 AM: Notice Motion 
Bond Reduction 
HUSKEY 
PT: MARCH 2@1 :30 
JT: APRIL 14-24@9:00w/HUSKEY 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 03/02/2015 01:30 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 04/14/2015 09:00 AM) stnw 
Arraignment- District Court (9:04 AM) (Judicial Officer: Carey, George D.) 
Motion Bond Reduction 
HUSKEY 
PT: MARCH 2@1:30 
JI': APRIL 14-24@9:00 w/HUSKEY Hearing result for Arrn. - District Court scheduled on 
01/09/2015 09:04 AM: Hearing Held 
Plea 
I. Murder I 
Not Guilty 
TCN: 1400105983 
Plea 
2. Robbery 
Not Guilty 
TCN: 1400105983 
Plea 
3. Burglary 
Not Guilty 
TCN: 1400105983 
Plea 
4. Kidnapping-Second Degree 
Not Guilty 
TCN: 1400105983 : 
Plea 
5. Battery-Aggravated 
Not Guilty 
TCN: 1400105983 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA 's Second Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
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801/14/2015 
01/14/2015 
01/14/2015 
01/16/2015 
01/23/2015 
01/23/2015 
01/23/2015 
01/26/2015 
01/30/2015 
02/06/2015 
02/20/2015 
02/27/2015 
03/02/2015 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Motion 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Defendant's Motion/or Return of Property 
Notice of Hearing 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 01/26/2015 09:00 AM) Return of Property 
Objection 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Objection to Motion for Return of Property 
Notice 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice Withdrawing Motion/or Return of Property and Vacating Hearing 
Hearing Vacated 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 01/26/2015 09:00 AM· Hearing Vacated 
Return of Property 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA Third Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
CANCELED Motion Hearing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Huskey, Molly J.) 
Vacated 
Return of Property Hearing result/or Motion Hearing scheduled on 01/26/2015 09:00 AM: 
Hearing Vacated 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Pa's Fourth Supplemental Response to Request/or Discovery 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA Fifth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA Sixth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 03102/2015 10: 15 AM) *reset for earlier time per Def counsel 
request; no objt from PA 
11 Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT 2; 
COURT REPORTER: Laura Whiting; 
DEFENSEA1TORNE~kMB~ak; 
HEARING TYPE: Pre Trial; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
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903/02/2015 
03/02/2015 
03/02/2015 
03/02/2015 
03/02/2015 
03/09/2015 
03/10/2015 
03/10/2015 
03/16/2015 
03/16/2015 
03/16/2015 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
START TIME: 03/02/2015 0:24AM 
STOP TIME: 03/02/2015 0:34AM 
ENTRY BY· FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY· FENNELL; 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 03/02/2015 10: 15 AM: Hearing Held *reset for 
earlier time per Def counsel request; no objt from PA 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 03/02/2015 10: 15 AM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
Hearing Vacated 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 04/14/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated stnw 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 03/16/2015 02:30 PM) 
Pre Trial (10:15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Huskey, Molly J.) 
*reset for earlier time per Def counsel request; no objt from PA Hearing result for Pre Trial 
scheduled on 03/02/2015 10: 15 AM: Hearing Held 
Order 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order Re: Jail Visits 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA Seventh Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Notice 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice of Intent 
Ii} Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT 2; 
COURT REPORTER: Laura Whiting; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: John Bujak; 
HEARING TYPE: Conference - Status; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
START TIME: 03/16/2015 2:18PM 
STOP TIME: 03/16/2015 2:30PM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 03/16/2015 02:30 PM· Hearing Held 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PAGE SOP 30 Printed on 12/18/2017 at 9:43 AM 
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03/16/2015 
03/16/2015 
03/16/2015 
03/16/2015 
03/16/2015 
03/17/2015 
04/09/2015 
04/14/2015 
04/17/2015 
04/22/2015 
04/22/2015 
04/23/2015 
05/01/2015 
05/12/2015 
05/15/2015 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Hearing result for Conference -Status scheduled on 03/16/2015 02:30 PM· District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than JOO pages 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference -Status 05/19/2015 08:15 AM) 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 06/08/2015 01:30 PM) 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/07/2015 09:00 AM) STNW 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 07/13/2015 09:00 AM) STNW 
Status Conference (2:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Huskey, Molly J.) 
Hearing result for Conference- Status scheduled on 03/16/2015 02:30 PM: Hearing Held 
Notice of Hearing 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice Of Hearing 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA 's Eighth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Huskey, Molly J.) 
04/15/2015-04/24/2015 
stnw Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 04/14/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA Ninth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 05/18/2015 09:00 AM) 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Amended Notice of Hearing 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA Tenth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA 's Eleventh Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA Twelfth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Miscellaneous 
PAGE90F 30 Printed on 12/18/2017 at 9:43 AM 
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05/18/2015 
05/18/2015 
05/18/2015 
05/18/2015 
05/18/2015 
05/20/2015 
05/20/2015 
05/20/2015 
05/21/2015 
05/28/2015 
06/01/2015 
06/03/2015 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Disclosure of Expert Witness Purusant To !C.R. 16(b)(7) and IRE 702,703,705 
ii) Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT 2; 
COURT REPORTER: Laura Whiting; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: John Bujak; 
HEARING TYPE: Pre Trial; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
START TIME: 05/18/2015 8:53AM 
STOP TIME: 05/18/2015 9:01AM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA 's 13th Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 05/18/2015 09:00 AM· Hearing Held 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result/or Conference -Status scheduled on 05/18/2015 09:00AM· District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting 
Number a/Transcript Pages/or this hearing estimated: less than JOO pages 
Status Conference (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Huskey, Molly J.) 
Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 05/18/2015 09:00 AM· Hearing Held 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA 's 14th Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Mediation -DC 06/18/2015 01:30 PM) 
Order 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Mediation Order 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Second Disclosure of Expert Witness Pursuant to I C.R. 16(b)(7) and IRE 702, 703, 705 
Notice 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice of Intent Rule 404(b}, IR.E. Evidence 
Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Defendant's Response to Request For Discovery and Notice of Intent to Present Alibi Defense 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
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06/05/2015 
06/05/2015 
06/05/2015 
06/08/2015 
06/08/2015 
06/08/2015 
06/08/2015 
06/08/2015 
06/08/2015 
06/15/2015 
06/16/2015 
06/18/2015 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Witness List 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA Fifteenth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Notice 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Response to Notice of Alibi 
Stipulation 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Stipulation to Enlarge Time for Hearing Pre-Trial Motions 
II Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: OCRT 2; 
COURT REPORTER: Laura Whiting; 
DEFENSE A1TORNEY: John Bujak; 
HEARING TYPE: Pre Trial; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
START TIME: 06/08/2015 3:20PM 
STOP TIME: 06/08/2015 3:23PM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 06/08/2015 01:30 PM: Hearing Held 
Continued 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 06/08/2015 01:30 PM· Continued 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 06/08/2015 01:30 PM· District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated· less than 100 pages 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Pre Trial 06/24/2015 08: 15 AM) 
Pre Trial (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Huskey, Molly J.) 
Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 06/08/2015 OJ :30 PM: Hearing Held 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA Sixteenth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA Seventeenth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Mediation -DC scheduled on 06/18/2015 01:30 PM: Hearing Held 
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06/18/2015 
06/24/2015 
06/24/2015 
06/24/2015 
06/24/2015 
06/24/2015 
06/24/2015 
06/24/2015 
06/25/2015 
06/25/2015 
06/25/2015 
06/29/2015 
06/29/2015 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Mediation (1:30 PM) (Judicial Officer: Culet, Gregory M.) 
Hearing result for Mediation -DC scheduled on 06/18/2015 01:30 PM: Hearing Held 
I) Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT 4; 
COURT REPORTER: Laura Whiting; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: John Bujak; 
HEARING TYPE: Pre Trial; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
START TIME: 06/24/2015 8:13AM 
STOP TIME: 06/24/2015 8:31AM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY· FENNELL; 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 06/24/2015 08: 15 AM- Hearing Held 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 06/24/2015 08: 15 AM· District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Special Setting 07/02/2015 01:00 PM) 404(b) Motion 
Pre-draw jury 
Motion 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Defendant's Motion To Suppress Statements Made To Det Peck 
Notice of Hearing 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice Of Hearing 
Pre Trial (8:15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Huskey, Molly J.) 
Hearing result for Pre Trial scheduled on 06/24/2015 08: 15 AM- Hearing Held 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Motion to Transport Witness 
Order to Transport 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order to Transport Witness (no hearing set) 
Memorandum 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Memorandum in Support of Admission of 404(b), LR.E. Evidence 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Defendant's Request for Jury Instructions 
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06/29/2015 
06/29/2015 
06/29/2015 
06/29/2015 
06/29/2015 
06/30/2015 
06/30/2015 
07/01/2015 
07/01/2015 
07/01/2015 
07/02/2015 
07/02/2015 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Defendant's Witness List 
Motion 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Defendants Motion in Limine re: 404(b) Evidence 
Memorandum 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendant's Motion in Limine re: 404(b) Evidence 
Notice of Hearing 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice Of Hearing 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Defendant's Exhibit List 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA Eighteenth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
BriefFiled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Brief in Opposition to Motion to Suppress 
Bond Posted - Cash 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 38317 Dated 6/30/2015 for 334. 00)(I'ranscript) 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PA Nineteenth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
State's Proposed Jury Instructions 
Motion 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Defendant's Reply In Support Of Motion To Suppress Statements Made To Det. Peck 
ll Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDJO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT 2; 
COURT REPORTER: Kathy Klemetson; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: John Bujak; 
HEARING TYPE: PT Motions I Pre-draw Jury; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
STARTT/ME: 07/02/2015 2:57PM 
STOP TIME: 07/02/2015 2:18PM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
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07/02/2015 
07/02/2015 
07/02/2015 
07/02/2015 
07/02/2015 
07/02/2015 
07/06/2015 
07/06/2015 
07/07/2015 
07/07/2015 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
PA Twentieth Supplemental Response to Request for Discovery 
Affidavit of Service 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Affidavit Of Service (subpoena Duces Te cum for Det Becky Doney) 
Affidavit of Service 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Affidavit Of Service (Subpoena Duces Tecum for Det Donald Peck) 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Special Setting scheduled on 07/02/2015 01:00 PM: Hearing Held 404(b) 
Motion 
Pre-draw jury 
Motn to suppress 
Motion Denied 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Special Setting scheduled on 07/02/2015 OJ :00 PM· Motion Denied I 
Motn to suppress 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Special Setting scheduled on 07/0212015 01 :00 PM· District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Kathy Klemetson 
Number a/Transcript Pages/or this hearing estimated: less than JOO pages 
Special Setting (1 :00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Huskey, Molly J.) 
404(b) Motion 
Pre-draw jury 
Motn to suppress Hearing result for Special Setting scheduled on 07/02/2015 01:00 PM· 
Hearing Held 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Request to Obtain Approval to Video Record, Broadcast or Photograph a Court Proceeding 
(wlorder) 
Order 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order Denying Request to Video Record, Broadcast or Photograph a Court Proceeding 
fil Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT 4/PMR; 
COURT REPORTER: Laura Whiting; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: John Bujak; 
HEARING TYPE: Jury Trial - Day 1; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
STARTT/ME: 07/07/2015 8:32AM 
STOP TIME: 07/07/2015 4:10PM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Transcript Filed 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Transcript Filed (Grand Jury) 
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07/07/2015 
07/07/2015 
07/07/2015 
07/07/2015 
07/07/2015 
07/07/2015 
07/07/2015 
07/08/2015 
07/08/2015 
07/08/2015 
07/09/2015 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Request to Obtain Approval to Video Record, Broadcast or Photograph a Court Proceeding 
(wlorder) 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Motion to Transport Witness 
Order to Transport 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order to Transport Witness 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 07/07/2015 09:00AM· Hearing HeldSTNW 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Jury Instructions Filed - Preliminary 
Jury Trial Started 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 0710712015 09:00 AM· Jury Trial Started 
Jury Trial (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Huskey, Molly J.) 
07/07/2015-07/09/2015 
STNW Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 07107/2015 09:00 AM· Hearing Held 
ll Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT4; 
COURT REPORTER: Laura Whiting; 
DEFENSEATTORNE~kMB~ak; 
HEARING TYPE: Jury Trial-Day 2; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
STARTT/ME: 07/08/2015 8:44AM 
STOP TIME: 07/08/2015 3:36PM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Order 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order Denying Request to Video Record, Broadcast or Photgraph a Court Proceeding 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 07/0812015 09:00AM· Hearing Held-Day 2 
II Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT 4; 
COURT REPORTER: Laura Whiting; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: JoM Bujak; 
HEARING TYPE: Jury Trial - Day 3; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
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I. 
i. 
I . 
I 
07/09/2015 
07/09/2015 
07/13/2015 
07/13/2015 
07/14/2015 
07/14/2015 
07/17/2015 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
START TIME: 07/09/2015 8:48AM 
STOP TIME: 07/09/2015 2:06PM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Order to Transport 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order to Transport Witness 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 07/09//2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Held - Day 3 
l'I Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT4; 
COURT REPORTER: Laura Whiting; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: John Bujak; 
HEARING TYPE: Jury Trial - Day 4; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
START TIME: 07/13/2015 9:16AM 
STOP TIME: 07/13/2015 3:40PM 
ENTRY BY: FENNEU; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 07/13/2015 09:00AM· Hearing Held- Day 4 
ll Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT 4; 
COURT REPORTER: Laura Whiting; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: John Bujak; 
HEARING TYPE: Jury Trial - Day 5; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
START TIME: 07/14/2015 8:52AM 
STOP TIME: 07/14/20151:30PM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 0711412015 09:00 AM· Hearing Held - Day 5 
II Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT 4; 
COURT REPORTER: Laura Whiting; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: John Bujak; 
HEARING TYPE: Jury Trial-Day 6; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
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07/17/2015 
07/20/2015 
07/20/2015 
07/21/2015 
07/21/2015 
07/21/2015 
07/21/2015 
07/21/2015 
07/21/2015 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
START TIME: 07/17/2015 8:55AM 
STOP TIME: 07/17/2015 0:03AM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 07/17/2015 09:00 AM: Hearing Held- Day 6 
~ Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT4; 
COURT REPORTER: Laura Whiting; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: John Bujak; 
HEARING TYPE: Jury Trial - Day 7; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
START TIME: 07/20/2015 9:05AM 
STOP TIME: 07/20/2015 3:35PM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result/or Jury Trial scheduled on 07/20/2015 09:00 AM· Hearing Held - Day 7 
~ Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT4; 
COURT REPORTER: Laura Whiting; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: John Bujak; 
HEARING TYPE: Jury Trial - Day 8; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
START TIME: 07/21/2015 9:01AM 
STOP TIME: 07/21/2015 4:32PM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on 07/21/2015 09:00 AM- Hearing Held- Day 8 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Jury Instructions Filed - Final 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Verdict Filed 
Found Guilty after Trial 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Found Guilty After Trial - all counts 
Statement of Defendant's Rights - Immigration Status 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Statement of Rights - Immigration Status 
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07/21/2015 
07/21/2015 
07/21/2015 
07/21/2015 
07/30/2015 
07/31/2015 
08/19/2015 
08/24/2015 
08/24/2015 
08/24/2015 
08/24/2015 
08/24/2015 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Pre-Sentence Investigation Evaluation Ordered 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
PSI Face Sheet Transmitted 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
District Court Hearing Held: 7, 8, 9, I 3, 14, 17, 20, 21 July 20 I 5 
Court Reporter: Laura Whiting 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: more than 500 pages 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 09/25/2015 09:00 AM) BLOCK A.M 
Bond Converted 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Bond Converted (Transaction number 2776 dated 7/30/2015 amount 334.00)(transcript) 
Motion 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal (no order) 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 08/24/2015 02:45 PM) 
l'J Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT 2; 
COURT REPORTER: Patricia Terry; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: John Bujak; 
HEARING TYPE: Conference - Status; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
STARTT/ME: 08/24/2015 2:48PM 
STOP TIME: 08/24/2015 2:55PM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Conference -Status scheduled on 08/24/2015 02:45 PM· Hearing Held 
Motion Granted 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Conference -Status scheduled on 08/24/2015 02:45 PM· Motion Granted/ 
Oral Motion to Withdraw as Attorney of Record (Bujak to submit order) 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 08/24/2015 02:45 PM: District Court 
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08/24/2015 
08/26/2015 
09/11/2015 
09/21/2015 
09/25/2015 
09/25/2015 
09/25/2015 
09/25/2015 
09/25/2015 
09/25/2015 
09/25/2015 
Hearing Held 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Court Reporter: Patricia Terry 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than JOO pages 
Status Conference (2:45 PM) (Judicial Officer: Huskey, Molly J.) 
Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 08/24/2015 02:45 PM· Hearing Held 
Notice 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice of Conflict of Interest and Assignment of Conflict Counsel I Aaron Bazzoli 
Memorandum 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Sentencing Memorandum 
Motion 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Motion to Continue Sentencing and Notice of Hearing 
ifiJ Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT 3; 
COURT REPORTER: Kathy Klemetson; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Aaron Bazzoli; 
HEARING TYPE: Sentencing; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Britton; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
START TIME: 09/25/2015 9:01AM 
STOP TIME: 09/25/2015 9:17AM 
ENTRY BY· BRITTON; 
LAST UPDATE BY: BRITTON; 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 09/25/2015 09:00 AM· District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Kathy Klemetson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than JOO 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 09/25/2015 09:00 AM· Hearing Held 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 09/25/2015 09:00 AM· Motion Held- Motion to 
Continue 
Motion Granted 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 09/25/2015 09:00 AM· Motion Granted- Motion to I 
Continue 
Motion 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Motion for Production of Trial Transcripts 
Order 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order to Produce Trial Transcripts 
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09/25/2015 
09/25/2015 
09/25/2015 
09/25/2015 
10/20/2015 
10/28/2015 
10/28/2015 
10/28/2015 
11/02/2015 
11/25/2015 
12/08/2015 
12/08/2015 
12/14/2015 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Notice of Hearing 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice Of Hearing 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 11/02/201511:00 AM) 
Notice of Hearing 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice Of Hearing 
Sentencing (9:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Kerrick, Juneal C.) 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 09/25/2015 09:00 AM· District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Kathy Klemetson 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: Less than 100 
Transcript Filed 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Transcript Filed (Jury Trial July 7-21, 2015) 
Order 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order Vacating and Resetting Hearing Scheduling Order 
Hearing Vacated 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 11/02/201511 :00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
scheduling 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference -Status 12/14/2015 08:15 AM) scheduling 
CANCELED Status Conference ( 11 :00 AM) (Judicial Officer: Kerrick, J uneal C.) 
Vacated 
scheduling Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 11/02/2015 11:00 AM: 
Hearing Vacated 
Memorandum 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Memorandum Of Points and Authorities On Motion For Judgment of Aquittal Under Idaho 
Criminal Rule 29 
Objection 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Objection to Defendant's Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Under Idaho Rule 29 
Brief Filed 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Brief in Support of Objection to Motion for Judgment of Acquittal Under Idaho Rule 29 
IJ Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT 2; 
COURT REPORTER: Tamara Weber; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Aaron Bazzo/i; 
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12/14/2015 
12/14/2015 
12/14/2015 
12/14/2015 
12/14/2015 
12/23/2015 
12/23/2015 
01/04/2016 
01/04/2016 
01/05/2016 
01/12/2016 
01/12/2016 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
HEARING TYPE: Motion for Judgment of Acquittal; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
START TIME: 12/14/2015 8:12AM 
STOP TIME: 12/14/2015 8:20AM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 12/14/2015 08:15 AM· Hearing Heldjudg of 
acquital 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 12/14/2015 08: 15 AM· District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Tamara Weber 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than JOO pages 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 01/13/2016 08: 15 AM) Oral Argument on Motion for 
Judgment of Acquittal or Sentencing 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Sentencing 01/25/2016 08: 15 AM) BLOCK A.M 
Motion Hearing (8:15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Huskey, Molly J.) 
judg of acquital Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 12/14/2015 08:15 AM· 
Hearing Held 
Notice 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice to Court and Counsel 
Brief Filed 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Defendant's Reply Brief to State's Objection for Motion for Judgment of Acquittal 
Order 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order on Rule 29 Motion 
Hearing Vacated 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 01/25/2016 08: 15 AM· Hearing Vacated BLOCK 
A.M 
Change Assigned Judge 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Change Assigned Judge (batch process) 
Letter 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Letter from Defendant 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Supplemental Material for Sentencing 
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01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
II Court Minutes 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: DCRT 2; 
COURT REPORTER: Tamara Weber; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Aaron Bazzo/i; 
HEARING TYPE: Sentencing; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
START TIME: 01/13/2016 8:20AM 
STOP TIME: 01/13/2016 9:43AM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on OJ /13/2016 08: 15 AM· Hearing Held 
Final Judgment, Order Or Decree Entered 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 01/13/2016 08: 15 AM· Final Judgement, Order Or I 
Decree Entered 
Sentenced to Incarceration 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Sentenced To Incarceration (118-4001-1 Murder I) Confinement terms: Credited time: 406 
days. Penitentiary determinate: 35 years. Penitentiary indeterminate: 99 years. 
Sentenced to Pay Fine 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Sentenced To Pay Fine 5245.50 charge: 118-4001-1 Murder I 
Sentenced to Incarceration 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Sentenced To Incarceration (118-6501 Robbery) Confinement terms: Credited time: 406 days. 
Penitentiary determinate: 30 years. Penitentiary indeterminate: 99 years. 
Sentenced to Pay Fine 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Sentenced To Pay Fine 5245.50 charge: 118-6501 Robbery 
Sentenced to Incarceration 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Sentenced To Incarceration (118-1401 Burglary) Confinement terms: Credited time: 406 days. 
Penitentiary determinate: 10 years. 
Sentenced to Pay Fine 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Sentenced To Pay Fine 5245.50 charge: 118-1401 Burglary 
Sentenced to Incarceration 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Sentenced To Incarceration (118-4501-II Kidnapping-Second Degree) Confinement terms: 
Credited time: 406 days. Penitentiary determinate: 20 years. Penitentiary indeterminate: 99 
years. 
Sentenced to Pay Fine 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Sentenced To Pay Fine 5245.50 charge: 118-4501-II Kidnapping-Second Degree 
Sentenced to Incarceration 
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01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Sentenced To Incarceration (I18-907 Battery-Aggravated) Confinement terms: Credited time: 
406 days. Penitentiary determinate: I 5 years. 
Sentenced to Pay Fine 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Sentenced To Pay Fine 5245.50 charge: I18-907 Battery-Aggravated 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice of Post Judgment Rights 
Judgment 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Judgment and Commitment 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 0111312016 08: I 5 AM· District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Tamara Weber 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
Status Changed 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk action 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Restitution Order and Judgment 
Restitution Ordered 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Restitution Ordered 3689. 75 victim # I 
Sentencing (8: 15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Huskey, Molly J.) 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 0111312016 08: I 5 AM: Hearing Held 
Disposition 
1. Murder I 
Guilty 
TCN: 1400105983 
Disposition 
2. Robbery 
Guilty 
TCN: 1400105983 
Disposition 
3. Burglary 
Guilty 
TCN: 1400105983 
Disposition 
4. Kidnapping-Second Degree 
Guilty 
TCN: 1400105983 : 
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01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/13/2016 
01/25/2016 
01/25/2016 
Disposition 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
5. Battery-Aggravated 
Guilty 
TCN: 1400105983 
Sentence (Judicial Officer: VanderVelde, Davis) 
1. Murder! 
Felony Sentence 
Confinement 
Type: 
Facility: Idaho Department of Correction 
Effective Date: 01/13/2016 
Determinate: 35 Years 
Indeterminate: 99 Years 
Concurrent with case 
Details: Counts II, III, IV and V 
Credit Term: 406 Days 
Sentence (Judicial Officer: VanderVelde, Davis) 
2. Robbery 
Felony Sentence 
Confinement 
Type: 
Facility: Idaho Department of Correction 
Effective Date: 01/13/2016 
Determinate: 30 Years 
Indeterminate: 99 Years 
Concurrent with case 
Details: Counts I, III, IV and V. 
Credit Term: 406 Days 
Sentence (Judicial Officer: VanderVelde, Davis) 
3. Burglary 
Felony Sentence 
Confinement 
Type: 
Facility: Idaho Department of Correction 
Effective Date: 01/13/2016 
Determinate: 10 Years 
Concurrent with case 
Details: Counts I, II, IV and V. 
Credit Term: 406 Days 
Sentence (Judicial Officer: VanderVelde, Davis) 
5. Battery-Aggravated 
Felony Sentence 
Confinement 
Type: 
Facility: Idaho Department of Correction 
Effective Date: 01/13/2016 
Determinate: 15 Years 
Concurrent with case 
Details: Counts I, II, III and IV. 
Credit Term: 406 Days 
CANCELED Sentencing (8:15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Huskey, Molly J.) 
Vacated 
BLOCK A.M Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 01/25/2016 08: 15 AM: Hearing 
Vacated 
CANCELED Sentencing (8:15 AM) (Judicial Officer: Huskey, Molly J.) 
Vacated 
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02/02/2016 
02/02/2016 
02/19/2016 
02/19/2016 
02/19/2016 
02/22/2016 
03/23/2016 
05/06/2016 
05/11/2016 
05/11/2016 
06/22/2016 
06/24/2016 
06/28/2016 
07/06/2016 
07/13/2016 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
BLOCK A.M Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 01/25/2016 08: 15 AM: Hearing 
Vacated 
Judgment 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Judgment for Victims 
Restitution Ordered 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Restitution Ordered 5000.00 victim # 2 
Notice of Appeal 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice of Appeal 
Appeal Filed in Supreme Court 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
Motion 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Motion/or Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender (wlorder) 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender 
Notice of Appeal 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AMENDED Notice of Appeal 
Motion 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Motion for Rule 35 and Motion to Extend Time for Filing Additional Information 
Order 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order Granting Motion to Extend Time for Filing Additional Information 
Objection 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Objection to Rule 35 Motion and Request for Hearing 
Order 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order Denying Rule 35 Motion 
Motion 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Supplemental Material in Support of Motion for Rule 35 
Motion 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Motion to Reconsider Order Denying Rule 35 Motion 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
copy 
Order 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
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12/13/2016 
01/20/2017 
02/23/2017 
03/01/2017 
03/01/2017 
03/06/2017 
03/06/2017 
03/16/2017 
03/20/2017 
03/20/2017 
03/20/2017 
03/20/2017 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Order Denying Motion To Reconsider 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
SC - Unpublished Opinion (Affirmed Judgment of Conviction) 
Remittitur 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Remittitur 
Memorandum 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Memorandum In Support Of Motion To Correct Sentence (Pro-Se) 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order Appointing Public Defender 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Conference - Status 03/20/2017 10:00 AM) 
Notice 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice of Conflict of Interest and Assignment of Conflict Counsel/ Aaron Bazzoli 
Motion 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Motion For Correction or Reduction of Sentence, /CR 35 (prose) ( no order) 
Objection 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Objection to Rule 35 Motion and Request for Hearing 
ll Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: 2C-CRT 130; 
COURT REPORTER: Christine Rhodes; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Aaron Bazzoli; 
HEARING TYPE: Conference - Status I Rule 35; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
STARTT/ME: 03/20/2017 0:25AM 
STOP TIME: 03/20/2017 0:30AM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result/or Conference -Status scheduled on 03/20/2017 10:00 AM: Hearing Held 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 03/20/2017 10:00 AM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Christine Rhodes 
Number a/Transcript Pages/or this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
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03/20/2017 
03/27/2017 
03/29/2017 
04/03/2017 
04/13/2017 
04/24/2017 
04/24/2017 
04/24/2017 
04/24/2017 
04/24/2017 
05/30/2017 
06/06/2017 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE NO. CR-2014-26736 
Hearing &heduled (Motion Hearing 04/24/2017 02:00 PM) Rule 35 
Status Conference (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: VanderVelde, Davis) 
Hearing result for Conference - Status scheduled on 03/20/2017 10:00 AM· Hearing Held 
Motion 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Motion For Conflict Free Counsel 
Miscellaneous 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
copies-CCPA 
Order 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order to Transport Defendant to Hearing 
Notice 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice of Conflict of Interest and Assignment of Conflict Counsel/ Kenneth Stringfield 
II Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: 2C-CRT 130; 
COURT REPORTER: Christine Rhodes; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Kenneth Stringfield; 
HEARING TYPE: Motion Rule 35 - cont; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
START TIME: 04/24/2017 2:07PM 
STOP TIME: 04/24/2017 2:11PM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Continued 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 04/24/2017 02:00 PM: Continued Rule 35 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 04/24/2017 02:00 PM· District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Christine Rhodes 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 06/19/2017 10:00 AM) BLOCK 45 MINUTES 
LC.R. 35 
Motion Hearing (2:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: VanderVelde, Davis) 
Rule 35 Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 04/24/2017 02:00 PM· Continued 
Memorandum 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Rule 35 Motion to Correct Sentence 
Notice 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Notice of Non-Filing 
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06/19/2017 
06/19/2017 
06/19/2017 
06/19/2017 
06/22/2017 
06/30/2017 
06/30/2017 
06/30/2017 
06/30/2017 
06/30/2017 
07/11/2017 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE NO. CR-2014-26736 
Continued 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 06/19/2017 10:00 AM· Continued BLOCK 45 
MINUTES 
LC.R 35 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 06119/2017 10:00 AM: District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Christine Rhodes 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 06/30/2017 11 :00 AM) Rule 35 
Motion Hearing (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: VanderVelde, Davis) 
BLOCK 45 MlNUTES 
LC.R. 35 Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 06//9/2017 /0:00 AM: Continued 
Order to Transport 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order to Transport 
ID Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: 2CCRT130; 
COURT REPORTER: Christine Rhodes; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Kenneth Stringfield; 
HEARING TYPE: Motion Hearing rule 35; 
MINUTES CLERK: C. Robinson; 
PROSECUTOR: Canyon County Prosecutor; 
STARTTlME: 06/30/2017 l:47AM 
STOP TlME: 06/30/2017 2:07PM 
ENTRY BY: ROBINSONC; 
LAST UPDATE BY: ROBINSONC; 
Continued 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 06/30/2017 11 :00 AM: Continued Rule 35 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter: # of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 06/30/2017 11 :00 AM· District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Christine RHodes 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing Scheduled (Motion Hearing 08/08/2017 10:00 AM) Block one hour 
Motion Hearing (11 :00 AM) (Judicial Officer: VanderVelde, Davis) 
Rule 35 Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 06/30/2017 11 :00 AM: Continued 
Order to Transport 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order to Transport 
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07/21/2017 
08/08/2017 
08/08/2017 
08/08/2017 
08/15/2017 
08/16/2017 
08/16/2017 
09/18/2017 
09/18/2017 
09/18/2017 
09/18/2017 
09/18/2017 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Memorandum 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum In Support Of Rule 35 Motion To Correct Sentence 
Hearing Held 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/08/2017 10:00 AM: Motion Held I Rule 35 
(UNDER ADVISEMENT) 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/08/2017 10:00 AM· District Court 
Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Christine Rhodes 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
Motion Hearing (10:00 AM) (Judicial Officer: VanderVelde, Davis) 
Block one hour Hearing result for Motion Hearing scheduled on 08/08/2017 10:00AM: 
Motion Held I Rule 35 (UNDER ADVISEMENT) 
Hearing Scheduled 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing &heduled (Sentencing 09/18/2017 11 :00 AM) 
Order 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order Re: Defendant's Motion For Reconsideration PUrsuant To /CR 35 
Order 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Order Setting Case For Sentencing And Order to Transport Defendant 
It Court Minutes 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
AUDIO TAPE NUMBER: 2C-CRT 130; 
COURT REPORTER: Christine Rhodes; 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY: Kenneth Stringfield; 
HEARJNG TYPE: Re-sentence count IV; 
MINUTES CLERK: S. Fennell; 
PROSECUTOR· Canyon County Prosecutor; 
START TIME: 09/1812017 0:55AM 
STOP TIME: 09/18/2017 1:04AM 
ENTRY BY: FENNELL; 
LAST UPDATE BY: FENNELL; 
Disposition with Hearing 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 09/18/2017 11 :00 AM: Disposition With Hearing 
Sentenced Modified 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Sentenced ModifiedSentence modified on 9/19/2017. (/18-4501-II Kidnapping-Second Degree) 
Commitment - Held to Answer 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Commitment - Held To Answer (Count IV only) 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
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09/18/2017 
09/18/2017 
09/19/2017 
10/05/2017 
10/25/2017 
10/25/2017 
10/25/2017 
10/25/2017 
12/01/2017 
DATE 
CANYON COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CR-2014-26736 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 09/18/201711:00 AM· District Court Hearing 
Held 
Court Reporter: Christine Rhodes 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 pages 
Sentencing (11 :00 AM) (Judicial Officer: VanderVelde, Davis) 
Hearing result for Sentencing scheduled on 09/18/2017 11 :00 AM· Disposition With Hearing 
Sentence (Judicial Officer: VanderVelde, Davis) 
4. Kidnapping-Second Degree 
Felony Sentence 
Confinement 
Type: 
Facility: Idaho Department of Correction 
Effective Date: 01/13/2016 
Determinate: 20 Years 
Concurrent with case 
Details: Counts I, II, III, and V. 
Comment: 09-18-17 Defendant re-sentenced to correct error ( from 20 + life 
to 20 +O). 
Status Changed 
Party: Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Case Status Changed: closed pending clerk action 
Amended Judgment 
'II Notice of Appeal 
Appeal Filed in Supreme Court 
'II Motion for Appointment of Public Defender 
State Appellate Public Defender 
'II order 
to Appoint State Appellate Public Defender 
'II order 
Augmenting Appeal 
Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 
Balance Due as of 12/18/2017 
Defendant Herrera, Raul E 
FINANCIAL INFORMATlON 
Criminal Cash Bond Account Type Balance as of 12/18/2017 
PAGE300F 30 
34,928.25 
268.00 
34,660.25 
0.00 
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Buzoli Law, PLLC 
Aaron Bazzoli 
815 Fillmore St. 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 402-5827 
Facsimile: (208) 874-4307 
Idaho State Bar No. 5512 
Attorneys for Defendant 
-
_F_I A.k~M. 
MAY O 6 2016 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
S ALSUP, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL E. HERRERA 
Defendant. 
Case Number CR-2014-26736 
MOTION FOR RULE 35 AND 
MOTION TO EXTEND TIME FOR 
FILING ADDITIONAL 
INFORMATION 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, Raul E. Herrera, by and 
through his Attorney of Record, BAZZOLI LAW OFFICE, PLLC, Aaron 
Bazzoli, handling attorney and contract public defender, and hereby moves this 
Honorable Court, pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 for leniency and to reduce 
the fixed portions of the sentence received on January 13, 2016. 
Defendant w~ sentenced on the following charges to the following fixed 
and indeterminate periods: Murder I: thirty-five years fixed, indeterminate life, 
Robbery, thirty years fixed, indeterminate life, Burglary, ten years fixed, 
Kidnapping in the Second Degree, twenty years fixed, indeterminate life, and 
MOTION FOR RULE 3S AND MOTION 1 
TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE ADDITIONAL 
MATERIAL 
33
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• 
Aggravated Battery, fifteen years fixed. Defendant was given credit for days spent 
in County jail. 
Defendant, respectfully requests, upon a hearing or upon this motion, that 
this Honorable Court further consider the information provided at Sentencing and 
contained in the Pre-Sentence Investigation. 
Defendant also requests an extension of time for the filing of additional 
supplemental material to support the Rule 35 motion with the Court setting a · 
deadline for supplementing material. Defendant is requesting the Court reduce 
the fixed portion of his sentences. 
DATED, Friday, May 06, 2016 
Aaron Bazzoli 
Attorney for Defendant 
MOTION FOR RULE 35 AND MOTION 2 
TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE ADDmONAL 
MATERIAL 
34
.. • • 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: 
I hereby certify that on Friday, May 06, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
within Motion to Reconsider Sentence Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 and Motion to 
Extend Time upon the individual(s) names below in the manner noted: 
• By hand delivering copies of the same to the ofrice(s) indicated below. 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA #116611 
IDAHO STATE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION UNIT 11 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise , Idaho 83 707 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
DATED Friday, May 06, 2016 
Aaron Bazzoli 
Attorney for the Defendant 
MOTION FOR RULE 35 AND MOTION 3 
TO EXTEND TIME TO FILE ADDITIONAL 
MATERIAL 
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, • ~.kE D P.M. 
MAY 11 2016 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
c:; ALSUP. DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL E. HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR14-26736 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
EXTEND TIME FOR FILING 
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
The defendant filed his Motion to Reconsider Sentence Pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 3 5 and a Motion to Extend Time for Filing Additional Information on May 
6, 2016. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the defendant shall have 
an additional thirty (30) days from the date of this order in which to file any additional 
supporting documents to supplement the record in reference to his Motion to Reconsider 
Sentence Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. 
Dated this / D day of May, 2016. 
~avisF. VanderVelde 
District Judge 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO EXEND TIME FOR FILING ADDITIONAL 
INFORMATION PAGE-I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss 
COUNTY OF CANYON ) 
I hereby certify that I served true and correct copies of the foregoing document 
upon the following: 
Bryan F. Taylor 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
1115 Albany St 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Aaron J. Bazzoli 
BAZZOLILAW 
815 Filmore St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
either by depositing the same in the U.S. mail, first class postage prepaid, or by personal 
service. 
Dated this_/ JL..--_ day of May, 2016. 
Chris Yamamoto, Clerk 
Clerk of District Court 
~tyClerk 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO EXEND TIME FOR FILING ADDITIONAL 
INFORMATION PAGE-2 
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BRYANF. TAYLOR 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
MAY 11 2016 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
A YOUNG, DEPUTY 
1 ll 5 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR2014-26736 
OBJECTION TO RULE 35 MOTION 
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 
COMES NOW GEARLD L. WOLFF, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of the 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, on behalf of the State of Idaho, who objects to 
the Rule 35 Motion filed by the Defendant RAUL EDGAR HERRERA herein, for the reasons 
that: 
1. The Defendant has provided no information relative to sentencing that was not 
previously supplied to the Court for consideration herein. 
2. No reason has been given to show that the sentence was illegal or unreasonable 
or unduly harsh when entered. 
OBJECTION TO RULE 35 MOTION 
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 1 
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3. The victims herein wish to address the Court on the Rule 3 5 motion, prior to 
the Court's ruling on the motion. 
5. The sentence imposed is consistent with the illegal conduct and activities of the 
Defendant. The crimes were committed in a premeditated and deliberate manner, with intent to 
cause the death of Jeffrey Dyer. 
Oral argument and public hearing is requested on the Rule 35 Motion and this 
objection. 
y-
DATED this / / _,day of May, 2016. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on or about this J ,.,,,,....._ day of May, 2016, I 
caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the attorney for the 
Defendant by the method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Aaron J Bazzoli 
815 Fillmore Street 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
FAX: (208) 874-4307 
OBJECTION TO RULE 35 MOTION 
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 2 
() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
() Hand Delivered 
(X) Placed in Court Basket 
0 Overnight Mail 
() Facsimile 
() E-Mail 
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e!:.J_..~.M. 
JUN 2 2 2016 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
M.NYE,DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR-2014-26736 
ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION 
After a trial by jury, Defendant was found guilty of Murder in the First Degree, 
Robbery, Burglary, Second Degree Kidnapping, and Aggravated Battery. For the crime 
of Murder, Defendant was sentenced to a unified term of life, with the first thirty-five 
years fixed. For the crime of Robbery, Defendant was sentenced to life, with the first 
thirty years, fixed. For the crime of Burglary, Defendant was sentenced to ten years 
fixed. For the crime of Second Degree Kidnapping, Defendant was sentenced to life, 
with the first twenty years fixed. Finally, for the crime of Aggravated Battery, Defendant 
was sentence to fifteen years fixed. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The 
sentences were executed. An appeal was filed and is currently pending. 
Defendant now seeks relief pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (hereinafter, Rule 
35). His motion was filed on May 6, 2016, and requested an extension of time to file 
ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION -1-
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supplemental material. The Court granted an extension of time until June 11, 2016. No 
additional information was filed. 
Defendant's motion is one for leniency. He requests that the Court further 
consider the information provided at sentencing and contained in the Pre-Sentence 
Investigation Report and reduce the fixed portion of his sentences. The State requested 
a hearing and objected to the motion on the following grounds: 
1 . Defendant provided no information relative to sentencing that was not 
previously supplied to the Court for consideration; 
2. No reason was given to show that the sentence was illegal, or unreasonable, 
or unduly harsh when entered; 
3. The victims wish to address the Court prior to the Court's ruling; and 
4. The sentence imposed is consistent with the illegal conduct and activities of 
the Defendant. The crimes were committed in a premeditated and deliberate 
manner, with the intent to cause the death of Jeffrey Dyer. 
The decision whether to hold a hearing on a Rule 35 motion is directed at the 
sound discretion of the trial court. In deciding whether an oral hearing is necessary, the 
inquiry is whether the defendant could have presented the desired evidence through 
affidavits filed with the motion, or whether the denial of a hearing unduly limits the 
information considered in the decision. State v. Thomas, 133 Idaho 682, 689, 991 P.2d 
870, 877 (Ct. App. 1999). Because there is no indication that denial of a hearing in this 
case would unduly limit the Defendant's presentation of evidence, no hearing is 
required. 
ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION -2-
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·' The decision to grant or deny a request to reduce an otherwise legal sentence is 
within the discretion of the Court. State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 318, 144 P.3d 23, 
24 (2006). The defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or 
additional information subsequently presented to the district court in support of the Rule 
35 motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203, 159 P .3d 838, 840 (2007). 
The Defendant has failed to offer any additional evidence that would indicate the 
sentences were excessively harsh in this circumstance, and the Court does not have 
any information which would warrant a reduction of the sentences. 
The crimes in this case were particularly egregious. In the early morning of 
November 18, 2014, the Defendant, angry with Jeffrey Dyer because Dyer had 
allegedly "ripped off" Herrera over $700 in prescription pills, took an associate, Angelo 
Cervantes, and went to the home of Jeffrey Dyer and his father, Ronald Ghostwolf. 
When Ghostwolf opened the back door for his dog, Herrera forced his way in the 
house, knocked Ghostwolf down and beat him, resulting in Ghostwolf suffering multiple 
broken bones in his face and skull. Cervantes then tied Ghostwolf and left him on the 
floor. Herrera proceeded to Dyer's room and began yelling at him and beating him. At 
some point during this time, Ghostwolf was moved into the bathroom and told to stay 
there and do nothing for twenty minutes. Herrera and Cervantes then left, taking a 
number of items from the house, along with Dyer's vehicle. When Ghostwolf emerged 
from the bathroom, he discovered a large amount of blood in the room and that his son, 
Dyer was missing. The following day, Dyer's vehicle was found in Ontario. Dyer's body 
was in the trunk, wrapped in a blanket. The cause of death was determined to be blunt 
force trauma to the head, with injuries including lacerations, abrasions, a skull fracture 
ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION -3-
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from at least four blows to the back of the head, and subdural and subarachnoid 
hemorrhage with brain swelling and central herniation. There were also multiple 
defensive wounds on Dyer's arms and hands. The murder weapon was eventually 
determined to be a collapsible metal baton. At the time of sentencing, the Court 
specifically stated that the sentences were not reached lightly, that it understood the 
significance of the sentences and also felt it would not have been inappropriate to 
impose a fixed life sentence; however, the Court did not do so due to the rehabilitative 
potential of the Defendant. Even so, the protection of society required a sentence that 
precluded the Defendant from being in a position to engage in similar behavior again. 
The Defendant has not presented any information that changes this conclusion. 
Given the foregoing, this Court finds that the four goals of sentencing ("protecting 
society, and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or 
retribution applicable to a given case") support the sentence imposed as it sufficiently 
balances the need for society's protection, the deterrence of the Defendant and society 
in general, the Defendant's rehabilitation, and his punishment. See State v. McGiboney, 
274 P.3d 1284 (Idaho Ct. App. 2012) citing State v. Toohi/1, 103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 
P.2d 707, 71 O (Ct.App.1982)). A reduction in the fixed portion of the sentence(s) at this 
time is neither warranted nor appropriate. 
In light of the above, the motion for Rule 35 relief is HEREBY DENIED. 
Dated this -Z. "2- day of June, 2016. 
D:s F. VanderVelde 7,h-
District Judge 
ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION -4-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on ~day of June, 2016, s/he served a true and 
correct copy of the original of the foregoing ORDER on the following individuals in the 
manner described: 
• upon counsel for the state: 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
Courthouse P.A. Box 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
• upon counsel for the Defendant: 
Aaron Bazzoli 
Attorney at Law 
815 Fillmore St. 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
• Upon the Defendant: 
Raul Herrera 
IDOC #116611 
ISCI 
Unit 11 
P.O. Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 83707 
• And upon: 
Sara B. Thomas 
IDAHO STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE 
P.O. Box 2816 
Boise, ID 83701 
and/or when s/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with 
sufficient postage to individuals at the addresses listed above. 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, 
Clerk of the Court 
ORDER DENYING RULE 35 MOTION -5-
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Bazzoli Law, PLLC 
Aaron Bazzoli 
815 Fillmore St. 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 402-5827 
Facsimile: (208) 874-4307 
Idaho State Bar No. 5512 
Attorneys for Defendant 
-
F , _A.k1fil 9,,M. 
JUN 2 \ 2016 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
M.NVE.DEPUTV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL E. HERRERA 
Defendant. 
Case Number CR-2014-26736 
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RULE 
35 
COMES NOW, the above-named Defendant, Raul E. Herrera, by and 
through his Attorney of Record, BAZZOLI LAW OFFICE, PLLC, Aaron 
Bazzoli, handling attorney and contract public defender, and hereby provides this 
Court and the Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney with the following three 
letters in support of his Rule 35 request for leniency. The letters are from 
Defendant, his wife, and an additional family member. 
DATED, Friday, June 24, 2016 
Aaron Bazzoli 
Attorney for Defendant 
SUPPLEMENT AL MATERIAL IN I 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RULE 35 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE: 
I hereby certify that on Friday, June 24, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of the 
within Motion to Reconsider Sentence Pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 and Motion to 
Extend Time upon the individual(s) names below in the manner noted: 
• Bv hand delivering copies ofthe same to the of(ice(s) indicated below. 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
DATED Friday, June 24, 2016 
Aaron Bazzoli 
Attorney for the Defendant 
SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIAL IN 2 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR RULE JS 
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To whom it may concern, 
I would like to write this letter in concerns to my rule 35. I believe I should be able to get a 
reduced sentence based on the facts that my co-defendant was given less time than I was. During that 
time I was not offered any deals that were reasonable or any chance to testify against him as he did 
against me. Regardless of what actually happened the day of the crime we were both convicted of the 
same crime. 
Due to the facts that were identified differently against me, nothing has actually matched up. 
There were so many inconsistencies in the testimonies of those who testified. There was evidence that I 
had asked my Private attorney John Bujak to put in and he didn't. I had seen my lawyer maybe 5 or 6 
times during the "preparation of my trial". I was never able to listen to the full audio or videos that were 
held against me, we never even went through the whole discovery. He would tell my wife that he had 
came to see me and he never had. He was being disbarred in the middle of my trial. He took a break in 
the middle of my trial. There were questions to be aske and witnesses' that were never called. I was not 
represented correctly. 
I believe that my codefendant and I should be around the same sentence. I was found guilty of 
first degree murder; he took a plea bargain that was promised to him long before he was even arrested. 
His sentence was 15 to life and I was given 35 years, which is 20 more years than he was given. I am 
asking for leniency on my behalf. I do not have a criminal history and I think that that should have been 
considered as it was not during my sentencing. If I were able to get out at an earlier time than I think I 
would be able to go back into society and re-adjust to being a good citizen. I do have the potential at 
rehabilitation. 
The main issue I am trying to get at right now is the difference between us. The prosecutor was 
not willing to work with me as he did my co-defendant. It is the same crime and I understand the extent 
of this case. I took the stand and I told the truth without inconstancies and without a deal on the table. I 
was not offered a thing in exchange as others were. I told my side of events from that day and I was 
sentenced worse than anyone else. Even though I knew there was a chance that nobody would believe 
me I still stood up and told my side of the story. Nobody listened or believed me, because there were 
others saying things already. I was painted as this bad terrible person. Yes I was on the wrong path and I 
did some things that I am truly not proud of. If I could go back in time and do things differently I would 
have never picked up a friend. I would have stayed home with my family in our home where I should be 
now. 
I am not living in the past anymore I've been gone for 17 months now. My son was 18 months 
old when I was arrested he is now 3 years old. He only knows me through pictures and a phone call. This 
is not the kind of father I ever wanted to be. I want to hold my son and play with him. To walk into my 
home to my wife and son smiling because I am home like before. 
Please give me the chance to live again .. I continue to fight for the second chance that I was not 
given yet others were. I feel as if the prosecutor picked and chose who he wanted to work with and 
from the moment I was arrested I was already guilty in their eyes. Please take your time in making this 
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decision; again I understand the extent of these crimes. I also understand that since day one I have 
fought every second for this second chance to be hopefully given to me. I will not lose my faith and hope 
that one day I will be able to come home to my son my wife and my family. I hope that you will take the 
time to reconsider this sentence I would like the chance to be a father to my son a husband to my wife a 
family man again as I once was. I have admitted my bad choices that I did make. 
Raul Herrera 
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To whom it may concern, 
I am writing this letter in regards to Raul Edgar C. Herrera. This letter is for the purpose of his 
rule 35. I have known Raul for 7 years we have been together for 6 years. We will be married July 3n1 
2016. Now this letter is not going to be as others are. I will give my points and hopefully you can have an 
open mind and take into consideration what I am about to say. 
I met Raul 7 years ago, we automatically just magnetized to each other since that day we have 
been inseparable. We now own our own home and car we have a beautiful son who is now three years 
old. As far back as I can remember Raul has always worked hard for what he had. Not a day would go by 
that he was not working employed or not he still found a way to get odd jobs done and provide for his 
family. He graduated high school when I was pregnant with our son he worked full time and went to 
night school to graduate. He has always helped others out no matter how hard times were for us he 
would find a way to help someone in need. I believe that personally knowing Raul and being by his side 
through this whole ordeal yes he has grown. To some it may not seem like he could have matured so 
much in such a short time of 17 months, but who would honestly not mature and grow when they have 
been put through something they have no control over. I do not believe my fiance should be in jail for 
this crime one bit which is why I continue to fight for him and his innocence. 
Now Raul wasn't always perfect, he has had his bad days just like any other person in this world. 
Yet he always has strived to make himself a better person. He is not a perfect man he is not a perfect 
anything but yet I still think and feel like he has gotten the bad end of the stick. I do not believe in any 
way he was given any kind of chance at his life. He has always had it rough but he has never been that 
person from the streets who was in and out of jail, and always in trouble he was the "one of a kind of 
person" from the streets who was going to make it. Then all of this happened. Now I stand and believe 
in my fiances innocence by no means do I believe he is guilty but this letter is only due to the facts of his 
rule 35. 
Now on the grounds of a rule 35 states that a person is requesting for a reduction in sentence, 
the grounds for requesting a reduction in sentencing is that of new evidence has been discovered that 
the judge was not able to see before sentencing, to ask for leniency on the sentence they were given, 
also allows the judge to correct an "illegal" sentence. 
I believe his sentence was too harsh due to the fact that not everything was taken into 
consideration. Like the evidence that was not presented in court that should have been among other 
things that were withheld. The others involved either got no time or a substantial amount of less time 
than my fiance Raul. They were also offered deals on behalf of the states Prosecuting Attorney's office. 
The fact that another involved was given less time for the same charge. His plea bargain was given to 
him before he was even arrested, during an interrogation his plea bargain was offered, he was also 
facing different charges yet they withheld these charges in exchange for testimony. A testimony that is 
wrong and also that contradicted with one of the victims. Another individual is still walking free, and 
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was paid money as well to testify. This person was paid the amount of $5,000.00 to testify. His 
interrogation was never recorded, or at a police station like procedures should have been. Instead he 
was picked by one of the detectives where they "took him for a cruise" to get his testimony. Then there 
is the fact that, his hired private attorney was being disbarred right before my fiance Raul's trial started. 
His trial was postponed because of this, and his lawyer took a week of work to get his mind straight. This 
should have been a mistrial but it was also not considered. We were told no. Seemed if and when we 
fight for everything it is just kicked out and not even considered. Seems as if the truth is not being 
recognized and a lie is better than the truth to some. This case has been nothing short of a nightmare 
for my little family and fiance. He was given the "bad hand" in this mess. Every person was given a deal 
or a second chance. My fiance was not. 
I understand that every case is significantly different. Yet sometimes there is favoritism or 
someone might fell as if they are stuck, like they must give a harsher sentence to set an example or 
maybe they are kind of forced to give a harsher sentence. Due to the media coverage or some other odd 
reason. The fact still lies that my fiance has had no criminal record, besides two minor tickets. His 
criminal history was not taken into consideration which is supposed to be a factor in every case, 
especially when sentencing someone. I am asking for you to please review my Fiances case and take into 
consideration the time he was given, and how it is such a long time that I believe if he were to do all 35 
years there would be no hope left for him. He would be institutionalized. 
Please give him a chance to be able to come home and be a father and husband again. I do think 
yes he did deserve to go to prison for some things that he made the wrong choices for, but to spend the 
rest of his life in there without a real second chance doesn't seem fair. I believe he can continue to 
change and be able to rehabilitate himself so when and if he is ever able to come home he can be a 
productive citizen in this world. Even now he continues to stay positive and have the highest of faith. 
Time is all he has left to look forward to and I pray that maybe you or someone else will be able to make 
that decision that will bring him home. 
I thank you for your time, and I hope you have a blessed day. 
Sophia Sanchez 
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Zollo Mail- Print 
phiac l 4@gmail.com 
To 
Reply to 
"Aaron Bazzoli" <aaron@bazzolilaw.com> 
phiac 14@gmail.com 
Subject 
Date 
Fwd: RAUL HERRERA RULE 35 LETTER 
Mon, 06 Jun 2016 20:38:05 -0700 
Get Outlook for Android 
From: Babiigurl Babiigurl 
Sent: Monday, June 6, 9:35 PM 
Subject: RAUL HERRERA RULE 35 LETTER 
To: Sophia Sanchez 
Dear your Honorable Judges, 
-
I am writing this letter to you in regards of the Rule 35 motion filed by my brother Raul Edgar Cantu Herrera. 
Throughout the 21 years growing up together, I have been blessed to have built a strong bond with my little 
brother being a year and a half younger than myself. In all them years, I know for a fact that my little brother 
Raul has a very passionate and considerate heart for myself and others. He is the only man who solely is the 
motivation behind the goals in my life to succeed and one of which I have look up to. If it weren't for my mother 
and my little brother Raul's encouragement growing up, I wouldn't have made it as far as being the first 
generation to graduate and continue onto college. And so I believe that the thirty-five year sentence decided for 
Raul's life has been unjust and he did not receive a fair trial in court because of facts withheld and an attorney 
that had neglected to give him any chance of a good representation due to being disbarred in the middle of 
Raul's trial. 
Without a hesitation, I know Raul Edgar Cantu Herrera is and could continue to be a positive role modeled 
citizen for his son, family, and others if eligible for the reduction of his sentencing. I have first-handedly seen 
Raul go out of his way to help others as well as myself even if not asked. For example, there was a baby, no 
older than two, who had walked into the road and he had dropped everything he was doing and saved that baby's 
life before getting hit by the car coming. We could be driving and he would give money to the homeless or a 
ride to a hitchhiker. This one time, my moms' dog had been lost, from following the ambulance to the hospital, 
and he spent all day looking for him until he finally found him and brought the state of depression out of my 
mom and happiness in it. There had been a time while I was attending college and was short five hundred dollars 
and he was right there to give to pay for my books. Each time I had struggled in writing english papers, a subject 
he excelled in, I knew I could count on him to enlighten my train of thought and accomplish what I needed to 
do; whether it be for what ever problem I had big and small, in school and in life. I admired his dedication to 
succeed and becoming someone in life. For example, we had moved alot and he had gone to school in boise and 
we lived in nampa and every morning he would ride his bike to school until he had graduated from high school 
instead of getting his GED with a 3.9 like myself. 
Raul has tried his hardest and worked very hard to have a brighter future for his son his wife, and himself and 
been a very independent young hardworking father, brother and son. Thus believing that my little brother Raul's 
sentence to prison for thirty-five years be too harsh because and so I ask and plead that you may review all the 
facts in Raul's case considerably and grant him a reduction of his modified sentence, so that he may once again 
provide and be another role model for his son and continue to excel in life, giving and having the necessities of 
which we had not had growing up, only having a single parent provide for us. I thank you for all your time and 
consideration. 
Sincerely, 
Florinda lysha Cantu Herrera 
https://mail.zoho.com/zm/print.do?msgld=7844066000000419011&vfc=true&accld=78440660000000081 1/1 
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BAZZOLI LAW, PLLC 
Aaron Bazzoli 
815 Fillmore St 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Phone: 208-402-5827 
Fax: 208-874-4307 
ISB #: 5512 
Attorney for Defendant 
- -
F 1.J~.M. 
JUN 2 8 2016 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
M.NYE,OEPUTY 
/ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OJ--CANYON 
/,/ 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA; 
Defendant. 
_/ 
Case No. CR-20.14-26736 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
ORDER DENYING RULE 35 
MOTION 
COMES NOW the Defendant, by and through Defendant's attorney of record, Aaron 
Bazzoli, conflict public defender, and hereby files with this Honorable Court a Motion for 
Reconsideration of the Order Denying Rule 3 5 and requests that the Court consider the letters 
filed on June 27, 2016 before final ruling on Defendant's Motion for Rule 35. 
The defense counsel was involved in a jury trial on the 9, 10 and 13th of June and 
preparation for said jury trial. The letters were received a few days before they were due and 
defense counsel simply overlooked getting them submitted immediately after being received. 
Defendant requests this Court review the letters and reconsider the order denying Rule 35. 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 1 
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DATED this_ day of June, 2016. 
-
Aaron Bazzoli 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 27th day of June, 2016, I served a true and correct copy of this 
Motion to Reconsider upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted: 
./ By depositing copies of the same in the individual(s) designated courthouse box. 
Bryan F. Taylor 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
./ By sending a copy of the same via U.S. Mail, postage prepaid to the individual(s) designated 
below. 
Raul Herrera 
IDOC # 11611' 
ISCI Unit 11 
P.O.Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Aaron Bazzoli 
Attorney for Defendant 
2 
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JUL 1 3 2016 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
S MEHIEL, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, 
Defendant 
CASE NO. CR-2014-26736 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER 
After a trial by jury, Defendant was found guilty of Murder in the First Degree, 
Robbery, Burglary, Second Degree Kidnapping, and Aggravated Battery. For the crime 
of Murder, Defendant was sentenced to a unified term of life, with the first thirty-five 
years fixed. For the crime of Robbery, Defendant was sentenced to life, with the first 
thirty years fixed. For the crime of Burglary, Defendant was sentenced to ten years 
fixed. For the crime of Second Degree Kidnapping, Defendant was sentenced to life, 
with the first twenty years fixed. Finally, for the crime of Aggravated Battery, Defendant 
was sentence to frfteen years fixed. All sentences were ordered to run concurrently. The 
sentences were executed. An appeal was filed and is currently pending. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER 
1 
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On May 6, 2016, Defendan~ filed a Motion for Rule 35 and Motion to Extend Time 
for Filing Additional Information. The Court issued an Order on May 11, 2016, granting 
Defendant an additional 30 days from the date of the order to file any additional 
supporting documents. Also on May 11 th, the State filed an objection to Defendant's 
Rule 35 motion. The Court received no further documentation and on June 22, 2016 
issued its Order Denying Rule 35 Motion. Two days later, on June 24, 2016, Defendant 
filed supplemental material consisting of three letters in support of his motion. The 
letters were from Mr. Herrera, his fiance 1, Sophia Sanchez, and his sister, Florinda 
Cantu Herrera. 
On June 28th, Defendant filed a motion to reconsider the Order Denying Rule 35 
Motion on the grounds that defense counsel was preparing for and in jury trial on the 9th, 
10th, and 13th of June, and that he received the letters a few days prior to the deadline, 
but inadvertently failed to submit them immediately. The underlying facts of this case 
are set forth in this Court's Order Denying Rule 35 Motion, and will therefore not be 
repeated here. 
Initially, the Court notes that a motion to reconsider the denial of a Rule 35 
motion is an improper successive motion and is prohibited by Rule 35. State v. Battens, 
137 Idaho 730, 52 P.3d 875 (Ct. App. 2002). Further, the prohibition of successive 
motions under Rule 35 is a jurisdictional limit. Id. As such, this Court is without the 
authority to consider this motion. 
However, even if the letters had been timely submitted, the motion would still 
have been denied. The letters outline three general reasons in support of Defendant's 
1 Sophia Sanchez states in her letter that she and the Defendant were planning to be married on July 3, 2016. The 
Court has no information regarding whether or not the marriage took place as planned. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER 
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plea for leniency: (1) that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) that he is a 
good person with a young family who simply did one bad thing, and (3) that a co-
defendant received a significantly lower sentence. 
As to the first reason, a Rule 35 motion is not the appropriate forum in which to 
address claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Therefore, the Defendant would not 
have been granted relief on this ground. The remaining two grounds for relief are not 
new information, and were addressed at the sentencing hearing. Defense counsel 
pointed out both that the Defendant's fiance and son would be without him, as well as 
the sentence received by the co-defendant. The Court also heard from the Defendant 
who expressed his regret as well as his desire for the opportunity to be a part of his 
family's life at some point in the future. 
Upon pronouncement of sentence, the Court noted the impact this crime and the 
respective sentences would have on the Defendant and his family. It also recognized 
that the Defendant was a beloved- son and family member, as well as, by all accounts, 
an extraordinarily loving and devoted father. Knowing this, the Court still chose to 
impose the sentences set forth above in light of the egregious circumstances of this 
case. There is no information presented in the letters provided that alters the 
appropriateness of the sentences imposed or justifies a reduction in the time imposed. 
As to the differences in the sentences received by Mr. Herrera and the co-
defendant, the Court specifically stated that it would not engage in a comparative 
analysis of sentences as each defendant's circumstances are unique. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER 
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For all of the foregoing reasons, as well as the reasons set forth in the Order 
Denying Rule 35 Motion, the Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 
Dated this \ 'L- day of July, 2016. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER 
4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned certifies that on J3 day of July, 2016, s/he served a true and 
correct copy of the original of the foregoing ORDER on the following individuals in the 
manner described: 
• upon counsel for plaintiff: 
Bryan Taylor 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
1115 Albany St 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
• upon counsel for defendant: 
Aaron J. Bazzoli 
BAZZOLI LAW, PLLC 
815 Fillmore St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
• Kathy Waldemer 
Appeals Clerk 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
and/or whens/he deposited each a copy of the foregoing ORDER in the U.S. Mail with 
sufficient postage to individuals at the addresses listed above. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, 
Clerk of the Court 
By: ____ /~_______. __ _ 
Deputy Clerk of the Court 
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
_F __ t_A.~.a&_g_,.,_ 
DEC 1 3 2016 
CANYONcou 
Docket No. 43975 K WALDEMER:~~b~K 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
v. 
RAULEDGARHERRERAakaEDGAR 
CANTU, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
) 2016 Unpublished Opinion No. 817 
) 
) Filed: December 13, 2016 
) 
) Stephen W. Kenyon, Clerk 
) 
) THIS IS AN UNPUBLISHED 
) OPINION AND SHALL NOT 
) BE CITED AS AUTHORITY 
) 
________________ ) 
Appeal from the District Court of the Third Judicial District, State of Idaho, 
Canyon County. Hon. Molly J. Huskey, District Judge. 
Judgment of conviction and concurrent unified sentences of life with thirty-five 
years determinate for murder in the first degree; life with thirty years determinate 
for robbery; ten years determinate for burglary; life with twenty years determinate 
for kidnapping second degree; and fifteen years determinate for aggravated 
battery, affirmed. 
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender; Justin M. Curtis, Deputy 
Appellate Public Defender, Boise, for appellant. 
Hon. Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General; Kenneth K. Jorgensen, Deputy 
Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. 
PERCURIAM 
Before MELANSON, Chief Judge; GUTIERREZ, Judge; 
and GRATTON, Judge 
Raul Edgar Herrera was found guilty of murder in the first degree, Idaho Code § § I 8-
4001, 18-4002, 18-4003(a}, 18-204; robbery, J.C. §§ 18-6501, 18-6502, 18-6503, 18-204; 
burglary, J.C.§§ 18-1401, 18-204; kidnapping second degree, J.C.§§ 18-4501, 18-4503, 18-204; 
and aggravated battery, J.C. §§ 18-903(a), 18-907(a}, 18-204. The district court imposed 
concurrent unified sentences of life with thirty-five years determinate for murder in the first 
1 
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degree; life with thirty years determinate for robbery; ten years determinate for burglary; life 
with twenty years determinate for kidnapping second degree; 1 and fifteen years determinate for 
aggravated battery. Herrera appeals, contending that his sentences are excessive. 
Sentencing is a matter for the trial court's discretion. Both our standard of review and the 
factors to be considered in evaluating the reasonableness of the sentence are well established and 
need not be repeated here. See State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 117-18, 822 P.2d 1011, 1014-
15 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 449-51, 680 P.2d 869, 871-73 (Ct. App. 
1984); State v. Toohill, 103 Idaho 565,568,650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982). When reviewing 
the length of a sentence, we consider the defendant's entire sentence. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 
722, 726, 170 P.3d 387, 391 (2007). Applying these standards, and having reviewed the record 
in this case, we cannot say that the district court abused its discretion. 
Therefore, Herrera's judgment of conviction and sentences are affirmed. 
The State acknowledges that the maximum sentence for kidnapping second degree is 
twenty-five years. However, the claim of an illegal sentence may not be raised for the first time 
on appeal without the trial court having first had an opportunity to consider the legality of the 
terms of the sentence. State v. Martin, 119 Idaho 577, 578-79, 808 P.2d 1322, 1323-24 (1991); 
State v. Boss, 122 Idaho 747, 748 n.l, 838 P.2d 876, 877 n.1 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. 
Hernandez, 122 Idaho 227,229, 832 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Ct. App. 1992). 
2 
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In the Court of Appeals of the State of Idaho 
- F ' A.~.q .. g_ ) 
P.M. 
STATE OF IDAHO, JAN 2 0 20!7 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
REMITTITUR 
Docket No. 43975 
CANYON COUNTY CLE tK 
(( WALDEMER, DEPU1 ii 
V. 
PAUL EDGAR HERRERA aka EDGAR 
CANTU, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Canyon County D.C. No. CR-2014-
26736 
TO: THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, COUNTY OF CANYON. 
The Court having announced its Unpublished Opinion in this cause December 13, 
2016, and having denied Appellant's Petition for Review on January \1~ 2017; therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the District Court shall forthwith comply with 
the directive of the Unpublished Opinion, if any action is required. 
cc: 
DATED this \1~ day of January, 2017. 
Counsel of Record 
District Court Clerk 
District Judge 
Clerk~ofthe Court oflJppeals 
STATE OF IDAHO 
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Raul Edgar Herrera, # { ( Co C, / I 
I.S.C.I., Unit fl e 3~ fs 
Post Office Box 4 
Boise, Idaho 
83707 
Raul E. Herrera, 
Petitioner, 
State Of Idaho, 
Respondent, 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO 
VS: 
) 
) 
) NO:CR-2014-26736-C 
) 
) Memorandum In 
) Support Of Motion 
) To Correct Sentence 
) 
) 
LE D A.M_, ___ P.M. 
FEB 2 3 2017 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
A NICKEL, DEPUTY 
COMES NOW, Raul Edgar Herrera, The Petitioner in the instant action, and 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Court Rule 35, who has moved this court for an 
order correcting the sentence imposed illegally upon him. 
The Petitioner was convicted in this Court before a jury , and such Trial was 
presided over by the Honorable Judge Molly J. Huskey, of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho. 
The Petitioner was sentenced to the Idaho State Department of Corrections for the 
following terms: 
1 ). Murder in the First Degree, 35 years determinate, followed by life indeterminate; 
2). Robbery, 30 years Determinate, followed by life indeterminate; 
3). Burglary, 10 Determinate, followed by -0-years indeterminate; 
4). Kidnapping in the Second Degree, 25 years Determinate, followed by life 
indeterminate. 
5). Aggravated Battery, 15 years Determinate, followed by -0- years indeterminate. 
All of the above sentences were ordered to be served concurrently to each other. 
1 
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ARGUMENT PRESENTED 
"A criminal Court Rule 35 Motion can be used for leniency or to correct a sentence that 
is illegal from the face of the record at any time". "A Motion to correct an illegal 
sentence is not subject to any time constraints and may be filed at any time". See e.g., 
State V. Kerrigan, 143 Idaho 185, 141 P.3d 1054, (2006); State V. Vetsch, 101 Idaho 
596,618 P.2d 773, {1980). 
THE SENTENCES IMPOSED VIOLATE DOUBLE JEOPARDY 
On the record , in open Court the Jury found that the commission of the crime 
of Murder was perpetrated in the commission of Robbery , Kidnapping , and 
Buglary. Please see Exhibit A as attached. 
It is without question that a person cannot be punished or placed into jeopardy 
twice for the same offense , please see the United States Constitution , 
Amendment(s) Five and Fourteen. 
Theses Constitutional prohibitions means that a criminal defendant maynot be 
convicted of both a greater and a lesser included offense. State V. Thompson, 101 
Idaho 430 , (1980). 
In Idaho , it is the "indictment" or "pleading" theory that is used to determine if 
one offense is a lesser included of another. State V. Thompson, Supra. 
This theory holds, "that an offense is an included offense if it is alleged in the 
information as a ways or means to commit another greater offense". State V. 
Anderson, 82 Idaho 293, 352 P.2d 972, (1960). 
A lesser included offense may also be one which is necessarily committed in the 
commission of another offense." State V. Hall, 86 Idaho 63, 383 P.2d 602, 
(1963). 
Attached as Exhibit B is a copy of the indictment that was served upon the 
Petiioner, and was duly signed by the grand jury of the State of Idaho. It is clear 
that in Count I, under the alternative theory, it is very clear, that the charging 
document, in conjunction with the Jury instructons, and the jury verdict form, 
(Exhibit A), show that when the Court sentenced the Petitioner to serve a 
sentence for each crime, the Court violated the provisions of the United States 
Constitution against being punished twice for the same offense(s), because the 
jury did in fact find that the underlying crimes were committed during the 
pertetration of the Murder. 
The Idaho State Supreme Court, in the case of State V. Bates, 106 Idaho 395, 
679 P .2d 672, {1984), has clearly held, " .. .in such circustances the District Court 
2 
63
! . 
• • 
judge is required to set aside the lesser conviction (s)". 
Whether the prohibition against double jeopardy prevents the Petitioner, (Mr. 
Herrera), from being punished for Robbery, Burglary, and Kidnapping, as well as 
the predicate crime of First degree Murder would depend on whether or not the 
Jury found Mr. Herrera guilty of these offenses during the perpetration or the 
commission of the predicate crime of First Degree Murder. 
If the Jury did find the Petitioner guilty of these offenses during the perpetration 
of the crime of First degree Murder, then the individual convictions for these 
crimes are illegal and must be stricken from the judgment and sentence, and from 
the records of this case. 
Exhibit A, which is the jury verdict form, does show that the jury found the 
Petitioner guilty under the felony murder rule, and therefore the District Court is 
required to dismiss the lesser convictions, and the sentences thereof. 
THE SENTENCE FOR SECOND DEGREE KIDNAPPING EXCEEDS 
THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM 
The State of Idaho has conceeded that the sentence for the crime of second 
degree kidnapping is above the statutory limits for such crime. Please see order 
ofthe Court of Appeals, dated December 13th, 2016, case number 43975, opinion 
number 817, foot-note at page two. 
When the Court imposed the sentence upon the Petitioner, it imposed a sentence 
of 20 years fixed, or determinate, to befollowed by term of life indeterminate. 
Because the Statutory maximum penalty for the crime of second degree 
kidnapping is 25 years, and the court imposed an indetermnate life sentence, it is 
clear that the Court did not have authority to impose such a term, and therefore 
the sentence is illegal and must be stricken from the record. 
"Subject matter Jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general type or 
class of dispute". Bach V. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 158 P.3d 305, (2007). 
As stated, the Court at the time of the pronouncment of the sentence only had 
authority, or subject matter, to impose a maximum sentence of 25 years. When 
the Court sentenced the Petitioner to a term of life, (when the maximum term is 
25 years), the Court lacked statutory authority to impose such a sentence, and 
therefore it is illegal on it's face. 
"Any Order entered by a Court without Subject Matter Jurisdiction is Void" State 
V. Peterson, 148 Idaho 610, 226 P.Jd 552, (2010). 
"A sentence is illegal within the meaning of Rule 35 only if it is in excess of 
statutory limits or otherwise contrary to applicable law" State V. Alsanea, 138 
Idaho 733, 69 P.3d 153, Ct. App. 2003). 
Because the sentence imposed does in fact exceed the statutory limits for the 
crime of Kidnapping, it is mandatory upon this court to hold a new sentencing 
3 
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hearing. 
THE SENTENCE OF 35 YEARS DETERMINATE IS ILLEGAL FOR THE 
CRIME OF NON-CAPITAL MURDER 
Idaho Code, section 18-4004, and 19-2513, (2), when read In Para Materia, 
mandated that the sentencing court, in first degree murder cases, impose a 
sentence of precisely ten years determinate, with an indeterminate term of life. 
Consequently, the sentence imposed upon the Petitioner of 35 years determinate 
is illegal for the following reasons. 
In the case of Booth V. State, 151 Idaho _ _, 262 P.3d 255, (2011), the Idaho 
State Supreme Court when looking at the first degree murder statute, found as 
follows, " ... following a conviction for first degree murder, in cases where the 
death penalty is not sought, the Court is REQUIRED to impose an indeterminate 
life sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not less than 10 years. 
I.C. 18-4004. In other words, a defendant convicted of first degree murder 
automtically receives an indeterminate life sentence with a fixed term of ten 
years". Booth, Supra, at 266. 
The reasons and the rationale for this statement is very clear and is a matter of 
Statutory construction and Statutory interpretation. 
Idaho Code section 18-4004 is very clear in that there is a set mandatory 
minimum term of ten, ( 10) years that is to be ordered upon a conviction for first 
degree murder when the Death penalty is not sought. 
The authority to impose a "fixed" or a determinate term is provided to the 
District Court through the Unified Sentencing Act, which is codified as 19-2513. 
However, this authority to impose a "fixed" or a determinate term is not 
unlimited. 
In the second paragraph of 19-2513, the Legislature of the State of Idaho, when 
passing the Unified Sentencing Act made the following provision in the Second 
paragraph: 
"If the offense carries a mandatory minimum penalty as provided in the Statute, 
the Court shall specify a minimum period of confinement that is consistent with such 
Statute". 
The Idaho State Supreme Court has held that, " ... the word SHALL when used in 
a Statute, is mandatory". Goff V. H.J.H. Co., 95 Idaho 837, 521 P.2d 661, 
(1974). 
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19-2513, in the second paragraph uses the word SHAIL. It commands that the 
Court, when pronouncing a criminal sentence, if the Statute for which the 
Criminal Defendant is accused of violating, has a mandatory minimum in that 
statute, then the determinate term of the sentence SHALL be consistent with that 
statute. 
In this case, the statute in question is 18-4004, and it does in fact have a 
mandatory minimum term of ten years in that statute. So, when the court ordered 
the Petitioner to serve a 35 year fixed, or determinate term, that is three and one 
half times the 10 year mandatory minimum term in 18-4004, and it is clearly not 
CONSISTENT with that statute, and therefore it is an illegal sentence. 
"Statutes must be interpreted to mean what the Legislature intended for the 
Statute to mean". In Re Miller, 110 Idaho 298, 715 P.2d 968, (1986), quoting, 
Grumprecht V. City of Coeur d'Alene, 104 Idaho 615, 661 P.2d 1214, (1983). 
In addition, statutes that are in Pari Materia are to be construed together, so as to 
further Legislative intent State V. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 670 P.2d 463, (1983). 
Where as here, the Statutes deal with the same subject matter, i.e., sentencing, 
the Statutes are Pari Materia~ and therefore I.C. 18-4004 and 19-2513(2) must be 
read and construed together to understand the Legislative meaning. 
A Court must adhere to the letter and intent of the law, even if the Court does 
not agree with the result, or it's logical strict construction. Ravencroft V. Boise 
County, 154 Idaho 613, 301 P.3d 271, (2013). 
Applying these rules of Statutory construction and interpretation, this Court should 
conclude that the Statutes when read together mean that the sentencing Court 
"SHALL" impose a fixed term of confinement that is "CONSISTENT" with the 
mandatory minimum term required by 18-4004, i.e., a term that is precisely 10 
years. 
The second paragraph of the Unified Sentencing Act, 19-2513, (2), is only to be 
used for those offenses that have a set mandatory minimum term in the Statute. 
In all other cases, the District Court must act under the first paragraph of 
19-2513, which grants to the sentencing Court the ability to impose any fixed 
term, up to and including the Statutory maximum as is provided for in Statute. 
The second paragraph clearly limits the Court's discretion to impose a fixed term 
in those cases where there is a mandatory minimum term in the statute, and it is 
because of this that this Court is mandated to resentence the Petitioner to a term of 
IO years, with an indeterminate life term to follow. 
This is not just a matter of Statutory interprettion of State law, but it is also a Federal 
Due Process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution. "The failure of a State to follow it's own laws and statutory 
commands may implicate a liberty interest that violates the "Fourteenth 
Amendment". Fetterly V. Paskett, 997 F.2d 1295, (9th. Cir. 1993); Ballard V. 
Estelle, 937 F.2d 453, (9th Cir. 1991). 
Both of the aforementioned cases, are from the State of Idaho, whereas Idaho 
would not follow it's own sentencing statutes, very similar to the case before this 
Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons as listed, this Court should enter an order that allows a new 
sentencing hearing to take place, whereas the Petitioner should have the assistance 
of conflict free counsel, and the ability to present any evidence in mitigation of 
the sentence. 
OATH OF PETITIONER 
Comes now, Raul Edgar Herrera, the Petitioner herein, who does now declare under the 
United States Code, Title 28, Section 1746, that the information contained herein is true 
and correct to the best of his knowledge and belief. 
{)./ 11/17 
Dated 1 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
FILED 
CLERK 
BY. 
~~ AT IL3.lw.!.M. 
0 DISTRI5 COUilT 
· 11) 1 i, , Deputy ., 
THE STATE OF IDAHO/or 
} 
} 
} 
-A--;, ·) 
ci,uj_ e_. tfiMj/U:L l 
-----~-------------> 
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC 
DEFENDER 
The Court being fully advised as to the application of the above-named applicant and it appear.ing to 
be a proper case, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Canyon County Public Defender be, and hereby is, appointed for 
THE MATTER SHALL BE SET FOR ________________ _ 
__________________ before Judge _________ _ 
Dated: 3 -- / -/7 
~ Custody - RclatRe :COO(.) 
0 Released: D O.R. 
_ D on bond previously posted 
D to PreTrial Release 
Juvenile: D In Custody 
Signed:~-
/ Judge 
D Released to 
---------------
0 No Contact Order entered. 
D Cases consolidated. 
D Discovery provided by State. 
D Interpreter required. 
D Additional charge of FT A. 
Original-Court File 
ORDER APPOINTING PUBLIC 
DEFENDER 
Yellow-Public Defender Pink--Prosecutlng Attorney 
2/06 
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• aaul Bd~ar qerrer~ Inm t 1\,,1\. a e name F:da::T" p;,m 1 Hprr.er:~. 
IDOCNo. -
Address 
Defendant 
-------
0 aq~ Office Box 14 
Boisr--, rd2bo 
A3707 
• 
---~~ 
CANYON COUNTY ClFU11( 
C JIMENEZ, DE:Plffv 
IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE Tt.rI"Rn WDICIAL DISTRICT 
----'------
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF C?U!YO'N 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
,,_ 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Raul Edgar Herrera 
Defendant. 
) 
) _ .. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
MOTIONFOR 
CORRECTION OR 
REDUCTION OF 
SENTENCE, ICR 35 
• 
COMES NOW, Raul Edgar Herrera Defendant in the instant action, and pursuant 
to Idaho Criminal l.lule 35, moves this Honorable Court for its Order: 
[Xj Correcting the Defendant's illegal sentence, or 1 
[ ] Reducing Defendant's sentence for the reasons stated on page two of this motion: 
1. The Defendant was convicted of .....,(UA.n:dt £ t lb± def'-'2" before the Honorable 
-- -- - ..... -.. 
. .. -- - ·:ruJge _M ....o_l-, '1....,y~·--·H~1 .... 2s ....... k_eioo:l!y ________ and sentenced to a term of imprisonment ID 
the custody of the Idaho Department of Correction for: 
txl a unified term of .Li..feYears including -3..5_ years fixed followed by 1 i teYears 
indeterminate, 
[ ] a fixed term of __ years. 
2. The Defendant has been incarcerated since Ue Q.Q.ro'oe r oLj :;tJ\ ~ and has served 
d ~ ,Qfl)Qn3\u(months/years) of the sentence. 
MOTION FOR REDUCTION OR CORRECTION OF SENTENCE, ICR 35 - 1 
Revised: 3/24/16 
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3. The Defendant believes: 
[ ] The Court should reconsider its earlier sentence and reduce the same on the 
following grounds, or, 
i:Ji The sentence is illegal and should be changed on the following grounds: 
(State the reasons why you believe your sentence should be reduced. You may add extra pages if 
necessary. Any additional documentation must be attached hereto.) 
F.; rst _. the sentence is ~ 1 legal hG'ca·1$e t-he ,.Pry fcPnd 
that all cf the les~er crimes were done iry th~ pcrt~tratton 
~f the Firat Degree Homi~tac, and therefore it is Felony Murd0~, 
and the Court sho11ld not have imposed a sentence for each offense. 
Next, thP rnurt .; mpcped ~ ::aent!=>Dr'f' of life -For th.c> rrj me 
cleHrly only provides fer a s~nt~~ce of 25 ve~r~. 
EinaJJy: tbe crimr-- rf F'irc;t- Deg"'""'"' Mprdcr, wh"-'~ the deat-h 
~~xi~um penalty 0f life indeterminate. ~1th ten. (10), vear~ 
fixef. The Court in violation cf 19-2513, (2}, di~ not give 
to t11~ Defendant a fixed torm that W:JZ "co.nsi stent" to t11e f ir:::t 
dearee homicide statute. rt Rent-enc3a tbP npfendant to J 1/2 
times the amount or0viaca for and inasmuch violated 19-2513.(2), 
:,-rid 18--4004. These fa~ts ana ~.rgument is conta:i.nco in the 
rnmncrar.dum in S1-1pport of t.h:i.s Motion,. a.1.so f.ilea herd.n. 
MOTION FOR REDUCTION OR CORRECTION OF SENTENCE, ICR 35 - 2 
Revised: 3/24/16 
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Defendant additionally submits the following documentation for consideration: 
Thr.. M.:.m..--randPro i !"I S• 1 ppor+- c-F tbe "Qp 1 e ~ c:: Motion~ and. 
the .1·1ry'c: verd;,..+- for,·o, 91.!-:rh~bit A), --:od the Ch::ir9"1ncr Documentr 
CExbihi~ B), filed therein. 
WHEREFORE, the Defendant, t?anl Rdgar Herrera 
this Honorable Court to reduce or correct the sentence as follows: 
, respectfully prays 
ReF 0 nt-ence +-he OPfPndaot to a term of lifa, with ten, (10} 
years fixod. such as is providg1 for within the ~tatutory scheme 
c"'-, -F.:..,..·· -=t..:..:h'-'~ ..... - -'-'l=c1=--'llc:..,·1s'-"----o=f---=t=h=Gc.....c.:S;_;:t""".;;:i"-'_t=-e::.......:o=--f=--T==-__ d,:;;;.. • .:o'.3-~h=c-=·----------- or grant such 
other and further relief, as the Court deems appropriate. 
Respectfully submitted this 7,,-,.)> day of_ ..... ~---'-"-'<..~"'--------' 20 \"t . 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 1.,~ day of -~i-=-.:."""~<M~---'' 20 \"1- , I 
delivered to prison authorities for the purpose of mailing a true and correct copy of the MOTION 
FOR REDUCTION OF CORRECTION OF SENTENCE, ICR 35 via prison mail system for 
processing to the U.S. mail system to: 
-- ---------·---·-··------------ I- ----- - ----···--
1 
C.\:;'1:["t; __ .Q..f_llJ>'~C'~..!".t._ C::ioyoo · County Prosecuting Attorney 
ca.nyon:·.cc~mt:y'"CO~.rrthcffue banyan co~rnty Ccurthousn 
1115 P.Jbany St.rGet t 11 5 2\lbe,ny st:-::-~et 
c".aI~relT:-ya;",;:-~ ·--------;:~=-a-.I,....,0..-•:.-,e~l...,_ l..-: -----=-r....,d_a,..h_c _______ _ 
83605 I 83F.f!'1 
·----·-···-·----------
-- ____ ... ------
MOTION FOR REDUCTION OR CORRECTION OF SENTENCE, ICR 35 - 3 
Revised: 3/24/16 
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BRYANF. TAYLOR 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
DEC \ 7 201~ 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
D KENNEL, OEPUTV 1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA 
DOB:
Defendant. 
SUPERCEDING INDICTMENT l 
CASE NO. CR2014-26736 
SUPERCEDING INDICTMENT 
for the crime of: 
COUNT I - MURDER IN THE FIRST 
DEGREE 
Felony, LC. §18-4001, 18-4002;18-4003(a) and 
18-204 
or in the alternative 
COUNT 1- FELONY MURDER (FIRST 
DEGREE) 
Felony, I.C. 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003(d); and 
18-204 
COUNT II - ROBBERY 
Felony, I.C. §18-6501, 18-6502, 18-6503, and 
18-204 
COUNT III - BURGLARY 
Felony, LC. §18-1401 and 18-204 
COUNT IV - KIDNAPPING SECOND 
DEGREE 
Felony, I.C. §18-4501, 18-4503 and 18-204 
COUNT V - AGGRAVATED BATTERY 
Felony, I.C. § 18-903(a), 18-907(a) and 18-204 
72
, 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA is accused by the Grand Jury of Canyon County ofthe 
crimes of MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE, a felony, Idaho Code Section 18-4001, 18-
4002; l 8-4003(a) and 18-204, or in the alternative FELONY MURDER (FIRST DEGREE), a 
felony, Idaho Code Section 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003(d); and 18-204; ROBBERY, a felony, 
Idaho Code Section 18-6501, 18-6502, 18-6503, and 18-204; BURGLARY, a felony, Idaho 
Code Section 18-1401 and 18-204; KIDNAPPING SECOND DEGREE, a felony, Idaho Code 
Section 18-4501, 18-4503 and 18-204; and AGGRAVATED BATTERY, a felony, Idaho Code 
Section l 8-903(a), 18-907(a) and 18-204, committed as follows: 
COUNTI 
That the Defendant, Raul Herrera, on or about the 8th day of November, 2014, in 
the County of Canyon, State ofldaho, did wilfully, unlawfully, deliberately, with premeditation, 
and with malice aforethought, kill and murder Jeffrey Dyer, a human being, by striking Jeffrey 
Dyer in the head with a blunt object creating injuries from which he died, or did aid, abet or 
assist Angelo Cervantes who did willfully, unlawfully, deliberately, with premeditation, and with 
malice aforethought, kill and murder Jeffrey Dyer, a human being, by striking him in the head 
with a blunt object inflicting wounds from which he died. 
All of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section I 8-4001, 18-4002 ;I 8-4003(a) and 18-
204, and against the power, peace and dignity of the State ofldaho. 
or in the alternative 
COUNTI 
That the Defendant, Raul Herrera, on or about the 8th day of November, 2014, in 
the County of Canyon, State ofldaho, did in the perpetration of, or an attempt to perpetrate, a 
robbery and/or burglary and/or kidnapping, kill and murder Jeffrey Dyer, or did aid, abet or 
SUPERCEDING INDICTMENT 2 
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assist Angelo Cervantes who did in the perpetration of, or an attempt to perpetrate, a robbery 
and/or burglary and/or kidnapping, kill and murder Jeffrey Dyer. 
All of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003(d); 18-204 
and against the power, peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
COUNT II 
That the Defendant, Raul Herrera, on or about the 8th day of November, 2014, in 
the County of Canyon, State of!daho, did feloniously, intentionally and by means of force and/or 
fear take from the possession of Jeffrey Dyer and/or Ronald Ghostwolf certain personal 
property, to-wit: oxycodone pills and/or hydrocodone pills and/or a samurai style sword and/or 
cellular telephones and/or buffalo meat and/or gold coins and/or a television, the property of 
Jeffrey Dyer and/or Ronald Ghostwolf, which was accomplished against the will of Jeffrey Dyer 
and/or Ronald Ghostwolf, or did aid, abet or assist Angelo Cervantes who did feloniously, 
intentionally and by means of force and/or fear take from the possession of Jeffrey Dyer 
and/or Ronald Ghostwolf certain personal property, to-wit: oxycodone pills and/or hydrocodone 
pills and/or a samurai style sword and/or cellular telephones and/or buffalo meat and/or gold 
coins and/or a television, the property of Jeffrey Dyer and/or Ronald Ghostwolf, which was 
accomplished against the will of Jeffrey Dyer and/or Ronald Ghostwolf. 
All of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section 18-6501, 18-6502, 18-6503, and 18-204 
and against the power, peace and dignity of the State ofldaho. 
COUNTIII 
That the Defendant, Raul Herrera, on or about the 8th day of November, 2014, in 
the County of Canyon, State of Idaho, did enter into a certain building, to-wit: a house, the 
property of Ronald Ghostwolf, located at 1110 West Dakota in the City of Nampa, with the 
SUPERCEDING INDICTMENT 3 
74
, 
intent to commit the crime of theft and/or robbery and/or aggravated battery and/or kidnapping 
and/or murder. 
All of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section 18-1401 and 18-204 and against the 
power, peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
COUNT IV 
That the Defendant, Raul Herrera, on or about the 8th day of November, 2014, in 
the County of Canyon, State of Idaho, did wilfully seize and/or confine and/or detain Ronald 
Ghostwolf with the intent to inflict serious bodily injury upon him and to cause him to be kept or 
detained against his will within Idaho. 
All of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section 18-4501, 18-4503 and 18-204 and 
against the power, peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
COUNTY 
That the Defendant, Raul Herrera, on or about the 8th day of November, 2014, in 
the County of Canyon, State of Idaho, did willfully and unlawfully use force or violence upon 
the person Ronald Ghostwolf causing great bodily harm by beating him and/or kicking him 
and/or hitting him in the head causing great bodily harm, to wit: severe lacerations, broken bones 
and/or cranial bleeding. 
All of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section l 8-903(a), l 8-907(a) and 18-204 and 
against the power, peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
A TRUE BILL 
SUPERCEDING INDICTMENT 4 
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BRYAN F. TAYLOR 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
•• f L t:: D 
__ __,AM ___ ...sP.M. 
DEC 18 2014 
CANYON COUNTV CLERK 
D KENNEL, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE ST A TE OF lDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
~SE NO. C}3.20 I 4-26736 
Jtf.l~C -,p, I\'\ 
WAkRANT OF-:AitREST 
TO ANY SHERIFF, CONST ABLE, MARSHAL, OR POLICEMAN 
IN THE ST ATE OF IDAHO: 
A SUPERCEDING INDICTMENT having been found on the Jl_ day of December, 
2014, in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, in and for the County of Canyon, State 
ofldaho, charging RAUL EDGAR HERRERA with the crimes of MURDER IN THE FIRST 
DEGREE, a felony, Idaho Code Section 18-4001, 18-4002;18-4003(a) and 18-204, or in the 
alternative FELONY MURDER (FIRST DEGREE), a felony, Idaho Code Section 18-4001, 18-
4002, l 8-4003(d); and 18-204; ROBBERY, a felony, Idaho Code Section 18-6501, 18-6502, 18-
6503, and 18-204; BURGLARY, a felony, Idaho Code Section 18-1401 and 18-204; 
KIDNAPPING SECOND DEGREE, a felony, Idaho Code Section 18-4501, 18-4503 and 18-
WARRANT OF ARREST 
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Presented in Open Court this ci!!day of ~6er , 20/!l 
JJ;;}kA_--_... -
Foreman of the Grand Jury of 
Canyon County, State of Idaho 
NAMES OF WITNESSES EXAMINED BEFORE THE GRAND JURY 
1. Ronald Ghostwolf 
2. Dr. Joseph Kranz 
3. Don Peck 
4. c..r -tt J'i , ~ 
5. Christine Cannon 
6. Cameron Cowdery 
7. Angela Weeks 
SUPERCEDING INDICTMENT 5 
------------------------······-··· ---· 
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__ F __ , A~ 4%7::B.M. 
JUL 2 1 2015 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
S FENNELL, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
______________ ) 
CASE NO. CR- 2014-26736 
VERDICT 
We, the Jury, duly impaneled and sworn to try the above-entitled action, for our verdict, 
unanimously answer the questions submitted to us as follows: 
QUESTION NO. 1: Is Raul Edgar Herrera guilty or not guilty of Murder in the First Degree? 
Not Guilty __ _ Guilty 6. 
VERDICT 
l',.,... 4 .... , •• 4 ' • 
I ; , , 
vJ ,, ... ,, ., ··-' 
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INSTRUCTION No.1-:r> 
•• 
• 
You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged with the 
sincere thanks of this Court. The question may arise as to whether you may discuss this case with 
the attorneys or with anyone else. For your guidance, the Court instructs you that whether you 
talk to the attorneys, or to anyone else, is entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to 
discuss this case, if you wish to, but you are not required to do so, and you may choose not to 
discuss the case with anyone at all. If you choose to, you may tell them as much or as little as 
you like, but you should be careful to respect the privacy and feelings of your fellow jurors. 
Remember that they understood their deliberations to be confidential. Therefore, you should 
limit your comments to your own perceptions and feelings. If anyone persists in discussing the 
case over your objection, or becomes critical of your service, either before or after any 
discussion has begun, please report it to me. 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
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If your answer to Question No. 1 is "Guilty," proceed to answer Question Nos. l(a)-l(d). 
If your answer to Question No. 1 is "Not Guilty," skip Question Nos. l(a)-l(d), and proceed to 
answer Question No. 2. 
QUESTION NO. l(a): Is Raul Edgar Herrera guilty or not guilty of First Degree Murder 
with Malice Aforethought? 
Not Guilty 
---
Guilty A 
QUESTION NO. l(b): Is Raul Edgar Herrera guilty or not guilty of Murder in the 
Perpetration of Robbery? 
Not Guilty __ _ Guilty ~)_;:_ 
QUESTION NO. l(c): Is Raul Edgar Herrera guilty or not guilty of Murder in the 
Perpetration of Burglary? 
Not Guilty 
---
Guilty ~ 
QUESTION NO. I(d): Is Raul Edgar Herrera guilty or not guilty of Murder in the 
Perpetration of Kidnapping? 
Not Guilty __ _ Guilty _· .... '/2. __ 
VERDICT 2 
319 
80
.. • 
, 
QUESTION NO. 2: Is Raul Edgar Herrera guilty or not guilty of Robbery? 
Not Guilty 
---
Guilty '/..,. 
• 
QUESTION NO. 3: Is Raul Edgar Herrera guilty or not guilty of Burglary? 
Not Guilty 
---
Guilty 'f..... 
QUESTION NO. 4: Is Raul Edgar Herrera guilty or not guilty of Kidnapping? 
Not Guilty __ _ Guilty b 
QUESTION NO. 5: Is Raul Edgar Herrera guilty or not guilty of Aggravated Battery? 
Not Guilty __ _ 
Dated this _J_l_day of July, 2015. 
~t l~rb:k/~7 ~ 
Presiding Juror 
VERDICT 
~t/.1 
Juror No. 
Guilty £, 
3 
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BRYAN F. TAYLOR 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Telephone: (208) 454-7391 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR2014-26736 
OBJECTION TO RULE 35 MOTION 
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 
COMES NOW CHRISTOPHER BOYD, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney of the Canyon 
County Prosecuting Attorney's Office, on behalf of the State ofldaho, and objects in part to the 
Defendant's rule 35 motion. With the exception of the indeterminate portion of Herrera's 
sentence on the second degree kidnapping count, the state objects to the Defendant's motion as 
having no basis in law or fact. However, the State moves the court for a correction of the 
sentence on the count of second degree kidnapping to remove the indeterminate portion. As no 
new substantive information was provided by Defendant, there is no need for a new Sentence 
Hearing. 
OBJECTION TO RULE 35 MOTION 
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 1 ORIGINAL 
82
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A trial court may correct an illegal sentence at any time. Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (a). The 
maximum sentence for second degree kidnapping is 25 years. Idaho Code 18-4504(2). On the 
count of second degree kidnapping, the sentence pronounced was 25 fixed and life 
indeterminate. While the court's sentence on that particular count was in error, it may be 
corrected on the judgement without need for a hearing by simply removing the indeterminate 
portion. Defendant would not be prejudiced by this correction in any way because the court 
already imposed an indeterminate life sentence legally on the first degree murder conviction. 
A new Sentence Hearing is not required, however, as Defendant has not provided any 
new or additional information that the court ought to have considered in sentencing. See State v. 
Huffman, 144 Idaho 201,203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). 
Accordingly the state respectfully requests the Court deny in part, grant in part the 
Defendant's motion. 
DATED this 16th day of March, 2017. 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
OBJECTION TO RULE 35 MOTION 
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 2 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on or about this 16th day of March, 2017, I caused a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing instrument to be served upon the attorney for the Defendant by the 
method indicated below and addressed to the following: 
Canyon County Public Defender 
111 N. 11th Ave, Suite 120 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Raul Edgar Herrera 
Inmate# 116611 
IDOC 
PO Box 14 
Boise, ID 83707 
OBJECTION TO RULE 35 MOTION 
AND REQUEST FOR HEARING 3 
() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
() Hand Delivered 
(X) Placed in Court Basket 
() Overnight Mail 
() Facsimile 
() E-Mail 
(X) U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid 
() Hand Delivered 
() Placed in Court Basket 
() Overnight Mail 
() Facsimile 
() E-Mail 
CHRIST 
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: DAVIS F. VANDERVELDE DATE: MARCH 20, 2017 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) COURT MINUTES 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO: CR-2014-26736-C 
) 
vs. ) TIME: 10:00 A.M. 
) 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, ) REPORTED BY: Christine Rhodes 
) 
Defendant. ) 2C-CRT 130 (1025-1030) 
) 
This having been the time heretofore set for status conference in the above 
entitled matter, the State was represented by Mr. Matthew Bever, Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney for Canyon County. The defendant was not personally present in court, but 
was represented by counsel, Mr. Aaron Bazzoli. 
The Court noted the Motion to Reduce Sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35, filed by 
the defendant, as well as the State's objection. 
Mr. Bazzoli requested additional time to submit briefing. 
The Court instructed Mr. Bazzoli to submit any briefing no later than the 14th day 
of April 2017. The State shall respond no later than the 20th day of April 2017. 
The Court set this matter for oral argument the 24th day of April 2017 at 2:00 
p.m. 
COURT MINUTES 
MARCH 20, 2017 Page 1 
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Mr. Bazzoli stated he wished to have the defendant present for oral argument 
and would submit a transport order. 
COURT MINUTES 
MARCH 20, 2017 Page 2 
Deputy Clerk 
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Raul Edgar Herrera, II~ 
I.S.C.I., Unit 11, Cell, _...;;~~,,&.-
Post Office Box 14 
Boise, Idaho 
83707 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO 
) 
MAR 2 7 2017 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
A NICKEL, DEPUTY 
Raul Edgar Herrera, 
Defendant, ) 
) 
) 
NO: C'Y- \ L\ -X 7 3(o-C..,. 
Motion For Conflict 
VS: 
State of Idaho, 
Plaintiff, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Free Counsel 
Comes now, Raul Edgar Herrera, the Defendant herein who does now move this Court for the 
re-appointment of counsel due to a conflict which is herein shown to this Court. The Defendant 
seeks an order from this Court for the appointment of conflict free representation. For 
assistance in this matter, this Court should be aware of the following facts: 
1 ). That during the trial in this case, the Defendant was represented by Attorney John Bujak. 
2). That as a result of having Idaho State Bar proceedings against him Mr. Bujak subsequently 
moved to withdraw from the case, and this Court, (For purposes of sentencing), appointed Mr. 
Buzzoli. 
3). During the sentencing hearing Mr. Buzzoli did not present to the Court the mitigating 
information the Court, which would have perhaps served to ameliorate the sentence imposed. 
4). Mr Buzzofi informed the defendant that he would file a Criminal Court Rule 35 Motion, 
seeking to reduce the sentence imposed, and that he would at that time produce the information 
that would ameliorate the sentence imposed. 
5). Mr. Buzzoli went so far as to seek permission from this Court, for an extension of time to file 
such information, yet never filed such information in this Court. 
6). Mr. Buzzoli, at the time of sentencing, did not even realize that the Court had imposed an 
illegal sentence, (which the Court of appeals and the attorney general during the direct appeal 
process, all recognized as illegal), for the charge of second degree kidnapping. 
7). Furthermore, the issues that are inherent in the present Motion to correct an illegal sentence 
are all issues that reelect that counsel was ineffective during sentencing, or during Trial, and 
therefore it is not logical or permissible for this Court to allow Mr. Buzzoli to be appointed for any 
further action in this case. 
87
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8). It is because of the errors of Counsel Buzzoli and counsel Bujak that the Defendant is being 
compelled to prepare and present, (In the near future), a petition for Post conviction Relief, 
which is based upon these errors. 
Therefore, in keeping with the Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, it is mandated to this Court that the Defendant has a right to conflict free 
representation during the process which is Due to him. 
The United States Supreme Court has clearly held that a Criminal Court Rule 35 Motion is part 
of the direct criminal process, and that the appointment of counsel during such a process is 
mandated under the constitutional guarantee of the Sixth Amendment and the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Wall V. Kholl, 131 S. Ct 1278, 179 L.Ed.2d 252, (2011). 
THEREFORE, it is respectfully requested that this Court enter an order directing that conflict 
counsel be appointed to represent the Defendant during the pendency of the abOve action. 
Raul Edgar Herrera:s-=6 
-
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~-~E D P.M. BAZZOLI LAW, PLLC 
Aaron Bazzoli 
815 Fillmore St 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Phone: (208) 402-5827 
Fax: (208) 874-4307 
Idaho State Bar No. 5512 
APR O 3 ,m1 
CANYON COUNTY CLe'Rf( 
M. CERROS; DEPUTY 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL HERRERA 
Defendant. 
Case No. CR-2014-26736 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
DEFENDANT TO HEARING 
The above-entitled matter, having come before the Court upon motion by the 
Defendant, and Defendant's presence is necessary at the Rule 35 Hearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Canyon County Sheriffs Office shall 
transport to and from the Idaho Department of Corrections, and that the Idaho Canyon 
County for transport, the Defendant, Raul Hererra, inmate number 116611, currently 
housed at ISCI Unit 11 to appear before this Court to be held on April 24, 2017 at 2:00 
p.m. in front of the Honorable Judge James Vandervelde. 
ORDER TO TRANPORT DEFENDANT 
FOR HEARING 
Pagell 
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The Canyon County Sheriff is further ordered to immediately return said 
defendant, to the custody of the Idaho Department of Corrections upon completion of 
said hearing. 
DATED this~ day of_A~~~r_._7 ___ , 2017. 
~~-ab_l_e_J_am_e_s_V_an_d-erv-el_d_e __ _ 
District Judge 
ORDER TO TRANPORT DEFENDANT 
FOR HEARING 
Page 12 
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CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2- day of~ I , 2011-: I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted: 
D By depositing copies of the same in Canyon County Courthouse Interdepartmental Mail. 
[J By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid first class. 
~By hand delivering copies of the same to the office(s) of the attorney(s) indicated below. 
D By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: 
Canyon County Prosecuting Attorney 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
D By depositing copies of the same in Canyon County Courthouse Interdepartmental Mail. 
depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid first class. 
hand delivering copies of the same to the office(s) of the attorney(s) indicated below. 
y faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: 
Aaron Bazzoli 
BAZZOLI LAW, PLLC 
815 Fillmore St. 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
D By depositing copies of the same in Canyon County Courthouse Interdepartmental Mail. 
0 By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid first class. 
~ hand delivering copies of the same to the office(s) of the individual(s) indicated below. 
D By faxing copies of the same to said individual(s) at the facsimile number: 
Canyon County Sheriff's Office 
1115 Albany Street 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
ORDER TO TRANPORT DEFENDANT 
FOR HEARING 
Page 13 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: DAVIS F. VANDERVELDE DATE: APRIL 24, 2017 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) COURT MINUTES 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO: CR-2014-26736-C 
) 
vs. ) TIME: 2:00 P.M. 
) 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, ) REPORTED BY: Christine Rhodes 
) 
Defendant. ) 2C-CRT 130 {207-211) 
) 
This having been the time heretofore set for Defendant's Motion to Correct 
Sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 in the above entitled matter, the State was 
represented by Mr. Matthew Bever, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County. 
The defendant was present in court with counsel, Mr. Kenneth Stringfield. 
The Court reviewed relevant procedural history and noted Mr. Stringfield was 
recently appointed in this case. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Stringfield requested additional time to 
prepare for this matter. 
The Court instructed Mr. Stringfield to file any additional information no later than 
the 31 st day of May 2017. 
The State shall respond no· later than the 14th day of June 2017. 
COURT MINUTES 
APRIL 24, 2017 Page 1 
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The Court set this matter for oral argument the 19th day of June 2017 at 10:00 
a.m. (Block 45 minutes). 
The defendant was remanded to the custody of the Canyon County Sheriff 
pending transport back to the Idaho Department of Correction. 
COURT MINUTES 
APRIL 24, 2017 Page2 
Deputy Clerk 
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Kenneth F. Stringfield 
PO Box777 
213 S. 10th Ave. 
• 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606 
Telephone: (208) 459-6879 
Facsimile: (208) 442-7915 
ISB No.: 3907 
kstringfieldlaw@gmail.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
• 
_F_I ,._,r. ___ e_g,_M. 
MAY 3 0 2017 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
E BULLON, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL E. HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO: CR2014-26736 
DEFENDANT'S 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF RULE 35 MOTION TO 
CORRECT SENTENCE 
COMES NOW Kenneth Stringfield, counsel for the Defendant, Raul E. Herrera, 
and does hereby submit this memorandum supporting Defendant's February 23, 2017 
pro se Motion to Correct Sentence ("pro se motion"), filed pursuant to Idaho Criminal 
Rule 35. Mr. Herrera asks that the Court correct his sentence for second degree 
kidnapping, as the Court imposed an illegal sentence, one greater than the statutory 
limits. 
BACKGROUND 
Neither of the other two Rule 35 illegal sentence claims Mr. Herrera raised in his 
motion are argued in this memorandum. Those claims are: (1) that his sentence violated 
double jeopardy principles by imposing multiple punishments for the same crime; and 
(2) that the determinate portion of Mr. Herrera's sentence for first degree murder 
conviction exceeded what LC. § 18-4004 authorized. The first claim, based on the 
principles of included offenses, merger and felony murder, fails because the jury found 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RULE 35 MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE - 1 
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Mr. Herrera guilty of, and the Court sentenced him for, premeditated murder, LC. § 18-
4003(a), not felony murder, LC.§ 18-4003(d). See, Judgment and Commitment, pp. 1-
2, Jan. 13, 2016, and State v. McKinney, 153 Idaho 837 (2013) (No double jeopardy 
violation where defendant was convicted of premeditated and felony (robbery) murder 
in the alternative, because premeditated murder and robbery have different elements.). 
The second claim appears to rely upon a misreading of LC. § 18-4004 and Booth v. 
State, 151 Idaho 612 (2011). The assertion muddies the statute's language establishing 
the floor, "minimum period of confinement of not less than 10 years," with a statutory 
instruction for a court to impose a definite sentence. In order for the assertion to 
succeed, the statute should read something like, "a determinate period of confinement 
neither more, nor less, than 10 years" or "a fixed term of confinement of 10 years." 
Mr. Herrera was convicted after jury trial for the crime of second-degree 
kidnapping, in violation of Idaho Code §§ 18-4501, 18-4503 and 18-204. (Judgment and 
Commitment, pp. 1-2, Jan. 13, 2016). For the kidnapping, Mr. Herrera was sentenced to 
twenty (20) years determinate and an indeterminate period not to exceed life, for a total 
unified term of life. Id. at 2. 
LAW 
The court may correct a sentence that is illegal from the face of the record at any 
time. LC.R. 35. An illegal sentence under Rule 35 is one in excess of a statutory 
provision or otherwise contrary to applicable law. State v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 745 
(Ct. App. 2003). Kidnapping in the second degree is punishable by imprisonment in the 
state prison not less than one (1) nor more than twenty-five (25) years. LC. § 18-
4504(2). Idaho Code provides that: "The court shall specify a minimum period of 
confinement and may specify a subsequent indeterminate period of custody. The court 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RULE 35 MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE - 2 
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shall set forth in its judgment and sentence the minimum period of confinement and the 
subsequent indeterminate period, if any, provided, that the aggregate sentence shall not 
exceed the maximum provided by law." I.C. § 19-2513. 
ANALYSIS 
An illegal sentence is one that, from the face of the record, imposes a penalty that 
is simply not authorized by law. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 86 (2009). The law 
authorizes a maximum of twenty-five years incarceration for second-degree kidnapping. 
LC.§ 18-4504. The Court sentenced Mr. Herrera to a fixed term of twenty years; 
therefore, it could only impose an indeterminate term of five years or less. When the 
Court sentenced Mr. Herrera to indeterminate life, it exceeded its authority and the 
sentence in excess of authority was illegal. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant Defendant's Rule 35 motion to 
correct its sentence. 
DATED: M~o17. 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RULE 35 MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE - 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was served by the following method indicated below to each of the following: 
Canyon County Prosecutor 
4-o 
DATED: Ma~2017. 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ x ] Attorney's basket 
in clerk's office 
DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RULE 35 MOTION TO CORRECT SENTENCE - 4 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: DAVIS F. VANDERVELDE DATE: JUNE 19, 2017 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) COURT MINUTES 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO: CR-2014-26736-C 
) 
vs. ) TIME: 9:45 A.M. 
) 
RAUL HERRERA, ) REPORTED BY: Christine Rhodes 
) 
Defendant. ) 2C-CRT 130 (944-947) 
) 
This having been the time heretofore set for Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 
Sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 in the above entitled matter, the State was represented by 
Mr. Matthew Bever, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County. The defendant was 
not personally present in court, but was represented by counsel, Mr. Kenneth Stringfield. 
Mr. Bever indicated the State had no objection to correcting the sentence on the 
Kidnapping charge. 
The Court noted if the motion was granted, it would set the matter out for sentencing 
and order an updated Presentence Investigation Report. 
The Court continued this matter until the 30th day of June 2017 at 11 :00 a.m. 
The Court instructed Mr. Stringfield to prepare the transport arder. 
COURT MINUTES 
JUNE 19, 2017 Page 1 
Deputy Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DIST~~CLEJI( 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF CANY(§#&fl!L. DEPUTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL E. HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO: CR.2014-26736 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
This Court having read the Defendant's Motion for Transport and good 
cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that RAUL E. HERRERA be transported by the 
Canyon County Sheriff from the Idaho State Correctional Institution Unit 11, 
Boise, Idaho, on or before June 30, 2017 at the hour of 11:00 a.m. to appear at a 
hearing before the Honorable Honorable Davis R. VanderVelde at the Canyon 
County Courthouse in Caldwell, Idaho. 
DATED this '1. l day of June, 2017 . 
. Davis R. VanderVelde, District Judge 
. ··, .. 
' ,{ ··,~ 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT- 1 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served by the following method indicated below to each 
of the following: 
Canyon County Sheriff 
Canyon County Prosecutor 
Kenneth F. Stringfield 
PO Box 777 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606 
DATED this~ay of June, 2017. 
[] U.S. Mail 
[] FAX 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
~Basket in 
clerk's office 
[] U.S. Mail 
[] FAX 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[x] Attorney's basket in 
clerk's office 
[] U.S. Mail 
[] FAX 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
')(. Attorney's basket in 
clerk's office 
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT- 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: DAVIS F. VANDERVELDE DATE: June 30, 2017 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
COURT MINUTES 
CASE NO: CR2014-26736*C 
TIME: 11 :00 A.M. 
REPORTED BY: 
Christine Rhodes 
2CCRT130 (1147-1207) 
This having been the time heretofore set for motion Rule 35 in the above entitled 
matter, the State was represented by Mr. Christopher Topmiller, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney 
for Canyon County; and the defendant was personally present, represented by counsel, Mr. 
Kenneth Springfield. 
The Court called the case. 
Mr. Springfield advised the Court the defendant wished to address the Court. 
The defendant requested the Court continue this matter and presented argument in 
support of the motion. Additionally, the defendant indicated he was unable to reach his attorney 
until yesterday at the prison. 
. . 
Mr. Stringfield advised the Court in his brief he noted he would not argue the language of 
Idaho Code 18-4004; however he did. discussed with the defendant the memorandum that he 
would submit to the Court. Additionally, Mr. Stringfield advised the Court he did not see an 
issue with the double jeopardy and he had a supplemental memorandum. 
COURT MINUTES 
June 30, 2017 Page 1 
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Mr. Topmiller inquired of the Court as if Mr. Stringfield was a conflict attorney with the 
Public Defender's officer or private counsel. 
The Court noted Mr. Stringfield was a conflict attorney. 
Mr. Topmiller advised the Court based on previous cases without a legal conflict it would 
be up to Ms. Howard. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, the defendant indicated he wanted to continue with Mr. 
Stringfield and he wanted additional time to discuss this matter with Mr. Stringfield. 
The Court examined the defendant and determined he understood he had the right for 
the appointment of counsel; he did not have the right for someone be appointed that would 
agree with everything that he believed. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Stringfield advised the Court he felt ·additional time 
would be appropriate. 
The Court noted the defendant needed time to prepare with his attorney. 
Mr. Stringfield advised the Court he had the supplemental memorandum; however he 
needed to discussed it with the defendant. 
Mr. Topmiller advised the Court the State had no objection in a continuance. 
Additionally, Mr. Topmiller advised the Court the State would concede on the kidnapping 
charge. 
The Court noted the only issue was if whether there should be a resentencing or if it 
could be amended. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, Mr. Stringfield advised the Court he would need three 
(3) weeks to get the briefing filed. 
Mr. Topmiller advised the Court the State would not need much time to review the briefs. 
COURT MINUTES 
June 30, 2017 Page2 
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· The Court noted that Mr. Stringfield's breifs would need to be submitted by July 21, 2017 
and the State would have until July 28, 2017 to respond. 
The Court continued the Rule 35 motion until August 8, 2017 at 10:00 a.m. before 
Judge VanderVelde. The Court noted it would block one (1) hour for the hearing. 
The Court instructed Mr. Stringfield to prepare the transport order. 
The defendant was remanded into the custody of the Canyon County Sheriff pending 
transport to the Idaho Department of Correction. 
COURT MINUTES 
June 30, 2017 Page 3 
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\~\ I A.~ E D P-M, 
JUL 11 2017 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
M.NYE,DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL E. HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO: CR2014-26736 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT 
This Court having read the Defendant's Motion for Transport and good 
cause appearing therefore; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, that RAUL E. HERRERA be transported by the 
Canyon County Sheriff from the Idaho State Correctional Institution Unit 11, 
Boise, Idaho, on or before August 8, 2017 at the hour of 10:00 a.m. to appear at a 
hearing before the Honorable Honorable Davis R. VanderVelde at the Canyon 
County Courthouse in Caldwell, Idaho. 
DATED this 10 day of July, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing document was served by the following method indicated below to each 
of the following: 
Canyon County Sheriff 
Canyon County Prosecutor 
Kenneth F. Stringfield 
PO Box 777 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606 
DATED this -lL day of July, 2017. 
[] U.S. Mail 
fl FAX 
.. Jiand Delivery 
,:1X!.. Basket in 
clerk's office 
[] U.S. Mail 
[ J FAX 
Hand Delivery 
l_xJ Attorney's basket in 
clerk's office 
[] U.S. Mail 
LJ FAX 
[] l la11d Delivery 
~ Attorney's basket in 
clerk's office 
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Kenneth F. Stringfield 
POBoxm 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606 
Telephone: (208) 459-6879 
ISB No.: 3907 
kstringfieldlaw@gmail.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
F I ~~1!/t.M. 
JUL 2 1 2017 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
V CASTRO, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL E. HERRERA, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO: CR2014-26736 
DEFENDANTS 
SUPPLEMENTAL 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF RULE 35 MOTION TO 
CORRECT SENTENCE 
RAUL E. HERRERA through his attorney, Kenneth Stringfield, submits this 
supplemental memorandum to address his attorney's mistake in not arguing that the 35 
years fixed portion of the first degree murder sentence was illegal because it exceeded 
the statutory limits of Idaho Code §18-4004 (§18-4004). 
INTRODUCTION 
On February 23, 2017, Mr. Herrera filed a prose Motion to Correct Sentence 
(Motion) and supporting Brief. He was appointed an attorney, who filed an initial 
Memorandum (Memo) on May 30, 2017; the state filed a notice of non-filing on June 6, 
2017. The Memo briefly discussed §18-4004's statutory limits to the fixed portion of Mr. 
Herrera's sentence. This supplemental memorandum addresses the argument from 
Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612 (2011)1 and then addresses considerations of statutory 
construction. 
1 Attachment 1. 
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ISSUE 
Whether Idaho Code §18-4004 required the court to impose a period often {10) 
years for the fixed portion of a unified life sentence of where Mr. Herrera was convicted 
of first degree murder, but not given the death penalty. 
reads, 
LAW 
Mr. Herrera was sentenced under Idaho Code §18-4004. The relevant portion 
... [E]very person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be 
punished ... by imprisonment for life, provided that ... [l]f 
the death penalty is not sought, the court shall impose a life 
sentence with a minimum period of confinement of not less 
than ten (10) years .... 
Emphasis added. In other words, a defendant convicted of first-degree murder 
automatically receives an indeterminate life sentence with a fixed term of ten years. 
Booth v. State, supra. 
The statutory construction rules require courts to apply statutes rationally, based 
on the plain meaning of all the words of the statute -unless the words or statute as a 
whole are ambiguous. State v. Willison, 159 Idaho 215 {Ct.App.2015) {Williston asked 
the appellate court to review the trial court's interpretation of §18-923, Attempted 
Strangulation), citing: State v. Burnight, 132 Idaho 654, 659 (1999); State v. 
Escobar, 134 Idaho 387,389 (Ct.App.2000). A statute is not clear, is ambiguous, ifit 
can have "more than one (reasonable) meaning." State v. Taylor, 160 Idaho 381 {2016).2 
If a statute is ambiguous, a court is to examine the reasonableness of the interpretations, 
the statute's words, the legislative intent -including the policy behind and history of the 
statute. Id. If possible, a court should not read a statute to render it absurd or a nullity. 
2 Citing Doe v. Boy Scouts of America, 148 Idaho 427, 430 (2009) (quoting State v. Doe, 
147 Idaho 326, 328 (2009)). 
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State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437 (Ct.App.2013); and State v. Doe, 140 Idaho 271, 275 
(2004). 
Additionally, if a criminal statute is ambiguous, the rule oflenity applies and the 
statute must be construed in favor of the accused. Bradshaw, Id.; State v. Dewey, 131 
Idaho 846, 848 (Ct.App.1998). However, where a review of the legislative history makes 
the meaning of the statute clear, the rule oflenitywill not be applied. Bradshaw, Id.; 
State v. Jones, 151 Idaho 943, 947 (Ct.App.2011). 
ARGUMENT 
Idaho Code §18-4004 unambiguously instructs a court to impose a life sentence 
that includes a ten (10) year a minimum sentence. Mr. Herrera's pro se brief argued that 
the statute was clear and required Judge Husky to impose a fixed ten (10) years 
sentence for the murder conviction. The state will likely argue that §18-4004 is clear and 
only limits the lower end of a fixed sentence, but allows any fixed sentence up to life. 
Plainly§ 18-4004 limits a judge's discretion regarding the fixed period of time for a first 
degree, non-capital, murder conviction. 
1. The Booth Argument. 
Since submitting the Memo, Mr. Herrera's attorney has re-considered his 
conclusion that Mr. Herrera's earlier argument was based on a misreading of Booth v. 
State, and §18-4004. Booth states that I.C. §18-4004 is a clear, unambiguous statute and 
that the penalty for first degree, non-capital murder is, "an indeterminate life sentence 
with afix.ed term of ten years." State v. Booth, supra (emphasis added). 
Booth challenged his attorney's representation after his conviction and sentence 
for first degree murder; the exact issue involved Booth's lawyer's understanding of the 
application of statutory aggravating circumstances; however, the Court also addressed a 
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State's argument that compared the penalties for non-capital first and second degree 
murder. Justice Jim Jones wrote the Booth decision for an unanimous Supreme Court. 3 
Booth argued that bis attorney was ineffective because his attorneys advice was based 
on a misunderstanding of the potential penalties established by §18-4004. Booth's 
argument was a matter of first impression in Idaho; but, it had been considered by the 
United States Supreme Court in Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) ("when a 
statute unambiguously sets forth a particular penalty, an attorney has a duty to provide 
correct advice regarding such penalty"). The Idaho Supreme Court stated that §18-4004, 
like the statute at issue in Padilla, was unambiguous and "the potential penalties in 
Idaho for first-degree murder in a non-capital case are clear from the statute." State v. 
Booth, supra. The Court analyzed the State's argument that Booth faced the same 
penalty for first or second degree murder under §18-4004. The Court noted the 
difference in the potential sentences, 
Under I.C. § 18-4004, second-degree murder is "punishable 
by imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and the 
imprisonment may extend to life." I.C. § 18-4004. In 
contrast, following a conviction for first-degree murder, in 
cases where the death penalty is not sought, the court is 
required to impose an indeterminate life sentence with a 
minimum period of confinement of not less than ten years. 
I.C. § 18-4004. 
Justice Jones then restates the point, 
3 Justice Jim Jones authored the Booth decision and was the Idaho Attorney General 
from 1983 to 1991. See http://www.naag.org/naa,g/about naag/naag-histo:o,:/past-
state-attomeys-general-by-state/idaho-former-attomeys-general,php C opened July 18, 
2017). See Attachment 2. Jim Jones and his deputies took part in the 1985-1986 
legislative process discussed below responsible for Idaho's unified sentencing scheme 
and the statutory language at issue in this case. 
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In other words, a defendant convicted of first-degree 
murder automatically receives an indeterminate life 
sentence with a fixed term of ten years, while a defendant 
convicted of second-degree murder only faces a unified tenn 
of not less than ten years. 
Emphasis added. The Court's restatement is consistent with the construction that §18-
4004 imposes both a floor and ceiling for the fixed time and that the language "not less 
than ten (lo) years" simply amplifies that the time is a "minimum" fixed period. 
For the reason that §18-4004 is clear, and establishes a fixed period often (10) 
years for first degree murder, and because Mr. Herrera was sentenced to a fixed term of 
35 years, the court should grant his request to be resentenced. 
2. The Statutory Construction Argument. 
Although Mr. Herrera believes that §18-4004 clearly sets the fixed sentence at ten 
(10) years, he understands the argument that the statute is unclear whether it simply 
limits the minimum fixed time or establishes the determinate time that a sentencing 
court must impose. The state will likely argue that §18-4004 is clear and only limits the 
lower end of a fixed sentence, but allows any fixed sentence up to life. If the State's 
position is reasonable (ignoring Booth), then §18-4004 has at least two reasonable 
meanings and therefore is ambiguous. State v. Taylor, supra. But even if the statute is 
ambiguous, the analysis resolves in Mr. Herrera's favor. 
First, Mr. Herrera has not asked the court to read the statute in an unreasonable 
manner. Sentencing courts sometimes use the phrase, "a minimum period of 
confinement of not less than ten (10) years ... " to refer to the detenninate portion of a 
defendant's sentence. Likely, the judges who use the phrase this way are reasonable and 
are using the phrase in a reasonable manner. Just because there are other ways to say 
the same thing, as pointed out on page 2 of the Memo (Background paragraph), does 
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not mean that it Mr. Herrera's reading of the statute is unreasonable. Further, and 
simply in respect to reasonableness, Mr. Herrera and Justice Jones' interpretation of 
§18-4004 are consistent. Assuming for this argument that the State's position is also 
reasonable, then there is an ambiguity in the statute and it is necessary to look to 
legislative intent. 
Second, the legislative intent should be determined if possible by examining the 
public policy for the statute and its legislative histocy. State v. Taylor, supra.4 In 1972, 
the legislature set the penalty for first degree murder at death or life in prison. The next 
year, it removed the life in prison and left the death penalty. In 1986, the legislature 
changed the penalty back to include life with this language, " ... whenever the court shall 
impose a sentence of life imprisonment the court shall set forth in its judgment and 
sentence a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (10) years during which 
period ... the offender shall not be eligible for parole ... " 1986 Session Laws, ch. 232, sec. 
2, p.639; HB 524.s The 1986 change was the result of the legislature's response to the 
disparity of sentences between Idaho's judicial districts and judges. The legislature 
acknowledged that both judges and the public knew of the disparity and the result was a 
loss of respect and confidence in the criminal system and unfair treatment to 
4 There is an argument based on case law that if a criminal statute is ambiguous the rule 
oflenity applies and requires the court to find in favor of the defendant's interpretation. 
When it is a criminal statute that is at issue, the court must construe the statute strictly 
and in favor of the defendant. State v. Culbreth, 146 Idaho 322 (Ct.App.2008); State v. 
McCoy, 128 Idaho 362, 365 (1996); State v. Martinez, 126 Idaho 801, 803 
(Ct.App.1995). State v. Bradshaw, 155 Idaho 437 (App. 2013). 
5 Searching the Idaho Legislature Research and Legislation Division website did not 
tum up a statement of policy as its searchable session laws and committee reports only 
goes back to 1994. The legislative sessions that have searchable committee minutes only 
goes back to 1998. 
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defendants. In order to solve the problem a Criminal Sentencing Committee was 
formed. See House Concurrent Resolution No. 20. 6 Eventually, because of the 
comII_1ittee's work, the legislature passed the Unified Sentencing Act (Act)1 and the 
language of §18-4004 that is at issue here. 
Portions of the legislative history show the legislative intent behind the Act's 
change to §18-4004. In July 1985, as Attorney General, Jim Jones addressed the 
Committee, "Clarification of sentencing statues to make more definite the amount of 
time that a convicted person must serve." Idaho Legislative Council Committee Minutes, 
July 25, 1985. This is consistent with the statute setting a determinate ten (10) year 
sentence. Also consistent is the Legislative Council Staff Memo indicating that RS12057, 
which did not make it out of committee, created a "new fixed term for murder. "8 
However, the intent to simply establish a sentencing floor but not a ceiling for the 
determinate portion of is not perfectly clear. The Statement of Purpose for the Act 
contains the following language, 
The change to Section 20-223 requires new language in 
Section 18-4004 to require persons serving a sentence for 
first degree murder serve a minimum of 10 years. 
Statement of Purpose, RS 12299 C3.9 The Statement then addresses the policy, 
There are two major policy justifications for this proposal. 
First, by making the minimum period fixed and not subject 
to reduction, greater truth in sentencing is achieved. At the 
time of sentencing everyone knows the minimum period 
which must be served. Second, greater sentencing flexibility 
6 Attachment 3. 
7 HB 524 and Minutes. Attachment 4. 
s See Attachment s 
9 Attachment 6. RS12299 made it out of committee and eventually became law. 
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is achieved. The court can tailor the sentence to fit the 
person convicted by combining minimum and indeterminate 
periods. The court can impart the specific amount of 
punishment it feels to be just and till impose an 
indeterminate period to be used by the commission of 
Pardons and Parole for rehabilitation and parole purposes. 
The broadest reading of this policy is that judges will have unlimited discretion to 
impose a fixed and indeterminate sentence. But that is not the case. Judges are limited 
by the penalty the statute provides. The title to the Act regarding §18-4004, states, 
Relating to criminal sentencing; providing a short title; 
amending section 18-40004, Idaho Code, to require a 
mandatory minimum sentence of ten years be served if a 
sentence for life imprisonment is imposed ... 
This title reflects the intent to fix the mandatory minimum sentence at ten (10) years. 
Had the either the title or the statute said something along the lines of "with a 
mandatory minimum sentence of at least ten years," then it would be clear that the 
legislature intended the determinate period of the sentence to be ten years or greater. It 
appears that the policy and history behind HB 524 regarding the language at issue 
before the court are not perfectly clear policy. 
Third, because the legislative intent is not clear or does not help determine the 
meaning of the statute, the court must apply the rule of Ienity in favor of the defendant. 
Bradshaw, supra.; State v. Dewey, 131 Idaho 846, 848 (Ct.App.1998). Because (1) there 
is an ambiguity and (2) the policy language does not clarify the language at issue, the 
lenity rule of statutory construction requires that the court favor Mr. Herrera's 
interpretation of §18-4004. 
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CONCLUSION 
Although the state's construction of the statute appears reasonable, when either 
Booth, or the rules of statutory construction are considered, Mr. Herrera's construction 
that the statute sets the fixed portion of a sentence at ten years is more reasonable. For 
these reasons, the Court should grant Defendant's Rule 35 motion to correct Mr. 
Herrera's sentence. Mr. Herrera should be resentenced for first degree murder to a fixed 
ten (10) years followed by indeterminate life. 
DATED: July 21, 2017. 
KENNETH STRINGFI~LD . 
Attorney for the Defen.dant 
I 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
document was served by the following method indicated below to each of the following: 
Canyon County Prosecutor [ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
DATED: July 21, 2017. 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ x] Attorney's basket 
in clerk's office 
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Trevor James BOOTH, Petitioner-Respondent, 
v. 
STATE of Idaho, Respondent-Appellant. 
No. 37296. 
Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, June 2011 Term. 
July 28, 2011. 
257*257 Honorable Lawrence G. Wasden, 
Attorney General, Boise, for appellant. Kenneth K. 
Jorgensen argued. 
Law Offices of Van G. Bishop, Nampa, for 
respondent. Van G. Bishop argued. 
SUBSTITUTE OPINION 
THE COURT'S PRIOR OPINION DATED JUNE 29, 
2011 IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN 
J. JONES, Justice. 
The State of Idaho appeals the district court's 
order granting Trevor Booth's petition for post-
conviction relief on the ground that Booth 
received ineffective assistance of counsel. We 
affirm. 
I. Factual and Procedural Background 
On January 16, 2005, Leonard Kellum died as a 
result of multiple gunshot wounds that he 
-
silencer made out of a plastic soda bottle. Law 
enforcement found a single set of footprints 
leading from the back door of Kellum's residence 
to the street, where neighbors said a black pickup 
truck was parked at the time of the shooting. 
Booth, who owned a black pickup truck, told law 
enforcement that he had driven to Kellum's 
residence on the morning Kellum was shot to pick 
up marijuana that he planned to sell. Booth 
claimed he parked his pickup truck on the street 
and approached the front door of the residence 
where he heard screaming and gunshots. Booth 
told law enforcement that he left the residence 
after hearing the shots. However, before Kellum 
passed away, he was transported to the hospital 
where he identified Booth as the person who had 
shot him. 
Booth was subsequently charged with first-degree 
murder, and was represented by Richard Harris. 
Although the crime of first-degree murder carries 
a potential penalty of death,111 the State declined 
to file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty, 
thereby establishing that Booth's case was a non-
capital casePl During the time the case was 
pending, Harris met with Booth periodically to 
discuss Booth's version of the events leading up to 
Kellum's death. Although Booth initially 
maintained that he did not commit the offense, he 
eventually acknowledged that he killed Kellum, 
but asserted he did so in order to defend himself 
sustained at his residence. After an investigation, and his family. Booth told Harris that he was 
law enforcement suspected that Trevor Booth was actively involved in selling controlled substances 
responsible for the shooting. Law enforcement and Kellum was his supplier. Booth explained that 
based this conclusion on several pieces of 
evidence obtained during the investigation. First, 
law enforcement determined that the perpetrator 
had entered Kellum's residence through the back 
door and shot him five times using an improvised 
he eventually fell behind in paying Kellum for the 
drugs he had supplied, and Kellum began making 
threats of physical violence towards Booth, his 
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family, 258*258 and his girlfriend if he did not pay 
the money owed. 
Prior to trial, Gearld Wolff, the prosecutor 
handling Booth's case, informed Harris that he 
intended to file a motion requesting that the 
Court provide a special verdict form to be used by 
the jury if Booth was convicted of first-degree 
murder. Specifically, the proposed verdict form 
would instruct the jury to determine whether 
certain statutory aggravating circumstances 
delineated in I.e.§ 19-2515(9)l31existed, including 
whether (1) the murder was especially heinous, 
atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional 
depravity; (2) by the murder, or circumstances 
surrounding its commission, the defendant 
exhibited utter disregard for human life; or (3) the 
defendant, by prior conduct or conduct in the 
commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited 
a propensity to commit murder which will 
-
court if a jury is waived, finds a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable 
doubt but finds that the imposition of the death 
penalty would be unjust, the court shall impose 
a fixed life sentence. If a jury, or the court if a 
jury is waived, does not find a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable 
doubt or if the death penalty is not sought, the 
court shall impose a life sentence with a 
minimum period of confinement of not less than 
ten (10) years during which period of 
confinement the offender shall not be eligible 
for parole or discharge or credit or reduction of 
sentence for good conduct, except for 
meritorious service. Every person guilty of 
murder of the second degree is punishable by 
imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and 
the imprisonment may extend to life. 
Wolff interpreted this statute to mean that if the 
probably constitute a continuing threat to society. jury were to find any statutory aggravating 
Wolff communicated to Harris his understanding circumstances in a non-capital case, the court 
that pursuant to I.C. § 18-4004, the statute dealing would then be required to impose a fixed life 
with the penalties for first-degree murder, the sentence. 
State could seek an instruction regarding statutory After examining the statute, Harris agreed with 
aggravating circumstances even in a non-capital Wolff's interpretation and believed Booth would 
case. I.e.§ 18-400414lprovides, 
Subject to the provisions of sections 19-2515 
and 19-2515A, Idaho Code, every person guilty 
of murder of the first degree shall be punished 
by death or by imprisonment for life, provided 
that a sentence of death shall not be imposed 
unless the prosecuting attorney filed written 
notice of intent to seek the death penalty as 
required under the provisions of section 18-
4004A, Idaho Code, and provided further that 
whenever the death penalty is not imposed the 
court shall impose a sentence. If a jury, or the 
be subject to a fixed life sentence if the jury were 
to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a 
statutory aggravating circumstance existed. Harris 
and Wolff subsequently met with the district court 
judge prior to the scheduled pretrial conference to 
discuss the State's intent to request the special 
verdict form. During this meeting, the parties 
discussed Wolff and Harris's mutual 
understanding of I.C. § 18-4004. The judge 
informed Wolff and Harris that the court would 
likely use the special verdict form if it was 
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requested by the State and supported by the 
evidence. 
Thereafter, Harris prepared a memorandum to 
Booth outlining his understanding of the potential 
penalties if Booth were to be convicted by a jury 
of first-degree murder. In the memorandum, 
Harris set forth the text of I.C. § 18-4004 and 
explained that, 
What this statute means is that upon a 
conviction for first degree murder, if the jury or 
judge if [a] jury is waived, finds a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond 259*259 a 
reasonable doubt[,] the sentence is death. 
mitigation, [is] a fixed life sentence which means 
you will spend the rest of your life in prison. 
The memorandum goes on to explain what 
statutory aggravating circumstances the State 
intended to prove. Harris mentioned that in his 
experience, "it is not too difficult for a finding to 
be made that a murder is heinous (a murder by 
definition is considered heinous) atrocious or cruel 
or alternatively that by committing the murder, 
the defendant showed utter disregard for life." 
Harris also described, in detail, all of the State's 
evidence against Booth, and explained "based 
upon the evidence as currently presented, I 
believe the high probability is that the jury is going However, if the prosecutor does not seek death, 
as is the case here, and if a statutory aggravating to return a verdict of guilty." Finally, Harris 
advised Booth that his best option was to consider 
circumstance is found, then the sentence is a 
fixed life sentence. That means the person 
sentenced will spend his life in prison and will 
die there. At the pre-trial conference on Friday 
the Judge indicated to the prosecutor and 
myself that he will submit a verdict form to the 
jury that will ask the question of the jury: "Did 
Trevor Booth commit the crime of first degree 
murder? Yes or No." The verdict form will also 
contain the same question for second degree 
murder and for manslaughter. If the jury finds 
you guilty of first degree murder, the verdict 
form will contain the further question for the 
jury: "do you find beyond a reasonable doubt a 
statutory aggravating circumstance? Yes or No." 
Since the trial judge intends to submit the 
question to the jury as part of the verdict form 
and if the jury finds a statutory aggravating 
circumstance as part of the verdict, then the 
sentence to be imposed by the judge, 
notwithstanding all the evidence there is in 
entering into a plea agreement with the State. 
The bottom line is this. If you go to jury trial, 
there is the very strong probability of facing a 
fixed life sentence. That means spending the 
rest of your life in prison. If you enter a plea to 
murder with the prosecutor waiving aggravated 
circumstances, or not requesting the court 
consider aggravated circumstances, then you 
would face a minimum period of incarceration 
of ten years or whatever greater period the 
judge[] might impose. I have indicated above I 
do not think the Judge would impose a term 
greater tha[n] fifteen years followed by an 
indeterminate life. Life in that context means 
thirty years. My recommendation is because of 
the strong risk of spending the rest of your life in 
prison, a plea agreement may be your best 
option. 
After giving the memorandum to Booth, Harris 
met with Booth's family members to explain and 
discuss the memorandum. Harris discussed with 
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Booth's family the nuances of the statutory 
aggravating circumstances and the risks 
associated with taking the case to trial. During this 
time, Harris continued to negotiate with Wolff 
regarding a potential plea agreement. 
Booth subsequently entered into a Rule 11 plea 
agreement with the State. Pursuant to the plea 
agreement, Booth agreed to plead guilty to first-
degree murder in exchange for the State's 
agreement not to pursue statutory aggravating 
circumstances as part of sentencing. The Rule 11 
agreement was filed with the court on June 9, 
2005, and Booth entered a plea of guilty on the 
same day. After holding a sentencing hearing, the 
district court sentenced Booth to an 
went to trial and the State's special verdict form 
was presented to the jury. According to the 
district court, I.C. § 18-4004 clearly indicates that 
if Booth's case had gone to trial, and the jury had 
found an aggravating circumstance, such a finding 
would "merely have been advisory in nature and 
the court would not have been mandated to 
sentence Booth to a fixed life term, but would 
actually have been bound only to sentence within 
the parameters of a life sentence, with any fixed 
portion above ten years .... " The court also 
determined that there was a reasonable 
probability that but for Harris' erroneous 
interpretation of the statute, Booth would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to 
indeterminate life sentence with thirty years fixed. trial. Therefore, the district court granted Booth's 
petition for post-conviction relief and ordered his 
After a failed appeal challenging his 
sentence,l5l Booth timely filed a petition for post-
conviction relief. The court dismissed all of 
Booth's allegations in support of his petition upon 
the State's motion for summary dismissal, except 
for his allegations that (1) Harris used coercive and 
threatening tactics to get him to plead guilty by 
assuring him and his family that he would receive 
a ten year fixed sentence if he pleaded guilty and 
a fixed life sentence if he took the case to trial; 
and (2) Harris used the sentencing memorandum 
to coerce him into pleading guilty and was not 
adequately prepared to go to trial even though 
Booth felt he "had nothing to loose (sic] by going 
to trial." 
260*260 After an evidentiary hearing on the 
matter, the district court concluded that Harris' 
representation of Booth fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness because Harris 
erroneously advised Booth that he would be 
guilty plea to be withdrawn and the case set for 
jury trial. The State timely appealed to this Court. 
II.Issue on Appeal 
I. Whether the district court erred in granting 
Booth's petition for post-conviction relief on the 
ground that he received ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 
Ill. Discussion 
A. Standard of Review 
When reviewing a district court's decision to grant 
or deny a petition for post-conviction relief 
following an evidentiary hearing, this Court will 
not disturb the district court's factual findings 
unless they are clearly erroneous. t.R.C.P. 
52(a); Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 
P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct.App.1992). A claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel presents a mixed 
question of law and fact. Murray, 121 Idaho at 
921, 828 P.2d at 1326; Strickland v. 
subject to a mandatory fixed life sentence if he 
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Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 698, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 
2070, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 700 (1984). When faced 
with a mixed question of fact and law, the Court 
will defer to the district court's factual findings if 
supported by substantial evidence, but will 
exercise free review over the application of the 
relevant law to those facts. Murray, 121 Idaho at 
921-22, 828 P.2d at 1326-27. 
B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
"The right to counsel in criminal actions brought 
by the state of Idaho is guaranteed by the Sixth 
was deficient and that Booth was prejudiced as a 
result of such deficiency. 
1. Deficient Performance 
On appeal, the State argues that Booth has not 
met his burden of demonstrating Harris' 
performance was deficient because, even though 
the court ultimately concluded that Harris' 
interpretation of I.C. § 18-4004 was incorrect, his 
interpretation was nevertheless objectively 
reasonable under 261 *261 the circumstances. 
According to the State, the reasonableness of 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Harris' interpretation is supported by the fact that 
Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho State the prosecutor also believed that the statute 
Constitution." McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567,570, would require the court to impose a fixed life 
225 P .3d 700, 703 {2010). A claim of ineffective sentence in the event that the jury found a 
assistance of counsel may properly be brought statutory aggravating circumstance. The State 
under the post-conviction procedure act. Baxter v. further argues that the district court also 
State, 149 Idaho 859, 862, 243 P.3d 675, 678 appeared to agree with Harris' interpretation, 
(Ct.App.2010). To prevail on an ineffective given that it intended to provide the jury with a 
assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must 
show that the attorney's performance was 
deficient and that the defendant was prejudiced 
by the deficiency. McKeeth v. State, 140 Idaho 
847,850, 103 P.3d 460,463 
(2004); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 
2064, 80 L.Ed.2d at 693. This Court applies 
the Strickland test when determining whether a 
defendant has received ineffective assistance of 
counsel during the plea process. McKeeth, 140 
Idaho at 850, 103 P.3d at 463. Before deciding 
whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to 
"the effective assistance of competent 
special verdict form instructing them to consider 
whether a statutory aggravating circumstance had 
been proven. Lastly, the State contends that 
Harris' memorandum demonstrates that Harris 
had carefully reviewed the facts of the case, the 
evidence that would likely be admitted at trial, 
and the applicable law, before advising Booth that 
his best option was to enter a plea of guilty and, 
therefore, Harris' representation of Booth was not 
deficient. 
In order to demonstrate the attorney's 
performance was deficient, the defendant has the 
burden of showing that the attorney's 
counsel." Padilla v. Kentucky, - U.S.__, -- representation fell below an objective standard of 
__, 130 S.Ct.1473, 1480-8l, 176 L.Ed.2d 284, 293 reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 
(2010). In this case, we conclude that the district 760, 760 P.2d 11741 1176 (1988); Strickland, 466 
court did not err in determining that Harris' U.S. at 688, 104 S.Ct. at 2064-65, 80 L.Ed.2d at 
representation of Booth during the plea process 693. In doing so, the defendant must overcome a 
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strong presumption that counsel was competent 
and diligent in his or her representation of the 
defendant. Schoger v. State, 148 Idaho 622, 624, 
226 P.3d 1269, 1271 (2010). Furthermore, 
"tactical or strategic decisions of trial counsel will 
not be second-guessed on appeal unless those 
decisions are based on inadequate preparation, 
ignorance of relevant law or other shortcomings 
capable of objective evaluation." Howard v. 
State, 126 Idaho 231, 234, 880 P.2d 261, 264 
(Ct.App.1994). "Where a defendant is represented 
by counsel during the plea process and enters a 
plea upon the advice of counsel, the voluntariness 
of the plea depends on whether counsel's advice 
was within the range of competence demanded of 
attorneys in criminal cases." Dunlap v. State, 141 
Idaho 50, 60, 106 P.3d 376, 386 (2004). 
Specifically a guilty plea is only valid where the 
plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice 
among the alternative courses of action open to 
the defendant. Id. 
Although it appears that this Court has never dealt 
with the precise issue of whether a defense 
attorney's erroneous interpretation of a 
sentencing statute constitutes deficient 
performance, the United States Supreme Court 
has recognized that when a statute 
unambiguously sets forth a particular penalty, an 
attorney has a duty to provide correct advice 
regarding such penalty. For example, in Padilla v. 
Kentucky, the Court held that an attorney engaged 
in deficient performance by failing to advise the 
defendant that his plea of guilty to drug 
distribution made him subject to automatic 
deportation because the consequences of the 
defendant's guilty plea could easily be determined 
from reading the removal statute._ U.S. at --J 
• 
130 S.Ct. at 1483, 176 L.Ed.2d at 295. The Court 
reasoned that, 
In the instant case, the terms of the relevant 
immigration statute are succinct, clear, and 
explicit in defining the removal consequence for 
Padilla's conviction .... Padilla's counsel could 
have easily determined that his plea would 
make him eligible for deportation simply from 
reading the text of the statute, which addresses 
not some broad classification of crimes but 
specifically commands removal for all controlled 
substances convictions except for the most 
trivial of marijuana possession offenses. Instead, 
Padilla's counsel provided him false assurance 
that his conviction would not result in his 
removal from this country. This is not a hard 
case in which to find deficiency: The 
consequences of Padilla's plea could easily be 
determined from reading the removal statute, 
his deportation was presumptively mandatory, 
and his counsel's advice was incorrect. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). Although the Court 
recognized that an attorney engages in deficient 
performance by rendering advice that is 
inconsistent with the clear provisions of a statute, 
the Court was careful to recognize that the result 
would not be the same where the law is not as 
clear. 
There will, therefore, undoubtedly be numerous 
situations in which the deportation 
consequences of a particular plea are 
unclear 262*262 or uncertain. The duty of the 
private practitioner in such cases is more 
limited. When the law is not succinct and 
straightforward ... , a criminal defense attorney 
need do no more than advise a noncitizen client 
that pending criminal charges may carry a risk of 
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adverse immigration consequences. But when 
the deportation consequence is truly clear, as it 
was in this case, the duty to give correct advice 
is equally clear. 
Id. Therefore, an attorney engages in deficient 
performance by rendering advice regarding 
potential penalties during the plea process that is 
inconsistent with the plain and unambiguous 
provisions of a sentencing statute. See also 22 
C.J.S. Criminal Law§ 422 ("The mere inaccuracy of 
a prediction regarding sentence will not give rise 
to a claim for ineffective assistance, but a gross 
mischaracterization of the likely outcome, 
combined with erroneous advice on the possible 
effects of going to trial, falls below the required 
level of competence.") 
In this case, the district court did not err in finding 
that Harris' performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness due to his erroneous 
advice regarding the potential penalty Booth 
would face if convicted at trial. Harris' 
interpretation of I.C. § 18-4004 is contrary to the 
plain and unambiguous language of the statute. 
I.C. § 18-4004 specifically provides that in first-
degree murder cases, "if the death penalty is not 
sought, the court shall impose a life sentence with 
a minimum period of confinement of not less than 
ten (10) years." The language of the statute makes 
it clear that in cases where the State chooses not 
to seek the death penalty, the court is required to 
impose an indeterminate life sentence with at 
least ten years fixed. 
It appears that Harris based his interpretation on 
the first part of I.C. § 18-4004, which provides, 
Subject to the provisions of sections 19-2515 
and 19-2515A, Idaho Code, every person guilty 
-
of murder of the first degree shall be punished 
by death or by imprisonment for life, provided 
that a sentence of death shall not be imposed 
unless the prosecuting attorney filed written 
notice of intent to seek the death penalty as 
required under the provisions of section 18-
4004A, Idaho Code, and provided further that 
whenever the death penalty is not imposed the 
court shall impose a sentence. If a jury, or the 
court if a jury is waived, finds a statutory 
aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable 
doubt but finds that the imposition of the death 
penalty would be unjust, the court shall impose 
a fixed life sentence. 
I.C. § 18-4004. However, Harris' interpretation is 
contrary to the plain language of this portion of 
the statute as well. First and foremost, I.C. § 18-
4004 specifically references I.C. §§ 19-2515 and 
19-2515A, which are both statutes that are only 
applicable in capital cases. I.C. § 19-2515A 
prohibits the court from imposing the death 
penalty against a "mentally retarded person." I.C. 
§ 19-2515A. Furthermore, I.C. § 19-2515 sets forth 
the procedures for holding a special sentencing 
proceeding in capital casesl61 and articulates the 
instructions to be given to the jury during these 
proceedings.!71 Finally, 263*263 I.C. § 19-2515(9) 
goes on to lay out the various statutory 
aggravating circumstances that must be proven 
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to justify the 
imposition of the death penalty. I.C. § 19-2515(9). 
The lead-in to subsection 9 states, "[t]he following 
are statutory aggravating circumstances, at least 
one (1) of which must be found to exist beyond a 
reasonable doubt before a sentence of death can 
be imposed." I.C. § 19-2515(9) (emphasis added). 
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These statutory sections make clear that the 
provision in I.C. § 18-4004 requiring the jury, or 
the court if a jury is waived, to impose a fixed life 
sentence for a first-degree murder conviction in 
the event that a statutory aggravating 
circumstance has been proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt applies only to those cases 
where the death penalty is sought. Under the 
statutory scheme, the court is only required to 
impose a fixed life sentence when (1) the State 
has filed a notice of intent to seek the death 
penalty; (2) the State seeks the death penalty; (3) 
the defendant is convicted of, or pleads guilty to, 
first-degree murder; (4) a special sentencing 
proceeding is held during which the jury, or the 
court if a jury is waived, determines that at least 
one statutory aggravating circumstance has been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and (5) after 
weighing any mitigating evidence against the 
statutory aggravating circumstances, the jury, or 
the court if a jury is waived, finds that imposition 
of the death penalty is unjust. It is clear from the 
relevant statutes that statutory aggravating 
circumstances can only be sought in a death 
penalty case. Because the State did not seek the 
death penalty in Booth's case, if Booth went to 
trial and was convicted of first-degree murder, he 
would have been subject to an indeterminate life 
sentence with at least ten years fixed, but not a 
mandatory fixed life sentence, as Harris 
asserted)81 
Given that the information Harris provided when 
advising Booth to plead guilty to first-degree 
murder was based on a blatantly erroneous 
reading of the sentencing statutes, the district 
court did not err in determining that Harris' 
performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. Just as in Padilla, the potential 
penalties in Idaho for first-degree murder in a 
non-capital case are clear from the statute and, 
therefore, Harris' duty to give correct advice in 
that regard is equally clear. It cannot be said that 
Booth's plea was entered voluntarily when Harris' 
advice was not within the range of competence 
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases. 
Dunlap, 141 Idaho at 60, 106 P.3d at 386. 
Moreover, the State's argument that Harris' 
interpretation of I.C. § 18-4004 was reasonable 
because the district judge and the prosecutor 
appeared to share the same interpretation is 
without merit. Just because other parties shared 
Harris' erroneous interpretation of the statute 
does not mean Harris' interpretation was 
reasonable, given that such an interpretation is 
contrary to the plain and unambiguous language 
of the statute. Therefore, we find that Booth met 
his burden of demonstrating that Harris' 
performance was deficient. 
2. Prejudice 
The State argues that Booth has not met his 
burden of demonstrating he was prejudiced by 
Harris' allegedly deficient performance because, 
even if Booth had insisted on going to trial, he 
would have still been subject to the same penalty 
as when he pleaded guilty. The State contends 
that even if Booth went to trial in hopes of 
obtaining a conviction for second-degree murder 
rather than first-degree murder, there no is 
reason to conclude that his sentence would have 
been any different and, therefore, rejecting the 
plea agreement and proceeding to trial would not 
have been rational under the circumstances. 
Rather, the State asserts 264*264 that Booth's 
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best option was to plead guilty and request 
leniency from the court regarding the sentence. 
In order to demonstrate prejudice, the defendant 
must show "a reasonable probability that the 
outcome of trial would be different but for 
counsel's deficient performance." McKay, 148 
Idaho at 570, 225 P.3d at 703. "A reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id. (quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 
L.Ed.2d at 698). When a defendant alleges some 
-
would face a minimum period of incarceration 
of ten years or whatever greater period the 
judge[] might impose .... My recommendation 
is because of the strong risk of spending the rest 
of your life in prison, a plea agreement may be 
your best option. 
Moreover, the Rule 11 plea agreement was based 
entirely on Harris and Wolff's erroneous 
interpretation of the statute. Booth pleaded guilty 
to first-degree murder in exchange for the State's 
agreement not to seek "an aggravated 
deficiency in counsel's advice regarding a guilty circumstance as that term is referenced in Idaho 
plea, the defendant must demonstrate that "there Code 18-4004." The Rule 11 agreement also 
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's 
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial." Ridgley v. 
State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925, 930 
(2010) (quoting Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 
106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203, 210 (1985)). 
In this case, the district court did not err in 
determining that, but for Harris' erroneous advice 
regarding the possibility of a fixed life sentence, 
Booth would have elected to proceed to trial. It is 
clear from Harris' memorandum that he advised 
Booth to plead guilty because he believed that 
there was a strong likelihood Booth would be 
convicted of first-degree murder and would be 
subject to a fixed life sentence in the event that 
the jury also found a statutory aggravating 
circumstance. 
The bottom line is this. If you go to jury trial, 
there is the very strong probability of facing a 
fixed life sentence. That means spending the 
rest of your life in prison. If you enter a plea to 
murder with the prosecutor waiving aggravated 
circumstances, or not requesting the court 
required the court to refrain from making a 
"finding of an aggravated circumstance as that 
term is used in Idaho Code 18-4004 for the 
purposes of sentencing." Harris was unable to 
reach an agreement with the State on what the 
recommended sentence would be at sentencing 
and, therefore, the plea agreement provided that 
"the sentence to be imposed is reserved to the 
sound discretion of the Court." Thus, the sole 
benefit that Booth received under the plea 
agreement was the State's agreement not to seek 
aggravating circumstances - something Booth 
was never subject to in the first place. 
Lastly, Booth filed an affidavit in support of his 
petition for post-conviction relief, wherein he 
stated that, 
I pied guilty to First Degree Murder only after 
my attorney Richard Harris threatened me with 
a Fixed Life Sentence if I insisted on going to 
trial. Mr. Harris told me that the judge had told 
him that he would give the jury a special verdict 
form asking for an aggravating fact and Mr. 
Harris told me as well as my family that the jury 
consider aggravated circumstances, then you would find an aggravating factor and that the 
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Court would then be bound to sentence me to a extend to life." I.C. § 18-4004. In contrast, 
fixed life sentence. following a conviction for first-degree murder, in 
cases where the death penalty is not sought, the 
court is required to impose an indeterminate life 
I wanted to go to trial and to prove that I did not sentence with a minimum period of confinement 
intentionally shoot the victim. I never wanted to of not less than ten years. I.C. § 18_40o4. In other 
plead guilty to the charge. I only plead [sic] 
guilty because Mr. Harris told me I would get a 
Fixed life Sentence and that the Judge would be 
bound to give it to me and if I plead [sic] guilty I 
would only get 10 years. 
words, a defendant convicted of first-degree 
murder automatically receives an indeterminate 
life sentence with a fixed term of ten years, while 
a defendant convicted of second-degree murder 
only faces a unified term of not less than ten 
When asked at the evidentiary hearing what had years. Therefore, the State erroneously argues 
convinced him to plead guilty, Booth responded, that Booth would have faced the same potential 
"[t]he fact that my attorney, the person who penalty if he were convicted of second-degree 
represented me, Richard Harris, repeatedly told murder after trial. 
me that if I did take this to trial, there is a huge 
chance that I would do life in prison .... I would die 
in prison." Based on this evidence, the district 
court did not err in determining that but for 
More importantly, the State's arguments 
demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the law as it relates to the prejudice prong of 
the Strickland test. The State's arguments focus on 
Harris' 265*265 error, Booth would not have the fact that Booth has not demonstrated that the 
pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to outcome of his case, specifically, his sentence, 
trial. 
The State's arguments on appeal fail for several 
reasons. First, the State misstates the law when 
arguing that "even if Booth would have insisted on 
going to trial in the hopes of obtaining a 
would have been any different if he went to trial. 
However, in this context, the relevant inquiry is 
whether, but for Harris' errors, Booth would not 
have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on 
going to trial. Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676, 227 P.3d 
conviction on second-degree murder rather than at 930. As this Court has previously noted, the 
first-degree murder, Booth would have faced the focus is "on the defendant's state of mind when 
same potential penalty he believed he was subject choosing to plead guilty," and there is no 
to when he pied guilty to first-degree murder, i.e., requirement that the Court speculate as to the 
up to life with a minimum of ten years fixed." 
Contrary to the State's assertion, the potential 
penalty for first-degree murder differs significantly 
from the potential penalty for second-degree 
murder. Under I.C. § 18-4004, second-degree 
murder is "punishable by imprisonment not less 
than ten (10) years and the imprisonment may 
potential sentence for a lesser charged offense 
should the jury convict on that basis at 
retrial. McKeeth, 140 Idaho at 853, 103 P.3d at 
466. Thus, the State's arguments fail because they 
do not address Booth's state of mind when 
pleading guilty or how his state of mind was 
affected by Harris' erroneous advice.191 As 
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mentioned above, the evidence demonstrates 
that Booth would not have pleaded guilty and 
would have insisted on going to trial if were not 
United States Supreme Court in Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 
556 (2002),that a jury, rather than a judge, find 
for Harris' advice regarding the potential of a fixed the necessary statutory aggravating circumstances 
life sentence. in a death penalty case. See 2003 Idaho Sess. Laws 
IV .Conclusion 
The district court did not err in concluding that 
Booth met his burden of demonstrating Harris' 
performance was deficient and that he was 
prejudiced as a result. Therefore, we affirm the 
district court's decision to grant Booth's petition 
for post-conviction relief. 
266*266 Chief Justice EISMANN, and Justices 
BURDICK, W. JONES and HORTON concur. 
[1] According to I.C. § 19-2515(1), 
Except as provided in section 19-2515A, Idaho 
Code, a person convicted of murder in the first 
degree shall be liable for the imposition of the 
penalty of death if such person killed, intended a 
killing, or acted with reckless indifference to 
human life, irrespective of whether such person 
directly committed the acts that caused death. 
All statutory citations in this opinion will refer to 
those in effect at the time that Booth's criminal 
case was pending. 
(2) Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2515(3)(a), a defendant 
convicted of a crime that is punishable by death 
cannot be sentenced to death unless the State 
files a notice of intent to seek the death penalty. 
[3] I.C. § 19-2515(9) sets forth the list of statutory 
aggravating circumstances, one of which must be 
found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt, before 
a sentence of death can be imposed. 
[4) I.C. §§ 18-4004 and 19-2515 were amended in 
ch. 19, Res. 12510 Statement of Purpose. 
(5) Booth appealed his sentence to the Court of 
Appeals, where his sentence was affirmed. 
(6] I.C. § 19-2515(5) provides, 
If a person is adjudicated guilty of murder in the 
first degree, whether by acceptance of a plea of 
guilty, by verdict of a jury, or by decision of the 
trial court sitting without a jury, and a notice of 
intent to seek the death penalty was filed and 
served as provided in section 18-4004A, Idaho 
Code, a special sentencing proceeding shall be 
held promptly for the purpose of hearing all 
relevant evidence and arguments of counsel in 
aggravation and mitigation of the offense .... The 
special sentencing proceeding shall be conducted 
before a jury unless a jury is waived by the 
defendant with the consent of the prosecuting 
attorney. 
(7] According to I.C. § 19-2515(7), 
The jury shall be informed as follows: 
(a) If the jury finds that a statutory aggravating 
circumstance exists and no mitigating 
circumstances exist which would make the 
imposition of the death penalty unjust, the 
defendant will be sentenced to death by the 
court. 
(b) If the jury finds the existence of a statutory 
aggravating circumstance but finds that the 
existence of mitigating circumstances makes the 
imposition of the death penalty unjust or the 
2003 to reflect the requirement established by the 
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jury cannot unanimously agree on whether the 
existence of mitigating circumstances makes the 
imposition of the death penalty unjust, the 
defendant will be sentenced to a term of life 
imprisonment without the possibility of parole; 
and 
(c) If the jury does not find the existence of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance or if the jury 
cannot unanimously agree on the existence of a 
statutory aggravating circumstance, the 
defendant will be sentenced by the court to a 
term of life imprisonment with a fixed term of 
not less than ten (10) years. 
[8] On appeal, the State does not argue that 
Harris' interpretation of the statutes was correct. 
The State offered such an argument before the 
district court in support of its Motion to 
Reconsider. However, the same argument has not 
been advanced on appeal. 
(9) The State also appears to argue that Booth was 
not prejudiced because his best option was to 
plead guilty and request leniency from the court 
based on the victim's mutual involvement in the 
drug community, his own drug addiction at the 
time of the murder, and his assertion that he 
acted out of fear for the safety of himself and his 
family. Although the State may be correct that 
Booth likely benefited by taking responsibility and 
pleading guilty to the crime, such a factor is not 
relevant in determining whether Booth has met 
his burden of demonstrating prejudice. As the 
United States Supreme Court has noted, 
The nature of relief secured by a successful 
collateral challenge to a guilty plea - an 
opportunity to withdraw the plea and proceed 
to trial - imposes its own significant limiting 
-
principle. Those who collaterally attack their 
guilty pleas lose the benefit of the bargain 
obtained as a result of the plea. Thus, a different 
calculus informs whether it is wise to challenge a 
guilty plea in a habeas proceeding because 
ultimately, the challenge may result in a less 
favorable outcome for the defendant, whereas a 
collateral challenge to conviction obtained after 
a jury trial has no similar downside potential. 
Padilla,_ U.S. at_-_, 130 S.Ct. at 1485-86, 
176 L.Ed.2d at 298 (emphasis in original). 
Therefore, the fact that Booth may have benefited 
by pleading guilty instead of going to trial is not 
relevant to whether he was prejudiced by Harris' 
deficient performance. 
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Forty-eighth Legislature 
LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
HOUSE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION NO. 20 
First Regular Session - 1985 
BY JUDICIARY, RULES AND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
A CONCURRENT RESOLUTION 
STATING LEGISLATIVE CONCERNS AND FINDINGS AND DIRECTING THE LEGISLATIVE COUN-
CIL TO UNDERTAKE AND COMPLETE A STUDY OF THE IDAHO CRIMINAL SENTENCING 
SYSTEM AND THE ADVISABILITY OF IMPLEMENTING A PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING 
SYSTEM. 
Be It Resolved by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
WHEREAS, under Idaho's current sentencing laws the disparity of sentences 
given among judicial districts and among individual judges for the conviction 
of the same or a similar crime is perceived to be a problem by many Idaho 
judges and reduces the respect and confidence of the public in the criminal 
system, and results in unfair treatment of, and bitterness in, the person con-
victed; and 
WHEREAS, under Idaho's current sentencing and parole laws, the sentences 
which are being handed down by the courts are seldom served to their full 
extent, creating a truth-in-sentencing problem and therefore reducing the 
respect and confidence of the public in the Idaho criminal system and reducing 
the deterrent effect of Idaho's criminal sanctions; and 
WHEREAS, Idaho's criminal and sentencing laws were enacted at different 
times and therefore reflect different sentencing philosophies, which have 
resulted in a somewhat uncoordinated interaction among the sentencing, correc-
tion and parole systems, and in sentencing statutes which are sometimes incon-
sistent, confusing and pose difficult problems of construction to the courts; 
and 
WHEREAS, nine other states have undertaken a 
tice systems and found many problems which 
Idaho's current problems, and have responded to 
presumptive sentencing systems; and 
review of their criminal jus-
are the same as or similar to 
these problems by enacting 
WHEREAS, President Ronald Reagan has expressed his support for legislation 
adopting a presumptive sentencing system be enacted on the federal level; and 
WHEREAS, a comprehensive review and reform, possibly through the imple-
mentation of a presumptive sentencing system, of Idaho's laws concerning crim-
inal sentencing, corrections and pardons and paroles, could result in a 
greater philosophical coherency, remove inconsistencies, reduce sentencing 
disparity, increase truth-in-sentencing, and therefore result in greater citi-
zen confidence and respect for Idaho's criminal justice system, greater deter-
rence to would-be criminals and justice for persons convicted. 
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the members of the First Regular Session 
of the Forty-eighth Idaho Legislature, the House of Representatives and the 
Senate concurring therein, that the Idaho Legislative Council is directed to 
establish a committee to undertake and complete a study of all matters relat-
ing to the criminal justice system of the State of Idaho and to evaluate and 
determine the advantages and disadvantages of the implementation of a presump-
tive sentencing system in the State of Idaho and to present to the Second 
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1 Regular Session of the Forty-eighth Idaho Legislature the Committee's final 
2 report, together with recommended legislation, if any. The Legislative Council 
3 is hereby authorized to create and appoint a Criminal Sentencing Alternatives 
4 Coamittee to be composed of not less than 10, and not more than 20, members 
5 from the Idaho House of Representatives and the Idaho Senate. The Chairman of 
6 the House Judiciary, Rules and Administration Committee and the Senate 
7 Judiciary and Rules Committee shall serve as Co-Chairmen of the Criminal Sen-
8 tencing Alternatives C0111111ittee. 
9 BE IT FURTH!ll RESOLVED that all costs incurred by the Criminal Sentencing 
10 Alternatives Conunittee shall be paid from the Legislative Account. 
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-------------------------------------------------------------LEGISLATURE OP THE STATE OP IDAHO 
Forty-eighth Legislature Second Regular Session - 1986 
------------~----------------------------------------------------
IN THE 
------------
CONCUUENT RESOLUTION NO. 
---- ---
BY 
--------------
l A CONCUIB.ENT RESOLUTION 
2 STATING LEGISLATIVE FINDINGS AND DIRECTING THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL TO UNDER-
3 TAK! AND COMPLBTI A STUDY OF THE IDAHO CRIMINAL AND CRIMINAL PlOCEDUllB 
4 STA1'UTBS AND TO RECOMMEND COMPREHENSIVE REFORMS Oll A COMPLETE UCODIFICA-
S TION IF RBQUIB.ED. 
6 Be It Resolved by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
7 WHEllEAS, a special committee on criminal sentencing met in the fall of 
8 1984 and, by adopting Hell 20, the Legislature directed the Legislative Council 
9 to create an interim study committee on criminal sentencing during the l98S 
10 interim; and 
11 WHEllEAS, the Legislative Council Criminal Sentencing Committee met seven 
12 times and undertook a detailed analysis of Idaho's criminal sentencing system, 
13 receiving testimony from judges, prosecutors, criminal defense attorneys, 
14 officials from the Board of Correction and the Commission on Pardons and 
15 Parole, the Office of the Attorney General and others experienced in the 
16 field; and 
17 WHEREAS, the recommendations made by the Legislative Council Criminal Sen-
18 tencing Committee would go far toward achieving truth in sentencing, removing 
19 sentencing disparities from the Idaho Code, and help to coordinate the efforts 
20 of the various entities involved in the criminal sentencing system including 
21 judges, the Commission on Pardons and Parole and the Board of Correction; and 
22 WHEREAS, although the Legislative Council Committee on Criminal Sentencing 
23 made substantial progress in resolving some of the most pressing problems, it 
24 was also determined that inconsistencies, discrepancies and conflicts were 
25 still present in the criminal and criminal procedure statutes which could be 
26 resolved through continuing study and that it would be beneficial to the 
27 people of the State of Idaho for a joint committee of the Legislature to con-
28 tinue in order to undertake a comprehensive study and revision of Idaho's 
29 criminal and criminal procedure statutes to achieve philosophical coherency, 
30 consistency and clarity in those statutes. 
31 NOW, THEllEFORE, BE IT RESOLVED by the m•bers of the Second Regular 
32 Session of the Forty-eighth Idaho Legislature, the House of Representatives 
33 and the Senate concurring therein, that ·the Legislative Council is directed to 
34 establish a committee to undertake and complete a study of all matters relat-
35 ing to criminal and criminal procedure statutes of the State of Idaho and to 
36 undertake a comprehensive revision or, if required, a complete recodification 
37 of the criminal and criminal procedure statutes of the State of Idaho, and to 
38 present to the First Regular Session of the Forty-ninth Idaho Legislature the 
39 Committee's report together with recommended legislation, if any. The Legis-
40 lative Council is directed to appoint a committee comprised of sis members of 
41 the House of Repre1enta~lve1 and four members of the Senate. The Chairman of 
42 the House Judiciary, Rules and Administration Co111D1ittee and the Senate 
43 Judiciary and Rules Committee shall serve as cochairmen of the Committee. 
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2 
1 BB IT FURTHBR RESOLVED that tbe Legislative Council is authorized to 
2 appoint a criminal code revision advisory committee to assist and advise the 
3 Legislative Council in preparing the foregoing studies and proposed laws and 
4 procedures. Such committee shall consist of one representative each from the 
5 judiciary, county prosecutors, criminal defense counsel and the Office of the 
6 Attorney General. 
7 BB IT FURTHER RESOLVED that all costs incurred by the Conunittee and the 
8 Advisory Committee sball be paid from the Legislative Account. 
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49-2514. CHANGE OF RULES AND REGULATIONS. Whenever any federal 
rule or regulation is cited in this chapter and is amended, modified, 
repealed or recodified, its successor rule or regulation shall govern 
and be operative. 
49-2515. SEVERABILITY. The prov1s1ons of this act are hereby 
declared to be severable and if any provision of this ace or the 
application of such provision to any person or circumstance is 
declared invalid for any reason, such declaration shall not affect the 
validity of remaining portions of chis act. 
SECTION 5, An emergency existing therefor, which emergency is 
hereby declared to exist, Section 49-2512, Idaho Code, which is 
enacted by Section 4 of this ace shall be in full force and effect on 
and after this act's passage and approval. The remaining provisions of 
this act shall be in full force and effect on and after January 1, 
1987; provided, however, that the Idaho Transportation 8oard and Idaho 
Transportation Department shall be authorized to permit any person 
renewing or purchasing a vehicle registration on and after July 1, 
1986, co acquire a vehicle registration endorsement prior to January 
1, 1987, and any receipts therefrom shall be placed in the Hazardous 
Material/Hazardous Waste Transportation Enforcement Account which is 
created in section 49-2507, Idaho Code, which is enacted by Section 4, 
of this act and Section 49-2507, Idaho Code, which is enacted by 
Section 4 of chis act shall be in full force and effect on and after 
July 1, 1986. 
Approved April J, 1986. 
CHAPTER 232 
(H.B. No. 524) 
AN ACT 
RE!,ATING TO CRIMINAL SENTENCING; PROVIDING A SHORT TtTU:; AfHiND[NG 
SECTION 18-4004, IDAHO CODE, TO REQUIRE A HANDATORY HINIMUM SEN-
TENCE OF TEN YEARS BE SERVED IF A SENTENCE FOR LIFE IMPRISONMENT 
IS IMPOSED AND TO DENY ELIG[BILITY FOR PAROLE OR DISCHARGE OR 
OTHER REDUCTION OF SENTENCE DURING THE HINlHUM TERH; AMENDING 
SECTION 19-2513, IDAHO CODE, TO AUTHORIZE A COURT TO IMPOSE A 
UNIFIED SENTENCI': CONTAINING A MINIMUM SENTENCE FOLLOWED, IN THE 
DlSCRf:TION OF THE COURT, BY AN INDETERHINATE SENTENCE, TO DENY 
EI.IGIBILITY FOR PAROLE OR DISCHARGE OR OTHl':R REDUCTION OF SEN-
TENCE, EXCEPT FOR MERITORIOUS SERVICE, DURING THE HlNIHUH TERM, TO 
REQUIRE UNIFIED SENTENCES BE CONSISTENT WITII STATUTORY HANDATORY 
HINIMUM SENTENCES IF APPLICABLE, TO REQUIRE THE COURT TO [MPOSE A 
HINIHl/11 TERM PURSUANT TO A SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT STATUTE IF 
REQUIRED BY STATUTE, IF APPLICABLE, TO REQUIRE ALL HINIHUH TERMS 
BE SERVED BEFORE rNDETERHINATE TERMS COMMENCE AND TO PROVIDE AN 
EFFECTIVE DATE; REPEALING SECTlON 19-2513A, IDAHO CODE; AND AMEND-
ING SECTION 20-223, IDAHO CODE, TO REMOVE MINIMUH ELIGIBILITY 
ATTACHMENT 4 
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REQUIREMENTS FOR PAROLE AND TO ALLOW PAROLE ONLY WHEN THE COMMIS-
SION OF PARDONS .AND PAROLE REASONABLY BELIEVES THAT THE PRISONER 
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A Tl!Q.EAT TO THE SAFETY OF SOCIETY; AND PROVID .. 
ING AN EFFECTIVE DATE. 
Legislature of the St:au of Idaho.: 
SECTION 1. This ,act shall be known as the 0 Unified Sentencing Act 
of 1986," 
SE.CTION 2. Th.at Section 18-4004, Idaho Code, be, and the same is 
hereby amende.d to read as fol lows: 
18-400'4. PIJNISHMENT FOR MURDER. Subject to the provisiims 0£ 
1!1-2:515, Idaho Code:1 every person guilty of murdet" of the· first degree 
shall be punished by death or by ~mpdsonment for lHe, provided tbat 
whenever the. court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment, the 
court shall set forth in its 'ud nient anf;I sentence a minimum · eriod of 
confinement of not less than ten 10 ears durin W'hich ed.od of 
i:on inement the offender shal 1. not be eli ible for arole or dischar e 
or .credit or reduction of sentence for &Ood conduct, except or meri-
torious service. Every person gui Lty of murder o.f the sec.and degree is 
punuhable liy imprisonment not less than ten (!OJ years and i:he 
i11prisonment may extend to life, 
SECTION 3. That Section 19-2513, Idaho Code, be, and the' same is 
to read as follows: 
19-2513. fN86f6RHHM'f6 UNIFIED SENTENCE. '!be-minimum-period-of 
imprrsilnmen1:-in-elte-penrtent:r.,ry-here1:0£ore-pro•ided-by--raw--£or--t:he 
p11nhhment:--"of--£elonies;-antf-each-,ach-mi:nimam-pedod;,.0£-i:mprhonme.nt: 
for-£eioni:es;-he-reby-i:s-aboiished-. Whenever any person is convicted of 
having committed a felony, the court shall, unless it sh.all commute 
the sentence, suspend or: withhold judgment and s.entence or grant 
probation, as provided by chapter 26 0£ title 19, Idaho Code, or 
unlus it shall impose the death sentence as provided by law, sentence 
su.ch o.ffender to the custody of the state bo-11rd of correction -for-an 
i:ndetermi:rurte-pe-ri:od-of-1:ime;-bc!;'-stat:ing-and-fi,d·ng-i-n-1111eh--j11dgment: 
ancl--sen1:enee--a--11111ll'i-mu,n-t:erm-whi-eh-eerin-shaH:-be-for-a-peri:od-of-not: 
ten-1:han-1:wo-H~-years-nor-exeeeding-.that-pro•ided-by--iaw--the,:-efor7 
and--judgmeift•-and--sentenee-shaH--be-giveft-aeco,:-di:ng'l:y;-,,a'l'!d-e11eh-1'en-
~enee;,.shitfr-be-known-as-an-indeterminate-sef!teneet-provi-ded,--h.owe,,-,-r, 
t;ha.t--the--e11aet:ment:--0£--t:his--aet-'-shal'1:--not-a££ect-the-indi:etment7 
inht111ation;-prliseeat:iiln;-t:T"tal;-.,erdret;-j!Jdgrnent:7-or--panishment--0£ 
· .. •ny-fel:oni:e11---heretofore--eommitt:ed,;-btit:-aH:-hws·now-and-1:ti:therto-i:n 
e££.ec:t-rerattng-theret:o",are-c;on1:inaed-rri-faH-foree-and-effeet:.,...-11s--to 
s1:1eh-·crimer-he1'et:0£ore--cc,mmit:t:ed. The court shall specify a minimum 
!!!dod of confinement _ and may specify a subsequent indeterminate 
P!tiod of custody, The court shall set forth in its judgment and sen-
tence the minimum period of confinement and the subsequent indetetrmi-
nat.e edod if' an , rovided that the a re ate sentence shall JlOC 
exc.ee<l the ma1rnnum provided by law. During a minimum term o confine-
·--- --------
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ment the offender shall not be eli ible for arole or dischar e 
credit or reduction of sentence for good cQnduet except for 
ous set"vice. The offender ma be considei,ed for arole or discbar e at 
any t me dudng the indeterminate period of the sentence. 
If the offense carries a mandator minimum enalt as i,ovided b 
statute, the court shall s e.cif a minimum eriod of confinement con 
11istent with such statute. If the offense is sub· ect to an enhanc 
~alty as provided by statute, or if consecutive 
imposed for multiele offenses, the court shall, if 
statute, direct that the enhanceme.nt or each .con11ecut i ve 
tarn a minimum period of confinement; in such event, an minimum 
of confinement shall be served before any indeterminate periods 
mence to run. 
Enactment of this amended s~e~c~t~1~·o~n"-~s~h~a~l~lc......:,==--;;..:;.=.e,-:.......c.=---"-==-
cution, adjudication or punishment of any felony 
effective date of enactment, 
SECTION 4, That Section 19-2513A, Idaho Code, be, and the same 
hereby repealed, 
SECTION 5. That Section 20-223, Idaho Code, be, and the same 
hereby amended to read as follows: 
20-223. PAROJ.E, RULES AND RECULATIONS GOVERNING RSSTRICTIONS 
PSYCHIATRIC OR PSYCHOLOGICAL. EXAM.lNA'l'lQN, (a) !ubject to se"cdo~ 
19-2513, Idaho Cqde, t'l:'he commission shall have the power t·o establish 
rules, regulations, policies or procedures in compliance with chapter 
52, title 67, Idaho Code, under which any prisoner, excepting any 
under sentence of death, may be allowed to go upon parole but to 
remain while on parole in the legal custody and. under the control of 
the board and subject to be taken back into cpnfinemenL at the direc-
t ion of the commi ssiont-pn1•i-ded;-ho.,e.,er;-that-no-per"on-set"ving-a 
¼ife-sentenc e-or-serving-a-terlft-of"'ehi rt y-f 381-or:--more -ye" rs-:rh«¼t--be 
erigibte--for-•re¼ease-on-parol:e-antir-he-has-served-at-¼east-ten-f¼8~ 
1.ears-and-no-per!lon-serving-a-l:esiJer-.!lentence-for-any-of-i:he-foHo,.rng 
crfmes1-homi:cide-i:n-11ny-degree,-trea!lon;-rape-by-force--or--thre11t--of 
bodiry--harm;-i:ncest,-crime-11g11in!lt.-natnre,-committing-a-l:e.,d-a.et-upon 
a-ehi-1:d,-robbery-of-any-kind;-ki-dnapping, -borgh"ty-o,hen -11 rrned--with- -a 
d1tngeroas--weapon;-or-•ith-an-at:tempt-or-ass,st1rt-with-inte.nt-1:o-co1M1i:t 
any-ofi-:!taid-crimes;--or-as-an-h11bftaa¼-offender;--sharl:-be-el:i-gibl:e--for 
re¼ease--on--paro¼e--antir-said-person-has-ser•ed-a-perrod-of-five-f51 
years-or-one-thi-rd-f¼f31-of-the-sentence,-whichever-is-the-iea!lt,--The 
provisions--of--this--section--shal:¼-af£ect-on¼y-those-persons-who-at'e 
se.ntenced-on~or.after-the--first--dt1y--of--:lt1lc)';--+988,--and--are--not 
:i:ntertded--to--re~al:--or-nmend-:!tec:t::i:on,-t9-rS¼3A;--¼9-i!5i!9-or-¼9-i5~9A; 
Idaho-Bode. 
{b) No person serving a sentence for rape, incest, committing a 
lewd act upon a child, crime against nature, or with an intent or an 
assault with intent to commit any of the said cdmes or whose history 
and conduct indicate to the commission that he is a se.x1.1aUy dangerous 
person, shall be released on parole except. upon the examination and 
evaluation of one or more psychiatrists or psychologists to be se-
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!ected by the commission and s11ch evaluation shail be duly considered 
· the commission in making its parole determination, The co!Mlission 
y, in its discretion, likewise require a similar .examination and 
al11•tion fo.r persons serving sentences f",or crimes either than those. 
ve enumerated, No psychiatri.st or psychologist making sU:ch eva:i,u-
shall be he.ld £inanei..ally responsible to any person for denial 
puole by the commission or for the results of the. future acts of 
·. th person if .he be granted parole. 
(c} Be.fore considering the parole of any prisoner, the to"1111ission 
llall afford the prisqner the opportunity to be. interviewed. A parole 
lL be ordeod only for the best interests qf society when the c:om-
• sion re1uonabl believes that the risqner no ton er oses a threat 
the safet of society, not as a reward of clemency and Lt shall not 
considered to be a reductio.n of sentence or a pardon. A prisoner 
11 be placed on parole only ..,hen arrangements have been made for. 
employment or mai11tenance and care, and when the toinnfrssion 
laves the prisoner is able and willing to fulfill the obligations 
a law-abiding citizen. The co111111ission may also by its rules, regu-
ions1 policies or proced11res £be the tlmes and conditions under 
ch any application denied may be reconsidered. 
(d) In making any parol.e or comm .. tation decision with respect to 
prisoner, the commission shall consider the compliance of the pris-
with any order of restitution which may .ha\le been entered accord-
to section 19-5304, Idaho Code, The commission may make compliance 
h such an order of restitution a condition of parole. 
This act shall be in full force and effect on and 
ter FebNary 1, 1987; and the amendments in this act shall apply 
y to those person·s who shall commit an offense on or af.te'r February 
1987, and are not intend.ed. to r11peal or amen.d those provisions of 
Code which apply .to persons committing an offense .pdor to. Febtu-
1, 1987, which provisions shall continue to ilpply, and further 
amendments in this act are not intend.ed to repeal or amend sec-
s 19-2520 1 19-2520A, 19-2520B, 19-'2520C or l9-2520D, Idaho Cod.e. 
3, .1986. 
CHAPTER 233 
(H,8, t,10. 542) 
.. AN ACT 
··. TlNG TO REGISTRATION OF OFF-HIGHWAY MOTORBIKES; .AMENDING C.HAPTEB. 
' 27, TITLE 49, IDAHO CODE, BY THK ADDITION OF A NEW SECTION 
49-2702, IDAHO CODE, TO DEFlN.E TERl'IS; AMENDING SECTION 49-2702, 
lDAljO, C:OQE, TO REDESIGNATE THE SECTION, TO PROVIDE THAT 
OFF-HIGHWAY MOTORBIKES MAY BE REGISTERED AT ANY VENDOR AND TO 
. CHANCE THE DATE \IHE.N REGISTRATION .SHALL EXPIRE; AttENDUIG SECTIOt! 
·. 49,-2703.; IDAHO C()DE, TO REDESIGNATE THE SECTION AND TO CHANGE THE 
11£QUIREMENTS FOR THE Tiµt,lSFER OF A STICKER OF RECISTMTION ISSUED 
, FOR AN OFF-HIGHWAY VEHICLE; AMENDING S1-:CTIONS 49•2704 At!D 49-2705, 
"WAHO CODE, TO REDF.SIGNATE THE SECTIONS; AMENDING SECTION 49-2706, 
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Minutes 
Senate Judiciary 
Wednesday, March 
Page Two 
MOTION 
RS 12746C1 
MOTION 
H 524 
and Rules Committee 
12, 1986 
Moved by Senator Smyser, second Senator 
Staker, that S 1264 BE SENT TO THE 
FOURTEENTH ORDER, WITH THE AMENDMENT 
CONSIDERED BY THE COMMITTEE. 
On a voice vote, the motion passed. 
Senators Risch, Dobler, Lannen absent. 
Relating to nonmedical indigency and 
medical indigency - Senator Darrington 
asked that the committee print RS 12746C1, 
and said it was for distribution purposes 
only - he did not intend for the legislation 
to be considered this session. 
Moved by Senator Smyser, second by Senator 
Bray, that RS 12746Cl BE INTRODUCED FOR 
PRINTING. 
On a voice vote, the motion passed. 
Senators Risch, Lannen, Dobler absent. 
Crime - unified sentence 
Presented by: Senator Fairchild. 
Senator Lannen here. 
MOTION 
H 535 
MOTION 
Moved by Senator Darrington, second by 
Senator Reed, that H 524 BE SENT TO THE 
FLOOR WITH A DO PASS RECOMMENDATION. 
On a voice vote, the motion passed. 
Senators Risch, Dobler absent. 
Sponsor: Senator Fairchild/Senator Smyser 
Sentence - maximum extended 
Presented by: Senator Fairchild 
Moved by Senator Smyser, second by Senator 
Darrington, that H 535 BE SENT TO THE FLOOR 
WITH A DO PASS RECOMMENDATION. 
On a voice vote, the motion passed. 
Senators Risch, Dobler absent. 
Sponsor: Senator Fairchild/Senator Smyser 
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HOUSE JUDICIARY, RULES AND ADMINISTRATION COMMITTEE 
MEETING MINUTES 
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, l !185 
GU'EST SPEAKER(S): 
Pat Kole, Deputy o\J;.torney General - Attorney General's Office 
GUESTS: 
(Se<!. a ttac;hed 'fOSt.et:.) 
The meecing was called tQ otder at l:35 P,M, by ChairmEJ.n Ran.is. All 
membet:s were present with the exception of Rep. Keeton who was absent., 
MOTION Mc,ved by Rep. Sc,rensen and seconded by Rep. B.eng11.on to approve the 
meeting minutes of February 21, 1986, Motion passed. 
H 668 Chairman Harris announced that we wQ11ld first hav;e H 668 before us tc,day. 
He addres11ed the problems with the Commission of Pardons and. Parole com-
plying wich che Idaho Open Meeting Law and also i.ndicated members have 
before them copies of S l 21 l, engrossed copy, for tomparison with H 668. 
The purpose of H 668 is intended to provide a lim'ieed form of protection 
to membars of the Commission of Pardons and Par.olc. Thi!! bill provides 
that the delibers..tive proceeding$ anc;I votes of thl! Co111111iss.ic:m, only on 
matters 0£ parole, would be confidential while all other proceedings 
would be open to the public. The decision (votes of t.he Commission) would 
be recorded and available. upon tequ·es t of the Governor and Cha iTillen of 
the Senate and !lo.use Judiciary Committees. 
Pat Kole addressed the issu.e of the Co.mmission complying with the Idaho 
Open Meeting Law.and elaborated on the provisions of the law. 
Rep. McDermott had questions as to whether there is ano.ther section of 
the Idaho Code which addresses the issue of pardons and commutations, 
MOTION Moved by Rap. Sorensen and seconded by Rep. Bayer~ send H 668 to the 
floor with a "Do Pass" recommendation. 
Rep. Sorensen said that it was his understanding that this bill would run 
into problems in. the Senate beciiuse ~here is discrepancy as to who should 
have access co the information on the pardon and pnrole hearings. 
Rep, Mc Der111Qtt had fui:ther comments and said she wondered if it was right 
to have the information kept secret but "going only to selected persons". 
She .,aid she. hoped th!! language in lines 18-:37, Page l could be cleaned up. 
SUBSTI- Moved by Rep. McDermott and seconded by l!erodon to hold H 668 in Committee 
JUTE until the next scheduled Committee meeting, 
MOTION Rep, Speck commented and said he is again$t the substitute .motion. Furthet: 
discussion from Reps. Forrey, Sayer, Montgomery, McDermott and Speck, 
H 524 
Re·p. ·Sorensen requested a roll .call vote on the substitute motion. Twelve 
membe.rs votinr, against, two in favor an.d one absent. Motion failed to 
carry on the .substitute mot ion. 
Motion passed by voice vote on the orie;,inal motion to send H 6.&S to the 
floor with a "Do Pass" t:ecomniendatiO.n. Rep. McDermott will be recorded 
as vo.ting "No''. Re.p, Ha?ris will sportso.r·. 
The purpose of l! 524 .ls to introduce the Unified Sentencing Act in Idaho. 
This represents a hndamencnl change in the. criminal sentencing area. 
Under this bill, a eourt can impose a purely fixed sentence but cannot 
impose a purely indet·erminate sentence.. It ,allows the cou.rc to impose 
a minimum term consistent With .the sentence enhance111ent sections, if ap-
plicable. It also removes all minimum parole requirements in Section 
20-22:3, ldaho Code. 
I 
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MEETIN.G MINUTES 
PAGE -2-
TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1986 
I 
Rap. Mo.ntgc:nne-ry gave int-roduetocy testimony to the issue .of this pr~
-
posed bill., He also sa.id t;he judges are. ,vc;it;}' mµch in support of this 
legblat:J;On. 
Rep. Soren.s.en. asksd. R•P· Morttgo•ry · vh&t :llll.pa·ct t<h:l.:s would havl\\ on th
e 
capacity Of th'e pe11iterttia:-r)', 11.ep. Montgq111ery re$ponde.d .bf saying that 
tbis would actually be a better planning tOQl than what lire have now. 
Rep. Stol<.er. sa'id he had prob1e~ "11th Page 2. 1:tnes 24 through 28 .. 
Furthei:; dis.cus!!ltoJI from Reps. MoJ1t&Q111ery,, !Jetndon, Fry, Sengson and 
Sorell$en, 
MOTION Moved PY Rep •. Sorensen and seconded. by .Rep, Speck to. send H 524 to 
the. 
floor with a "Do Pass0 rei:.o~nilation, 
-
Discus.sion .on the motion by Rep. St;!!'k.er who ssid he thinks we shou14
· 
s1?nd tt,e bill to General .Orders but <lid .. not llll>tion t!I di~t effect. 
Fu,rth1?r 
from Xteps. Soten111en. lierndon, Montgomery and. F!lrrey. ~iion pasS:ed 
with 
no .o~jections to send H 524 to the flo!lr with a "Do. Passi' reco111111enclation. 
Rep .• Ho.nt,gomery will sponsor. 
H. Sl5 tM,s bill amenrJs the erthartc~nt st!',tuteiil ln the 1441'!0 Code, se:i:.ti!lns 
19-2~20, 19-25101\., l9-2520B and 19-2S.20t t!I al.low th11 c!l.urt to impose
 
an. extended sentence instead of the pretenl; sentenc.e en~ncemen.ts, 
By 
unifying the matn sentence anjl dill' ,a.~ntenc;e, ektension. the eo-ission 
of PardP1'S .and Parole is no ~onget 'face'd wit!\ having to c:!lmmute .a se
ntence 
enhanceml!.nt before, they ,c11n put s!lmeorie. <on pa,r<>le. 
R_ep. Sorensen addressed the issue of H 535. 
MOTtON Moved by Rep. Stok:11r llnd 11ecorided by Rep. Speck to send H 53:S
 to the flo!!r 
with a "D!! Pas•" rii,;;!limnencletion • 
. Motl.on passed with no objectl!!ns, Rep. Sorensen w,:Lll sp!!nSo'r. 
H 547 This amends the enhance_.ent stat11tes in the Idaho Code, Secti!
lns 19-2520, 
19..;zs20A, L9-2:SWB and f9-2520C to requin the enhamcement term breat.ed
 
by thl!se sections be served 8n.d c!!mpleted ·before the maiJI. ullderly.ing
 sen-
tence can commence, The .ame:ndmen~s also tequi-.:e th• enha111cemen.~ sentence 
·run consecut.:i,vely t!I ant otbe11 ~titence:. 
MOTION Movecl by Rep, Bengson 'and secondeiJ by Rel). Lovel'1,tld to hold 'B 547 i.n C01
11-
mittee indef·in:lte;ly, 
Motion pused i,,gh no !lbjett11ms, 
.li 494 This bill would alt:e;r the current me-thod !If avariiing good tim
e in pris!ln 
fad.littes·. This b'l.ll wouid caua.e the award !If JO!!d time t!I be basec
l. on 
a merltor1,ous proces.s rather than be given ",initomatically'' when arti.
,,tng 
at th• PTlS!!n. 
Rep, .Spe.ek ;µitroducen tlr.l.s bill, He uid he prefers ff 494 because S 124.
l 
is. t\!lt i&Uch dl:f.ferent than what we have today. 
!10TION Moved by Rep. Herndon 11nd second11d by Rep, i'ort'ey to ,;.end R 494 to th,e 
fl!l!!r with a ''Do Pass'' rec!lmmendation. 
Rep .•. Sengaon had a question on the holdilfg capacity of the prison, 
Chairman 
Harris asked Al Murphy to eomment on Rep. Bl!.11,gsori's quelitton. 
Rei;, Fi'y had obje<:eiol'IS to s.ending this bill to the fl!!Oi' until we have 
a funding mechanism in place. 
Chairman Harris .C.oliil!lented on this issu• by saying that i,,e shoulcl hav
e the 
leg.ts·Lation in the. hands of the Senate, He also .sttid the Governor d
oes 
not yet supp.art the Head Tax Bill. Action in the House Re.venue and Tax
ation 
Commi.ttee on H 584 is bei11g de£e.rr.ed while ,ore negotiate because th11 C
hief 
Ei<ecuc:l.ve .does support additi!!nal maKimum secudt:Y• 
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Rep. McDera1ott said she supports the House bill as opposed to the Senate 
bill (S 1241) but that she has problems with the funding. 
Further.discussion from Reps. Loveland, S0rens1tri, MontgoPlery. Fry. Speck, 
Bengson, Herndon; Hay and Bayer 
Motion passed by ma,jority to send ll 494 to the £lo.or with a "Do Pas11" 
recommendation, Rep11, Fcy and McDecmott will be recorded as voting "No". 
Re.p. Speck Will sponsor. 
S 1241 Move.d by Rep. Stoker and seconded by Rep. Speck co hold S 124.l in Committee. 
Motion passed. 
No fµr.ther businus being before Commi.ttee, Cliairman Harris adjourned the 
:meeting at 3:00 P,M. 
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. HOUSE JUDICIARY, RVLES AND ADMINISTUl'ION COMMl?rSE 
MiET.lNG~S 
FltIDA'I;~ .JANUAkY .'.!-.,W~ 
Guest .Spea·kers: 
Juclge E:dward Loclge. - 'l'.hfrd .Judicial District Court 
Ktt Furl!}' - l!,dministTattve Office- of thil· Coui:.ts 
Barbara J. IH.lle.r - Idaho State. Bar 
--- -------------
Pat Barr.•U - D11i,t, of H & W, Support Enforc11ment llµreau 
-Bonnie l(inghorn - Inter ... , Rqus.e DP.aiocrat:s 
Ra)' .St.ark. - Legisl.aUve B11,!iget Office 
Thi! ~eting• was called to orde.r at 1:50 I>.M. l)y Cltair.Jl!!ln llarria. Reps. 
1.ovel,i,.ncl., B,i,.yer ·and speck were excused a:nd all o.tber Co!lllllittee 11!11.mbers 
wen in at t.endmu;e. 
Chairman Hards ·arinounc~ th,l!t (;911111d.ttee would ·fir.st addren RS .. 12220 C2 
a$ Jud~e Lodge b here 1md wishes to. teatUy in favor of the legfalat':1.ori, 
RS. 122201:'2 itit Furey. i.ritrodui::e<I Judge ·Llidge t;O the Co.mmittee iifter spt,1.aktng bridly 
,t, a-l!!Jut. RS 12220 C2., 
MOTION 
Ju4.ge Loqe l\lai!l, in I\I0111e ~-tances~ such. as in O!oiyhl!e Co_unty,_ thei;e ~ DI> 
plac·e to seqtu1si:er a jury and it is necessary for the jur1>rs to b.e taken 
by bus to . Nalnpa. _ lie hdo that; .judJ~S ;sl1oul.d b• ,g~ven the opportunity 
to let t)'le Juron go h0me as they think ls appropriate one case,-by-case 
bads, Jie also ind-teated be doail noi: feel :tb_e de«:iaiQn should b.e one by 
sd.p.µJ,ation of counul, but rather the resp,ons:tbility qf the Court. 
Moiled by Rep. Montgomei:s:y tq ret1.1rn RS l.2220 C2 to sponsox and have the 
CODllllit•tee re-con11ider RS U2l0 Cl. 
Rep. McDe.niott: spoke against tht c111otion- and said COIIIIJlittee should go ahead 
aJUI introdu.ce. RS 12220 C2 and get 1-t on the road. 
Furtl\er discµssion on. the is.sue £ro111 l!.4!ps. MontgOlllery and Fry, 
S.iJSS'.l'lTUtE Moved_ by Rep. Fty to int:rod:u¢e lS 1~22() C2 -for printing td,th die change 
liOTION to strike, beginning with U.ne 12, "end upon stipulation", line 13 in its 
enr.irety and line 14. through "iu the ptesence of the juey0. 
Furthe-r eommenu. from R;eps •. Sorensen,. lic!)eraiott, S,to.ker, Fi;y and For:tey. 
R!!P• :Sorensen urged Commtttee' s defeat of d,e slibsc;ir.u-te 111Qtion. 
Rep. Fry s;iid he would amend. his. sul>$titutejl!Ql;ion to •lso include the 
s.ubstitu.tion <>f the word "felony" for "offense" in line lL 
Division callad on the substitµte 111Qtion, Si~ in favor, five opposed. 
!-!or.tpn carried c·o introduce RS i222'0 CZ for printin·g wfth ohanges· as 
rec;~nded, 
as l:2;!~,CJ ~ep. MQnt;gomery spoke to the issue of ·Rs. 1-2299 Cl, 
,. 
Reps. Stokei;, ~~Dermott, an.d Sorensen asked general. qu1J.st:.;l.ons of Rep, 
Hpntgoil)ery. Rep. $Qren11en sr..ated t:bia ltS· would ti:tov:Lde more truth in 
sentencing and .;would. also be a bett!!r tool for pr1sou officials in .deter-
mining prison grow'th. 
MQTION t-ioved by Rep, &engson and se'conde'd by Rep, Fry to innoduce RS 12299 C3 
for priiJ.ting. 
Furt~r c;o111111.entlil by Jle•ps. Bengson,. Hei;ttdon, Fry, Stoker, Montgo111ery atid Forrey. 
Motion passe:d uJul.n:i1110ue1y eo intr.oduce RS 122,99 CJ for printing. 
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Rep. Montgomery suggested, at this time, that we have an informal 
meeting for those Collllllittee members who have not been directly in-
volved with the sentencing r.eform proposals by the InteriDI Sentencing 
Committee to help them better understand the proposals. 
Rep. Herndon suggested having Cad Bianchi come before the Committee 
to make a presentation such as the one he made before the Interim 
Sentencing Committee. 
Chairman Harris said this was a good idea and we would lean toward an 
early morning ~eeting snme time within the next ten days. 
Chairman Harris indicated that RS 12355 had been withdrawn as the 
issues it addressed had been taken care of through other channels. 
At this point, Chairman Harris turned the chair over tn Rep. Montgomery. 
Rep. Bengson spoke about what this RS would acco01plish. Chairman Harris 
also said the Child Support Enforcement Commission held hearings this 
past year and the disputes were not so much over support payments as they 
were over visitati.on rights. 
Rep. McDermott had a concern in that under this proposed legislation, 
a visitation plan would be required in every divorce action involving 
minor children while not all cases require that necessity. 
Moved by Rep. Stoker and seconded by Rep. McDermott chat, with the 
addition of "at:- the request:- of the Court" in place of, "provided, however, 
that" on line 4, Page 2, that RS 123S6 be introduced for printing. 
Rep. Stoker further discussed his reasons for the change. 
Motion passed with no objections to introduce RS 12356 for printing with 
changes as proposed. 
Rep. Stoker addressed Committee on the issue of this RS. 
There were further cornmeTits and questions from Reps. Bengson, Fry and Herndon, 
Moved by Rep. McDermott and seconded by Chairman Harris to introduce 
RS 12389 for printing. Motion passed with no objections. 
Rep. Stoker gave introductory testimony on the issue of RS 12390. 
Rep. McDermott commented and said this was unnecessary legislation. 
Moved by Rep, Herndon and seconded by Rep. Bengson to return RS 12390 
to sponsor. 
Moved by Rep. Farrey and seconded by Chairman Harris to introduce RS 12390 
for printing. 
Further Committee discussion by Rep, Herndon, Chaitlllan Harri& and Rep. Fry, 
A di.Vision was called on the substitute motion by ,ep, Montgomery. Motion 
fdled to carry. 
Motion carried on the original 111otion to return RS 12390 to sponsor. 
Rep, Stoker stated this RS would effectively be a substitute for RS 12390. 
Moved by Rep. Stoker and second.td by Chairman Harris to introduce )I.S 12391 
for printing, 
Motion possed unanimously. 
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January 8, 1986 
TO: SENATOR FAIRCHILD AND REPRESENTATIVE HARRIS 
FROM: LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL STAFF - HODGE 
SUBJECTS PROPOSED COMMITTEE ASSIGNMENT OF LEGISLATION 
This memo contains suggested committee assignments for legislation proposed 
by the Legislative Council Interim Study Committee on Criminal Sentencing or by 
the Co-Chairmen. Criteria used for assignment is as follows: proposed legis-
lation involving pardons and parole was assigned to the Senate and proposed 
legislation involving sentencing and miscellaneous code changes was assigned to 
the House. 
SUGGESTED ASSIGNMENT: 
SENATE 
RS11688C3 
RS11722C2 
RS11976 
RS12022Cl 
RS12023 
RS12072 
RS12073 
RS12074 
HOUSE 
RS11743 
RS11750Cl 
RS11760 
RS11883Cl 
RS11987Cl 
RS11988 
RS12056 
RS12057 
RS12058 
Commission of Pardons and Parole appointed by Governor. 
Good time revision. 
Joint Resolution repealing Section 7, Article 4. 
Creates permanent Commission on Pardons and Parole. 
Creates one third parole formula. 
Joint Resolution "as provided by law", Section 7, Article 4. 
Joint Resolution removes "commutation", Section 7, Article4. 
Creates one third-two thirds formula. 
Changes perjury law. 
Creates mixed sentence - combines all sentence alternatives. 
Creates mixed sentence - adds one new section. 
Continuing resolution for criminal sentencing. 
Enhancement amendments - "prior to". 
Enhancement amendments - "extended sentences". 
Creates general fine provision. 
Creates new fixed term for murder. 
Removes inconsistancy in statutes regarding probation. 
Coordination between tbe Bouse and Senate may be required on some of the 
ATTACHMENT 5 
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above ass because of incompatibility. For example, without amendment, the 
parole formula RSs in the Senate are probably incompatible with the mixed sen-
tence proposals in the House. 
In addition, several RSs within each package are mutually exclusive. In the 
Senate the 3 proposed joint resolutions (RS11976, 12072 and 12073) are mutually 
exclusive as are the proposed parole formula RSs (RS12023 and 12074), and 
RS11688C3 making the Commission of Pardons and Parole gubernatorial appointees 
and RS12022Cl creating a permanent coDDDission. In the House packet, the mixed 
sentence proposals (RS11750Cl and 11760) are mutually exclusive as are the pro-
posed changes to the enhancement sections (RS11987Cl and 11988). 
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-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE OP IDAHO 
Porty-eighth Legislature Second Regular Session - 1986 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
IN THE _________ _ 
_____ BILL NO. ____ _ 
BY 
--------------
1 AH ACT 
2 RELATING TO PUNISHMENT POI MURDER; AMENDING SECTION 18-4004, IDAHO CODE, TO 
3 PROVIDE THAT A COURT MAY IMPOSE A PIXED TERM SEHTEHCE OP NOT LESS THAN 
4 TWENTY YEARS FOR FIRST DEGREE MURDER. 
5 Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Idaho: 
6 SECTION 1. That Section 18-4004, Idaho Code, be, and the same is hereby 
7 amended to read as follows: 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
18-4004. PUNISHMENT POR MURDER. Subject to the provisions of 19-2515, 
Idaho Code, every person guilty of murder of the first degree shall be pun-
ished by death or by imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for a fixed term 
of not less than twenty (20) years. Every person guilty of murder of the 
second degree is punishable by imprisonment not less than ten (10) years and 
the imprisonment may extend to life. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: DAVIS F. VANDERVELDE DATE: AUGUST 08, 2017 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) COURT MINUTES 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO: CR-2014-26736-C 
) 
vs. ) TIME: 10:00 A.M. 
) 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, ) REPORTED BY: Christine Rhodes 
) 
Defendant. ) 2C-CRT 130 (1005-1027) 
) 
This having been the time heretofore set for Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 
Sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35 in the above entitled matter, the State was 
represented by Mr. Christopher Boyd, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney for Canyon County. 
The defendant was present in court with counsel, Mr. Kenneth Stringfield. 
The Court noted the motion set to be heard this date. 
Mr. Stringfield presented argument in support of the motion. 
The Court inquired of Mr. Stringfield. 
The Court noted there were two (2) additional claims contained in the motion. 
The Court further noted the State offered to stipulate to amend the Kidnapping 
charge to a fixed term only, and remove the indeterminate portion; therefore it would no 
longer be an illegal sentence. 
COURT MINUTES 
AUGUST 08, 2017 Page 1 
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Mr. Stringfield stated the defendant would prefer to be re-sentenced on the 
charge. 
Mr. Boyd presented argument in opposition of the motion. 
The Court cited case law for the record. 
Mr. Boyd requested additional time to review the case law cited by the Court. 
Mr. Stringfield stated the defendant would stipulate to keeping the fixed portion 
on the Kidnapping charge, and removing the indeterminate portion. 
Mr. Boyd indicated the State would stipulate to the same, provided the Court 
found the sentence on the charge of Murder in the First Degree, would remain as 
previously ordered. 
Mr. Boyd additionally stated if the Court granted the defense's motion to amend 
the fixed portion on the charge of Murder in the First Degree, to ten (10) years fixed, 
then the defendant should be completely re-sentenced. 
Mr. Stringfield made additional statements for the record. 
The Court took the matter under advisement and stated a written decision 
would be forthcoming. 
The defendant was remanded back to the custody of the Idaho Department of 
Correction. 
COURT MINUTES 
AUGUST 08, 2017 Page2 
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CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
s MEHIEL, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff, ) CASE NO. CR 2014-26736*C 
) 
vs- ) 
) ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
) FOR RECONSIDERATION PURSUANT 
RAUL E. HERRERA, ) TOICR35 
) 
Defendant. ) 
This matter came on for hearing on August 9, 2017, on the Defendant's motion for relief 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. Mr. Kenneth Stringfield appeared on behalf of the 
defendant; Mr. Christopher Boyd appeared on behalf of the State of Idaho. 
Procedural History 
On July 21, 2015, a jury found the defendant guilty of First Degree Murder with malice 
aforethought as well as Felony Murder with respect to Robbery, Burglary, and Second Degree 
Kidnapping. The jury also found the defendant guilty of Robbery, Burglary, Second Degree 
Kidnapping, and Aggravated Battery. 
The Court subsequently entered judgment and sentenced the defendant as follows: for 
the crime of First Degree Murder, to indeterminate life, with 35 years fixed; for the crime of 
Robbery, to indeterminate life, with 30 years fixed; for the crime of Burglary, to 10 years fixed; 
ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PURSUANT TO ICR 
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for the crime of Second Degree Kidnapping, to indeterminate life, with 20 years fixed; and for 
the crime of Aggravated Battery, to 15 years fixed. The defendant filed a motion for leniency 
pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35. That motion was denied. On appeal, the Idaho Court of 
Appeals affirmed the sentences, noting that while there was potentially an issue with the 
sentence on the Second Degree Kidnapping conviction; the issue may not be raised on appeal 
without the district court having first had an opportunity to consider the legality of the sentence 
imposed. See State v. Herrera, Idaho Court of Appeals Unpublished Opinion, Docket No. 43975 
(January 17, 2017). 
On February 23, 2017, the Defendant filed a pro se motion for relief pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) and a memorandum in support thereof. He argues that his sentence is 
illegal on the grounds that (1) the sentences imposed violates double jeopardy; (2) the sentence 
for Second Degree Kidnapping exceeds the statutory maximum; and (3) that the fixed portion of 
the sentence imposed for First Degree Murder is illegal. Counsel was subsequently appointed 
and on May 30, 2017, filed a memorandum in support of the Rule 35 motion. Counsel's motion 
provided that Defendant's pro se claims (1) and (3) were without merit, but that claim (2) is 
illegal. Specifically, LC. §18-4504 provides that the maximum period of incarceration for 
Second Degree Kidnapping is twenty-five years. Therefore, because the Court imposed twenty 
years fixed for Second Degree Kidnapping, it could legally impose no more than five years of 
indeterminate time. 
The State filed an objection on the ground that the motion has no basis in law or fact, 
with the exception of the indeterminate portion of the sentence imposed for Second Degree 
Kidnapping. The State also asserts that there is no need for a new sentencing hearing if the 
indeterminate portion of the sentence for the crime of Kidnapping is simply eliminated. The 
State stipulated to such in a Notice of Non-Filing filed June 6, 2017 and requested no further 
hearings. 
On July 21, 2017, the defendant filed a supplemental memorandum in support of his 
motion. Therein defense counsel argues that his assertion in his prior brief that the argument that 
the fixed portion of the sentence imposed for First Degree Murder was illegal was without merit 
is in error. The supplemental brief presents argument in support of the position that the fixed 
portion imposed for the crime of Murder is, in fact, illegal. The State did not file a response. The 
parties appeared through counsel and presented oral argument on August 8, 2017. During the 
hearing the parties agreed that in the event the Court ruled against the defendant on the issue of 
the legality of fixed portion of the Murder charge, the Court could resentence the Defendant to 
twenty years fixed, with no indeterminate time, for the Kidnapping. After considering the 
presentations of both parties, the Court grants the motion in part and denies the motion in part. 
Standard 
In his motion, Mr. Herrera asserts that his sentences are illegal. The term "illegal 
sentence" under Rule 35 is narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the face of the 
record, i.e., does not involve significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary hearing. Id at 
ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PURSUANT TO ICR 
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86, 1147 (2009). As the allegations here involve questions that can be resolved from the face of 
the record, they are properly before the Court. 
Analysis 
The Defendant first asserts that he was punished twice for the same offense because the 
indictment charges him with both First Degree Murder and felony Murder in the alternative and 
because the jury found him guilty of both First Degree Murder and felony Murder. 
Double jeopardy provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb." US. Const. Amend V. In this case, the defendant was charged with, 
and found guilty of both First Degree Murder with malice aforethought and felony Murder. 
These are not two different crimes, but rather alternative means of committing one crime: First 
Degree Murder. See I.C. §18-4003(a) and (d). The Judgment accurately reflects that he was 
convicted of and sentenced on only one count of Murder in the First Degree. Because the 
Defendant was convicted of, and sentenced on, only one count of Murder arising out of the facts 
of this case, the double jeopardy clause of the Constitution is not implicated. Rule 35 relief is 
therefore denied on this ground. 
Defendant next claims that that the thirty-five year fixed portion of his sentence for First 
Degree Murder is illegal because the maximum fixed portion allowable under the statute is ten 
years. This issue is squarely addressed in State v. Griffith, 157 Idaho 409,409,336 P.3d 816, 816 
(Ct App. 2014). In that case, Griffith was sentenced to a unified life term of incarceration with 
twenty-two years fixed. Griffith filed a Rule 35 motion, arguing that the twenty-two-year fixed 
term of his sentence was illegal because LC. §§18-4004 and 19-2513 require that the sentencing 
court impose a ten-year fixed term. In response, the Court stated: 
[Section] 18-4004 sets the outer limits of a permissible sentence for First 
Degree Murder, Section 18-107 gave the court authority to impose a sentence 
anywhere within those limits, and Section 19-2513 conferred discretion to 
determine what portion of the sentence in excess of the mandatory ten-year fixed 
term would be determinate. Consistent with that discretion, the district court may 
impose any fixed term of ten years or more, up to and including a fixed life 
sentence for First Degree Murder. 
Griffith argues that Idaho Code § 19-2513 limits the discretion of the 
sentencing court when a crime carries a mandatory fixed term. He relies upon the 
portion of I.C. § 19-2513 that states: "If the offense carries a mandatory 
minimum penalty as provided by statute, the court shall specify a minimum 
period of confinement consistent with such statute." Griffith argues that we 
should interpret this language to mean that the court may impose any 
indeterminate sentence otherwise authorized, but the fixed portion of the sentence 
may not exceed the minimum sentence stated in Section 18-4004. Because LC. § 
18-4004 authorizes "a minimum period of confinement of not less than ten (10) 
years," Griffith contends that his fixed term may not be more than ten years. 
ORDER RE: DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION PURSUANT TO ICR 
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Griffith's argument distorts the meaning of the statute. In substance, he contends 
that the ten-year minimum fixed sentence authorized by the statute is instead a 
ten-year maximum fixed term. The statute actually authorizes for First 
Degree Murder a unified sentence of life with a fixed term of any duration 
between ten years and life. Section 19-2513 authorizes the court, in its discretion, 
to distribute that sentence between a determinate (fixed) term and an 
indeterminate term within those parameters. Therefore, Griffith's sentence for 
First Degree Murder is consistent with I.C. § 18--4004, as required by LC. § 19-
2513. 
Id. at 410, 817. 
Defendant makes the identical argument in the case at hand. In support of his position, he 
cites to Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 262 P.3d 255 (2011), which he asserts holds that ''the 
penalty for First Degree, non-capital Murder is, 'an indeterminate life sentence with afzxed term 
of ten years."' Defendant's Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Rule 35 Motion to Correct 
Sentence, p. 3. (emphasis in brief.) Contrary to Defendant's argument, however, the Booth court, 
in addressing the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel in a post-conviction action, held that 
the district court did not err in finding counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness when he advised Booth that if he went to trial and was convicted of First Degree 
Murder, he would have been subjected to a mandatory life sentence. Booth v. State, supra. The 
Court went on to explain in dicta that the clear and unambiguous language of LC. § 18-4004 
provides that for a non-death penalty First Degree Murder conviction, the court is required to 
impose an indeterminate life sentence with at least ten years fixed. Id. at 619, 262 (emphasis 
added). This is consistent with the holding in Griffith, supra, and is contrary to Defendant's 
position. The mandatory ten year fixed sentence required by . C. § 18-4004 is the minimum 
possible sentence, not a required fixed term. The Court was therefore entitled, in its discretion, to 
impose any sentence between ten years and life. As it did so, the sentence is not illegal and relief 
is therefore denied on this ground. 
Finally, the Defendant asserts that his sentence for Second Degree Kidnapping is in 
excess of the statutory maximum. Idaho Code § 18-4504 provides that the maximum period of 
incarceration for Second Degree Kidnapping is twenty-five years. Here, Mr. Herrera was 
sentenced to indeterminate life with a determinate period of twenty years. The sentence of 
indeterminate life is in excess of the penalty provided by law, it is an illegal sentence and Mr. 
Herrera is entitled to relief. The parties have stipulated to eliminate the indeterminate portion of 
Defendant's sentence under the circumstances of the above rulings without further hearing. 
While the stipulation to the remedy is appropriate, a hearing is required to achieve such a 
resolution because where the sentence imposed for Second Degree Kidnapping is illegal, the 
judgment entered is void as to that crime. As such, Mr. Herrera must be resentenced pursuant to 
the stipulation and must be present for that resentencing. State v. Money, 109 Idaho 757, 710 
P.2d 667 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Edghill, 155 Idaho 846,317 P.3d 743 (Ct. App. 2014). As Mr. 
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Herrera must be present for that resentencing, a hearing is required; See also I.C. §19-2503; See 
also I.C.R. 43(a). A hearing for resentencing pursuant to stipulation will therefore be set by the 
Court as soon as practicable. 
DATED: t-I '-1-11 
~F. VanderVelde 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a copy of the foregoing Order was mailed and/or hand 
delivered to the following persons this lla. day of August, 2017. 
Kenneth F. Stringfield 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
PO Box 777 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
Bryan F. Taylor 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
1115 Albany St 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Idaho Department of Correction 
CENTRAL RECORD 
1299 N. Orchard St., Ste. 110 
Boise, ID 83 706 
Chris Yamamoto, Clerk 
By Deputy Clerk of the Court 
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- F I ··l')t:n 4~,~M. 
AU& 1 6 2017 
CANYON COUNTY CLIAI< 
S MEHtl!L, OIPUTV 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
ST ATE OF IDAHO, 
-vs-
RAUL E. HERRERA, 
Plaintiff, 
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
CASE NO. CR 2014-26736*C 
ORDER SETTING CASE FOR 
SENTENCING AND ORDER TO 
TRANSPORT DEFENDANT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above entitled matter is scheduled for 
sentencing hearing on September 18, 2017 at 11:00 A.M. before the Honorable Davis F. 
VanderVelde, District Judge, at the Canyon County Courthouse, Caldwell, Idaho. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Warden at Idaho State Correctional Institution, 
Boise, Idaho release said Defendant, Raul E. Herrera, IDOC No. 116611, to the custody of 
the Sheriff of Canyon County, Caldwell, Idaho on or before September 18, 2017, µending a 
sentencing hearing to be held on that date. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon completion of said hearing the Sheriff of 
ORDER SETTING CASE FOR SENTENCING AND 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT DEFENDANT 
ORIGINAL 
Page 1 
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Canyon County return the Defendant, Raul E. Herrera, to the custody of the Warden at 
Idaho State Correctional Institution. 
DATED: <?- Jf--17 
Davis F. VanderVelde 
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order was 
forwarded by me to the following this l(o day of August, 2017. 
Kenneth F. Stringfield 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
POBox777 
Caldwell, ID 83606 
Bryan F. Taylor 
CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE 
1115 Albany St 
Caldwell, ID 83605 
Idaho Department of Correction 
CENTRAL RECORD 
1299 N. Orchard St., Ste. 110 
Boise, ID 83 706 
Canyon County Sheriff's Office 
Transports 
ORDER SETTING CASE FOR SENTENCING AND 
ORDER TO TRANSPORT DEFENDANT 
Chris Yamamoto, Clerk 
~ 
by Deputy Clerk of the Court 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
PRESIDING: DAVIS F. VANDERVELDE DATE: SEPTEMBER 18, 2017 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) COURT MINUTES 
Plaintiff, ) 
) CASE NO. CR-2014-26736-C 
vs ) 
) TIME: 11 :00 AM. 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, ) 
) REPORTED BY: Christine Rhodes 
Defendant. ) 
) 2C-CRT 130 (1055-1104) 
This having been the time heretofore set for re-sentencing on Count IV in the 
above entitled matter, the State was represented by Mr. Gearld Wolff, Deputy Prosecuting 
Attorney for Canyon County, and the defendant was present in court with counsel, Mr. 
Kenneth Stringfield. 
The Court informed the defendant that the felony offense of Kidnapping in the 
Second Degree, carried a maximum possible penalty of twenty-five (25) years imprisonment 
and/or a fine in the amount of $50,000.00; as well as submission of a DNA sample and right 
thumbprint impression. It carried a minimum penalty of one (1') year incarceration. 
The Court noted the parties stipulated to an amended sentence of twenty (20) years 
fixed. 
Mr. Wolff made comments for the record and concurred with the stipulation. 
COURT MINUTES 
SEPTEM8ER 18, 2017 Page 1 
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The Court determined all parties had received I reviewed a copy of the Presentence 
Investigation Report, and attached evaluation. There were no factual corrections to be 
made. 
In answer to the Court's inquiry, neither counser had testimony/ evidence to present 
in aggravation or mitigation. 
Mr. Wolff made statements regarding the defendant and recommended the Court 
impose twenty (20) years fixed. 
Mr. Stringfield made statements on behalf· of the defendant and recommended the 
Court impose a sentence of twenty (20) years fixed. 
The defendant made a statement to the Court on his own behalf. 
The Court reviewed sentencing criteria for the record and expressed opinions. 
There being no legal cause why judgment should not be pronounced, the Court 
found the defendant guilty of the offense of Kidnapping. in the Second Degree, upon his 
plea of guilty and sentenced him as reflected in the Amended Judgment and Commitment. 
The Court advised the defendant of his post judgment rights. 
The defendant was remanded to the custody of the Canyon County Sheriff pending 
transport to the Idaho Department of Correction. 
COURT MINUTES 
SEPTEMBER 18, 2017 Page 2 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
STATE OF IDAHO 
COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, or 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
nal,j I fd~ar ~ 
Defendant. 
FILED ot1 i- t 7 AT 11 ·.o<oa1.M. 
CLEB.K~THE DISTRICT COURT 
BY L/lLLVLtl .Q .J V , Deputy 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
case No. CF: OOl 4- aul&G 
COMMITMENT 
To~= 
-----------------) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named Defendant, having been found guilty as charged, be 
committed to the custody of the Sheriff of Canyon County, Idaho and that this Order of Commitment shall 
serve as authority for continued custody. 
IT rs FURTHER ORDERED that the above-named Defendant shall serve: 
D ________ day{s). o _______ month{s). o ______ year(s). 
D ys previously Ordered on the Judgment dated 
$ credit for _______ day(s) served . 
.-e("determinate ao . ~detenninate_~..-.---- D retainedjurisdiction. 
a work search/work-outprivilegesgrantedfrom ________________ to 
o upon written verification. a as authorized by th~ Sheriff of Canyon County. 
D Sheriffs Work Detail: ____ days in lieu of ____ days jail to be completed by __ _ 
-------------------------------·· If the 
Defendant fails to report to the jail as ordered or at a time agreed upon with the jail, or fails to satisfactorily 
perform the Defendant's obligations with the Sheriff Inmate Labor Detail, then the Sheriff is ordered and 
directed to place the Defendant in custody to serve the Defendant's jail time that has not been suspended. 
/ OOer. l"oocwwnt wt a~ al:hw ~ Cl/MU'.tl:I~ ltJ }Xis\J.ru-
. . 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the above-named Defendant shall report to the Canyon County 
Sheriff on or before j mlnW ( Oto ( kp 
Dated: ___ O__.°}:_.l ___ <:J-__ l___ 1,____ _ 
a Jail a Defendant 
COMMITMENT * 3/02 
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OCT O 5 2017 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
S FENNELL, DEPUTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, 
AKA: 
EDGAR CANTU, 
SSN: 
0.0.8:
Defendant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
AMENDED 
JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
CASE# CR-2014-26736-C 
On this 18th day of September 2017, personally appeared Gearld Wolff, Deputy 
Prosecuting Attorney for the County of Canyon, State of Idaho, the defendant Raul 
Edgar Herrera, and the defendant's attorney Kenneth Stringfield, this being the time 
heretofore fixed for pronouncing judgment. This Amended Judgment reflects a change 
only to count IV, correcting what was previously an illegal sentence. All other terms and 
conditions remain the same and effective as of the original judgment. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant has been convicted upon finding of guilty 
by a jury to the offense of Murder in the First Degree, a felony, as charged in Count I 
of the Superseding Indictment, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-4001, 18-4002, 18-4003(a), and 
18-204. The defendant has been convicted upon finding of guilty by a jury to the 
offense of Robbery, a felony, as charged in Count II of the Superseding Indictment, in 
violation of I.C. §§ 18-6501, 18-6502, 18-6503, and 18-204. The defendant has been 
convicted upon finding of guilty by a jury to the offense of Burglary, a felony, as 
charged in Count Ill of the Superseding Indictment, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-1401 and 
18-204. The defendant has been convicted upon finding of guilty by a jury to the 
offense of Kidnapping Second Degree, a felony, as charged in Count IV of the 
Superseding Indictment, in violation of I.C. §§ 18-4501, 18-4503, and 18-204. The 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 
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defendant has been convicted upon finding of guilty by a jury to the offense of 
Aggravated Battery, a felony, as charged in Count V of the Superseding Indictment, in 
violation of I.C. §§ 18-903(a), 18-907(a), and 18-204; all having being committed on or 
about the 8th day of November 2014; and the Court having asked the defendant whether 
there was any legal cause to show why judgment should not be pronounced, and no 
sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be sentenced on count I to the custody of 
the Idaho State Board of Correction for a minimum period of confinement of thirty-five 
(35) years, followed by a subsequent indetenninate period of confinement not to exceed 
life, for a total unified tenn of life. The defendant be sentenced on count II to the 
custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction for a minimum period of confinement of 
thirty (30) years, followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of confinement not to 
exceed life, for a total unified term of life. The defendant be sentenced on count Ill to 
the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction for a minimum period of confinement 
of ten (10) years, followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of confinement not to. 
exceed zero (0) years, for a total unified term of ten (10) years. The defendant be 
sentenced on count IV to the custody of the Idaho State Board of Correction for a 
minimum period of confinement of twenty (20) years, followed by a subsequent 
indeterminate period of confinement not to exceed zero (0) years, for a total unified tenn 
of twenty (20) years. The defendant be sentenced on count V to the custody of the 
Idaho State Board of Correction for a minimum period of confinement of fifteen (15) 
years, followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of confinement not to exceed 
zero (0) years, for a total unified term of fifteen (15) years. These sentences shall run 
concurrently with each other. 
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant be given credit for four hundred six (406) 
days of incarceration (as of the 13th day of January 2016) prior to the entry of judgment 
for this offense ( or included offense) pursuant to I.C. § 18-309. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant pay court costs and fees in the 
total amount of $245.50 (each count),a fine in the amount of $5,000.00 (each count) 
and restitution in the amount of $3689. 75, pursuant to the Restitution Order. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED defendant pay a $5,000.00 civil fine (on count I) 
which shall operate as a civil judgment against the defendant and in favor of each 
victim, pursuant to I.C. §19-5307. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 2 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall have a permanent no 
contact order with the victim, Ronald Ghostwolf. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant shall submit a DNA sample and 
right thumbprint impression to the Idaho State Police or its agent, pursuant to I.C. § 19-
5506. Such sample must be provided within 10 calendar days of this order; failure to 
provide said sample within the 10 day period is a felony offense. 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant be committed to the custody of the Sheriff 
of Canyon County, Idaho, for delivery forthwith to the Director of the Idaho State Board 
of Correction at the Idaho State Penitentiary or other facility within the State designated 
by the State Board of Correction. 
IT IS Fl NALLY ORDERED that the clerk deliver a certified copy of this Judgment 
and Commitment to the Director of the Idaho State Board of Correction or other 
qualified officer and that the copy serve as the commitment of the defendant. 
DATED this 5th day of October 2017. 
~Davis F. VanderVelde 
District Judge 
AMENDED JUDGMENT AND COMMITMENT 3 
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l{enneth F. Stringfield 
··P.O~Boxm 
213 S. 10th Ave. 
Caldwell,Jdaho 83606 
Telephone: (208) 459-6879 
facsimile: (208) 442-7915 
. ISB No.: 3907 
.. ken@kstringfieldlaw.com 
. . 
J\:ttomey for Defendant 
F · l•Jlf r:i .. 
OCT 25 2017 
CANYON COUNTY CLERK 
E SUl.LON, DEPUTY. 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
. STATE OF IDAHO, 
·· · Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
. RAUL E. HERRERA, . 
··· Defendant-Appellant.· 
Case No. CR2014-26736 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
.. 
. .. 
fO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE PAR'lYS 
· ATI'ORNEYS, CANYON COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE; 1115 ALBANY ST., 
CALI>WELL, IDAHO, AND THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT. · ..
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. The above-named appellant, RaulE. Herrera, appeals agauist the above-nam~d 
respondent(s) to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Amended Jud.gmentof Convictio11 
· entered in the above-entitled action on the 5th day of October,·2017~ which refl~cted the 
trial court's denial of the portion of his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion to reduce or 
correct an illegal sentence regarding County 1- Murder 1, Honorable Davis 
VanderVelde, District Judge, presiding. 
2. That the Appellant has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court,and tile 
jµdgment described in paragraph 1 above is anappealable order under Rµle 11(~)·(~~9) 
I.A.R. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- 1 
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3. Appellant wishes to challenge the judgment, includi:ng but notlimited to, the 
denial of his request to modify the sentence for Count I based the state and trial court's 
interyretation of Idaho Code § 18,..4004 regarding the mandatory minimum sentence 
thatcan be imposed for a person convicted of first degree murder. Appellant may clarify 
('.)r•acld additional issues as this appeal progresses. 
4. There has been no order entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. A standard reporter's transcript is requested of the following. 
a. Motion Hearing, April 24, 2017. 
b. Motion Hearing, June 19, 2017. 
c. Motion Hearing, June 30, 2017. 
d. Motion Hearing, August 8, 2017. 
e. Re .. Sentencing Hearing, September 18, 2017. 
6. Appellant requests that the clerk's record include alldocuments norm~y 
Included under Rule 28, I.A.R. that are related to Mr. Herrera's February 23, 2017,· 
Motion for Correction of Sentence. 
7. I certify that: 
a) No transcript fee is due because no have yet been requested. 
b) Appellant is exempt from paying the fee for preparation of the transcript$ 
and the clerk's record as he is indigent and u11a.bleto pay such fee~ 
c) As this is an appeal taken in a criminal case, no appellate filing fee is due 
under Rule 23(a)(8), I.A.R. 
I 
I 
I 
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d) A copy of this Notice of Appeal was served as required by Rule 20, I.AR., 
upon the court reporter, Christine Rhodes, by placing a copy in her box at 
the Canyon County Courthouse, upon the Canyon County Prosecuting 
Attorney by placing such copy in the Prosecutor's basket at the Canyon 
County courthouse and additional copies were sent by mail to the Idaho 
Attorney General and the State Appellate Public Defender. 
DATED: October 25, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and correct copyof the foregoing 
document was served by the following method indicated below to each of the following: 
Canyon County Prosecutor 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany St. 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Lawrence Wasden 
Idaho Attorney General 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, Idaho 83703 
Christine Rhodes, Court Reporter 
· c/o Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany St. 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
DATED: October 25, 2017. 
Hand Delivery to office. 
[ x] U.S. Mail 
[X] U.S.Mail 
Hand Delivery to office. 
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·· Kenneth :F'. Stringfield 
P;O.'Boxm 
213 S. totb Ave. 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606 
Telephone: (208)459-6879 
Facsimile: (208)442-7915 
ISB No.: 3907 
ken@kstringfieldlaw.com 
FI ·,ie,.·•····.·.···.· ... 
•.•. y'-G! '1'\ 9 .. 
OCT 252017 . 
c":~~u····COUNTVON. . ... . . . ¢LEAk.·· . . i 
·. .. . . .QEPUTY 
. 
. 
· .. · 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE nuRD JUDICIAL DISTRICl' OF TJfg 
.· . . . .···. 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE coIJNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RAUL E. HERRERA, 
· Defendant-Appellant. 
.· Case No. CR2014-26736 
MOTIONFORAPPOINTMENl'OF.· .. •.• 
.· STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC 
DEFENDER 
COMES NOW, Raul E. Herrera, by and through his attomeyof record, Kenneth 
F. Stringfield, and hereby moves this Court for its order, pursuant to Idal'lo Code §19-
867et. seq., appointing the State Appellate Public Defender,s Office to represe11tthe 
Appellant in any and all further appellate proceedings aJ1d allowing cul];'entcoui:isel f<>r 
the defendant to withdraw as counsel of record for such purpose. 111is motion is 
brought on the grounds and for the reasons that: 
1. nie Defendant is currently repr~ented by Kenneth F. Stringfield who was 
appointed as a conflict public defenderin proceedings before tll~ district 
court; 
· 2. nie State Appellate Public Defenderis authorized by statuteto represent the 
··defendant in all felony appellate proceedings; ·at1d 
MOTION FORAPPOlNTMENT OF STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFBNDEJt,.. r 
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3. Defendant has expressed a desire to appeal his conviction in this matter. 
DATED: October 25, 2017. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I served - a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing Motion for 
Appointment of State Appellate Public Defender upon the mdividual(s}named bel()wjn 
the manner noted: 
By hand delivering copies of the same to the offi.ce(s) of the attomey(s)indicated below. 
Canyon County Prosecutor 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany St. 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Christine Rhodes, Court_ Reporter 
c/ o Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany St.• __ 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
o By depositing copies of the same in the United States Mail, postage prepaid, first class, 
- Lawrence Wasden 
Idaho Attorney General 
700 W. State Street 
P.O. Box83720 
_ Boise, ID 83720-0010 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703 
MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF STATE 
APPELLATE PUBLlC DEFENDER- :2. 
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Kenneth F. Stringfield 
P~O.Boxm 
213 S. 10th Ave. 
Caldwell, Idaho 83606 
Telephone: (208) 459-6879 
Faesinlile: (208) 442-7915 
ISB No.: 3907 
·ke11@kstringfieldlaw.com 
Attorney for Defendant 
F I L E D 
Signed: 11/112017 02:40 PM 
a.111nm1: 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO 
CLE~K OF THE DfstRICT COURT 
"'·· C ~ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICLU. DISTRJCl'OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOifTHE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
RAUL E. HERRERA, 
· Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. CR2014.;26736 
ORDERTO APPOINTS'l'ATE ·. . .. ·.• 
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER · 
UPON REVIEW of the Defendant's motion and good cause appearing therefore; 
ITlS HEREBY ORDERED and THIS DOESORDER thattbat .. tb.e Idaho State 
·Appellate.Public Defender shall appear as C()unsel ofrecordfor Defendant, ~ul E.Hel1'era;·· 
and is substituted for Kenneth R Stringfield. 
DATED this_ day of October, 2017. 
~~~. 
. . 
Honorable DavisVanderVelde < .... 
Signed: 11/112017 11:03 AM 
ORDER~1· 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
The undersigned does hereby certify that a true and correct copy ofthe fo~going 
document was served by the following method indicated below to each ofthe following; 
Canyon County Prosecutor 
Canyon County Courthouse 
1115 Albany St. 
Caldwell, Idaho 83605 
Lawrence G. Wasden 
Idaho Attorney General 
700 W. Jefferson 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
. Kenneth F .Stringfield 
POBoxm 
.·· Caldwell, Idaho 83606 
State Appellate Public Defender 
3647 Lake Harbor Lane 
Boise, ID 83703 
Slg(led: 11/112017 02:42 PM 
DATED this_ day of October, 2017~ 
[ ] U.S.Mail 
[ 1 Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ .] Attorney's basket in. 
clerk's office · 
~ Email 
[ ~] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile .. 
[ ] Hand Delivery ···. 
[ ] Attorney's basket in 
clerk's office 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ~] Attorney's basket in 
clerk's office 
_,l'j U$.Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ ] Hand Delivery .. [ J Attorney's basketiri · 
clerk's office 
Clerk 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNIY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
-vs-
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, etal., 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. CR-14-26736*C 
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify the following is 
being sent as a confidential exhibits: 
NONE 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this 3rd day of January, 2018. 
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in and for the County of Canyon . 
By:k~ Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
-vs-
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, etal., 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
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Case No. CR-07-14455 *C 
CERTIFICATE OF CLERK 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that the above and 
foregoing Limited Record in the above entitled case was compiled and bound under 
my direction as, and is a true, full correct Supplemental Record of the pleadings and 
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, except no documents were 
included from the previous appeal in Docket No. 43975-2016. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this 3rd day January, 2018. 
CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Canyon. 
By: vr< w~ Deputy 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUN1Y OF CANYON 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff-
Respondent, 
-vs-
RAUL EDGAR HERRERA, etal., 
Defendant-
Appellant. 
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Supreme Court No. 45547-2017 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, CHRIS YAMAMOTO, Clerk of the District Court of the Third Judicial District of 
the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Canyon, do hereby certify that I have 
personally served or had delivered by United State's Mail, postage prepaid, one copy 
of the Clerk's Record and one copy of the Reporter's Transcript to the attorney of 
record to each party as follows: 
Eric D. Fredericksen, State Appellate Public Defender's Office, 
322 East Front Street, Suite 570, Idaho 83702 
Lawrence G. Wasden, Attorney General, Statehouse, Boise, Idaho 83720 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal 
of the said Court at Caldwell, Idaho this 3rd day of January, 2018. 
CHRISY AMAMOTO, Clerk of the District 
Court of the Third Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho 
in and for the County of Canyon. 
By:~~ Deputy 
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To: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
451 West State Street 
Boise, Idaho 83720 
Fax: 334-2616 
Docket No. 45547 
(Res) State of Idaho 
vs. 
(App) Raul E. Herrera 
NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED 
Notice is hereby given that on January 2, 2018, I 
lodged O & 2 transcripts of Motion Hearings dated 
April 24, 2017, June 19, 2017, June 30, 2017, August 8, 
2017 and a Re-Sentencing Hearing dated September 18, 2017 
of approximately 49 pages in length for the 
above-referenced appeal with the District Court Clerk of 
the County of Canyon in the Third Judicial District. 
Christine E. Rhodes 
Court Reporter, CSR No. 991 
Date: January 2,- 2018 
